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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three papers that focus on the interplay of formal
and informal institutional processes in the sharing of water between the Mumbai
Metropolitan region and an agricultural area to its north and east in Thane district. The
first paper focuses on the interests and motivations that influence the everyday practices
of the canal bureaucracy in the Surya project in Dahanu. This paper is largely a critique
of the application of rational choice theory to analyzing bureaucratic corruption in a
literature in development studies that was pioneered by Robert Wade. Using an
ethnographic narrative style, the paper seeks to provide an account of bureaucratic
corruption by focusing on tensions within the local Irrigation Department over bribes
and transfers. The poor maintenance of the canal system by engineers in Dahanu and the
consequent wastage of water are highlighted as providing a rationale and justification
for diversion of water to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The second paper traces the
historical evolution of institutional practices and local water policy in the TansaVaitarna (T-V) water district, a major source of water for Greater Mumbai and others
towns in the Mumbai metropolitan region. It analyzes the failure of collective action in
the water district over local water needs and identifies prior appropriation and the
fragmentation of metropolitan water governance as the two major factors that are
constraints in meeting the water needs of the rural population in the T-V water district.
The third paper focuses on the experiences of farmers with water scarcity and
dispossession from land on a canal system in two villages in Dahanu. The paper uses
survey and interview data from interviews with farmers to understand how water
!ii

scarcity is manufactured on the canal minor system and discourses of efficiency,
abundance and waste are deployed by wealthy commercial farmers and local elites to
deprive small and marginal tribal farmers from water.

Key Words
Water Politics; Urban Geography; Mumbai; Canal Irrigation; Political Ecology;
Institutions; Peri-Urban; Adivasi; Thane District; Dahanu; Vasai-Virar; Konkan;
Maharashtra; India.
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1.

Introduction
There is more than enough water in the world for domestic
resources, for agriculture and for industry. The problem is that
some people – and notably the poor - are systematically excluded
from access by their poverty, by their limited legal rights or by
public policies that limit access to the infrastructures that provide
water for life and for livelihoods.
(UNDP, 2006, p. 2)

1.1

Introduction and Research Aims
The increasing contestation of water resources in various parts of India is at the

very centre of social struggle and academic debate about the environment there (Shiva,
2002; Anand, 2004; Joy et al., 2008). On one hand there are claims of the World Bank
(WB) and development economists who perceive those conflicts as an indicator of
growing water ‘scarcity’ and of weak water governance in India (Briscoe & Malik,
2005; World Bank, 2006; Ballabh et al., 2009). On the other hand, critical scholars,
social movement leaders and organizations such as United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) emphasize unequal access to water as a more significant issue.
According to the latter perspective, the main problem with the water sector in India is
that current institutions governing water use and resource planning have historically
excluded the poor and are in urgent need of reform (Shiva, 2002; Mehta, 2003 & 2005;
Joy et al., 2008). As such, assuming that water is (always) a scarce resource distorts and
limits how we perceive the issue, since “physical availability is only one dimension of
water insecurity as issues around access to water also hinge around local context and
institutions” (UNDP, 2006, p. 133). For example, this dissertation focuses on case
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studies where scarcity is actually a policy induced consequence of water resources
mismanagement. The academic debate on unequal access and water 'scarcity' also arises
in a context of rapidly-expanding urban centres and increasing inter-sectoral conflicts
over water, wherein institutional arrangements governing water-sharing between urban,
suburban and rural areas have consistently marginalized small-scale, poor farmers in the
urban hinterlands of Asia (Janakrajan, 2004; Ruet et al., 2007). In India this continuing
exclusion of the poor derives from laws and public institutions governing water access
(Singh, 1992).
India’s policies towards water resources have two main dimensions:
geographical and political-economic. The first involves a historical tendency of the
federal state to prioritize large, multipurpose dam projects in order to address problems
of growing urban and agricultural demands for water. Many argue that this preference
for ‘megaprojects’ persists largely at the expense of poor farming communities in the
rural hinterlands (Baviskar, 1995; Gadgil & Ramachandra, 1995; World Commission
for Dams, 2000; Phadke, 2003; Mollinga, 2010). Since the 1990s, academic and activist
critiques of such large dam projects have increasingly argued that they cater to the
demands of prosperous, industrial-scale farmers and cities downstream, resulting in
displacement and disenfranchisement of the poor (Dreze et al., 1997). The second,
political-economic aspect of India's experience with large dam projects involves the
growth of centralized, bureaucratic, metropolitan water supply systems (that have been
underwritten by the World Bank). Such systems have also been criticized for catering to
the needs of rich and middle-class urban and suburban inhabitants, while
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simultaneously minimizing the needs of the rural and urban poor (Gandy, 2008; Anand,
2011).
These geographical and political-economic dimensions are central to current
critiques of Indian water policies and provide a backdrop to my own investigation.
What remains little-understood is how and why the Indian State — in developing,
controlling and centralizing water allocation between urban, suburban and rural areas —
has helped concentrate political-economic power in ways that continue exacerbating
differential access and status among various consumers of this resource (Wittfogel,
1957; Vaidyanathan, 1999 & 2004; Gidwani, 2002; Wagle et al., 2012). That is, India's
centralized, hierarchical water management system — in both its publicly and privately
owned aspects — has enabled a few to (unofficially) monopolize control over wateraccess, and profit from it as they increase their control over that resource. That multipronged critique informs a large body of political ecology literature in human
geography and water policy (Bond, 2002; Mollinga, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2004; Linton,
2010; Budds & Linton, 2014), as well as key arguments in this doctoral dissertation.
The persistence of the centralization of water policy decision-making by the State in the
Indian context is a problem this dissertation attempts to analyze with a case study of
water politics in the Mumbai-Thane region. The absence of any form of participatory
institutions is particularly a serious problem in the context of water transfers from rural
to urban areas. The principal focus of my dissertation is how the increasing conflict over
access to water (among castes/classes of farmers in Mumbai's geographical hinterland)
is a consequence of growing urban demands upon that water, exacerbated by the
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systematic mischaracterization of a supposed water scarcity. This problem is examined
in the context of the state’s claims of the underutilization of water by agriculturists and
the claims of the latter that water institutions in the hinterland actually aid the state in
claiming underutilization of water and help it divert water quotas to urban areas.
Underutilization of irrigation water is a common problem identified in surface irrigation
projects in Maharashtra. However, the factors behind underutilization have not been
examined through a field study. Underutilization is the central research problem
examined in this dissertation’s two papers (Paper One and Paper Two) and it is of
empirical interest because it places the state’s claims on water distribution between
urban and rural areas under critical scrutiny. Furthermore, it also helps us understand the
role of formal and informal water institutions in managing the distribution of water
between a fast growing metropolitan region and its rural hinterland. This helps the
dissertation make a contribution to the theoretical literature on water institutions and the
political ecology of water.
My central aim is to identify and examine the causes and impacts of apparent
water scarcity among poorer, small-scale farmers in the Command Area (CA) of the
Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (SMIP) which is located in the Dahanu block of
Thane District in Maharashtra State, India. The Surya Project comprises two large
reservoirs that provide water to Greater Mumbai and smaller cities in the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region (MMR).
A secondary aim is to understand how and why local administrative units and
jurisdictions within Thane District continue to coordinate water distribution poorly in
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relation to the goals of dam projects there. In this context, my dissertation presents a
case study conducted in the Tansa-Vaitarna (T-V) lakes area of Shahpur, an
administrative subdivision (taluka) of Thane District that lies outside of Mumbai and
includes five separate dams (see Figure 1.1, below).

FIGURE 1.1: Map of Mumbai Hydrometric Area which extends into Thane District. Note the
Greater Mumbai area (lower left) and the Surya area (upper left). Shaded portions indicate areas
served by Surya, and Bhatsa Multipurpose Dam Projects (respectively).
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1.2

Political Ecology of Water and Urbanization:
The Broader Theoretical Context of Research
Within the literature on urban-rural relationships in the developing world, there

are three distinct strands of research that inform theoretical aspects of my dissertation.
They concern: (1) institutions; (2) development geography; and (3) political ecology.
The first strand of research deals with institutional and common-pool resources
(Ostrom, 1990), and generally adopts a wide definition of resource governance. It
focuses mainly on rules and norms that shape dynamics of public policy making and
civil society, within a broader context of complex, sociopolitical relations. Rights over
access and use of water and land, in a quickly urbanizing region, influence institutional
relationships among a vast range of administrative, agricultural, civil society and
government actors who variously co-operate or contest one another’s claims to water.
Moreover, allocation of water between large urban jurisdictions, smaller towns and rural
water districts is also governed by property rights and historical uses of water in each
region. Thus, local laws and state policy (and their interaction) play important roles in
determining how water is shared, and requires analyzing existing water governance
structures and practices in the region. The wide body of work on urban water in India
has not adequately utilized theoretical and empirical work of the common-pool resource
tradition to sufficiently analyze and understand the politics of urban and regional water
governance. Therefore, in addition to social relations, this dissertation emphasizes how
rules, laws, practices and governance frameworks inhibit or enable water sharing
between jurisdictions.
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The second research strand is the field of urban political ecology and is
concerned with urban-rural relationships. In particular, with how the environmental
transformation of cities and their respective hinterlands (including suburbanization of
peripheries) is closely entwined with the broader geographical scale and processes of
capitalist development (Cronon, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2004; Keil et al., 2013). For
example, growth and expansion of metro Mumbai and its peripheries largely depends
upon the commodification of natural resources. That produces new interactions that
reshape (materially and symbolically) how natural and social resources are valued and
constrained - for instance, water and access to water. This perspective highlights that,
while water is a necessity and a crucial common resource, it has also become a key
focus for political manipulation involving various classes and caste-groups, including
emerging urban interest groups in and around MMR.
The third, more recent strand of political ecology research on India considers
agrarian change, emphasizing political economy and cultural factors - specifically, how
upwardly mobile caste-groups function as vanguards of capital accumulation. This
strand emphasizes how specific cultural, economic and geographic trajectories drive
accumulation processes (Gidwani, 2000, 2001 & 2008; Chari, 2004). In other words,
development (in various local contexts) contributes to particular social dynamics that
guide specific trajectories of political, economic and ecological change (Gidwani, 2000;
Dubash, 2002). South Asian human geographers have made especially significant
contributions to this literature, and have expanded our understanding of the role that
caste- and class-relations play in shaping the political economy of rural and urban India.
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The dynamics of urbanization at the fringes of Mumbai have broader
implications too, since we can also observe similar, urban-periphery dynamics in the
shadow of other large, Indian metropolises such as Calcutta (Roy, 1997 & 2003),
Bangalore (Ranganathan 2014; Mehta et al 2014), Delhi and even Chennai. Certainly,
macroeconomic processes of economic liberalization and globalization play important
roles in transforming cities and regions. But it is only by examining important local
relationship differences (in politics, institutional arrangements and capital-state
relations) that we can see how the progressive absorption of agricultural land into
metropolitan rhythms and structures can produce quite divergent trajectories of urban
and regional change - including how water resources are governed and used within the
'orbit' of large, urban centres. The urbanization of formerly rural parts of Thane District
(and the increased pressure on natural resources there) thus overlaps with processes of
metropolitan expansion — including increasing claims by the city on neighbouring
water sources — and with the larger transformation of the hinterland environment.
These three important strands of scholarship all consider how notions of ‘nature’
are produced, and how regional changes in natural environments are shaped by social
relations, water governance practices and institutions. In the MMR, processes of urban
growth are closely linked to successive waves of ecological conquest and the extension
of the 'water frontier' into its rural hinterlands (Gandy, 2008). As such, the institutional
underpinnings of extending that frontier undergo close analysis in my research. In order
to understand the dynamics of underutilizing water on the canal system specifically, this
dissertation combines the political ecology of water with an institutional analysis of
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water governance, and situates critical literature from the political ecology of irrigation
(in South Asia) within institutional frameworks (Mollinga 2013).

1.3

Regional Resources and Livelihoods

1.3.1 Historical and Geographical Context of Inter-Sectoral Water
Politics in Thane District
The empirical focus of my research is an ethnographic study I conducted with
key actors in the Command Area of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (SMIP) in
Thane District, Maharashtra.
Surya Project was the first significant effort on the part of the Indian and
Maharashtra State Governments, respectively, to harness water for local irrigation
purposes - in particular, the west coast rivers of Konkan Region. The SMIP Command
Area lies directly outside the peri-urban fringes of Mumbai Metropolitan Region and
contains agricultural land increasingly being targeted for urban uses, including
expressway projects meant to connect metro Mumbai with other cities in northern and
western India. Surya Project taps the waters of the Surya River - which is a perennial
tributary of a larger river, the Vaitarna, that flows through Thane District. Another major
dam project in Thane is the Bhatsa Multipurpose Irrigation Project, also built on the
Vaitarna River. The Bhatsa Project taps the Vaitarna upstream in eastern parts of the
District, also for the benefit of metropolitan Mumbai, as well as for the benefit of a wide
agricultural belt in Bhiwandi and Shahpur blocks of eastern Thane District.
Both the Vaitarna and Surya Rivers have their sources in the Sahyadri
Mountains, both rivers flow down from eastern parts of Thane to the Arabian Sea. SMIP
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was the second built of these two major multipurpose irrigation projects in the District.
The Bhatsa Project was completed in the late 1970s and, like Surya, was intended to
benefit a large number of farmers in the Shahpur area. However, the Bhatsa Project (like
Surya) has since come to cater mainly to the needs of suburban Mumbai. Since
developing Bhatsa as a water source, the population of MMR has risen by 40%, along
with similar increases in demand for water to support such growth.
There are five major watersheds in Thane District that lie outside the political
boundaries of MMR, yet within its hydrometric area (see Figure 1.1): the Vaitarna,
Ulhas, Patalganga, Amba and Damanganga watersheds. Greater Mumbai depends upon
water from Ulhas watershed (where Bhatsa Dam is located), as well as from Vaitarna
watershed (where both Tansa-Vaitarna Dam and Surya Dam are located). Controversies
now surround water from Bhatsa, Tansa-Vaitarna and Surya Dams, respectively, as
conflicts increase between urban versus rural water needs - as well between domestic
and irrigation water needs within rural areas of the watersheds. The Surya Multipurpose
Irrigation Project in Vaitarna watershed is the focus of this study since conflict has been
sharpest there between urban/industrial versus rural/irrigation water needs, and since its
valley communities have been the focus of the most intense controversies (see Figures
1.2 and 1.3 for data on urban versus agricultural water allocations in this area). The
Damanganga watershed (shared by Maharashtra State, the Daman Union Territory and
Gujarat State) is another that will likely see displacement of rural communities and thus
also become a focus of similar controversy (see Figure 1.2). New dam projects to
connect with existing Vaitarna watershed reservoirs are scheduled for construction there
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during the next decade, in order to further expand the amount of water available to
Greater Mumbai.
The geographical area of these dam projects also bears highlighting. Most of the
large and medium reservoirs in Thane are located in the predominantly tribal1, hilly and
forested parts of the District. Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project is located in the subadministrative block of Jawhar, and its canal system benefits both tribal and non-tribal
parts of Dahanu and Palghar blocks. Other dams on the Vaitarna and Bhatsa rivers are
located in Shahpur block, about 80 km east of Surya Dam. This dissertation has thus
focused on watersheds in the tribal parts of Thane District, north of Greater Mumbai
and the MMR (see Figure 1.1); similar conflicts in the southern watersheds, south of the
city of Navi Mumbai in the Amba and Patalganga valleys, have yet to be researched.

Water Allocation in the Mumbai Hydro
Metric Area
1800.00
1350.00
900.00
450.00
0.00

Vaitarna

Ulhas

Patalganga

Amba Valley

DamanGanga

Domestic and/or industrial MCM
Irrigation MCM
FIGURE 1.2: Industrial/Urban and Irrigation use in major watersheds of Mumbai Hydrometric Area (in
million cubic metres). Source: Irrigation Commission Report (1999); Government of Maharashtra,
Irrigation Status Reports. Water Budgets (2003-2010).
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Water Allocation in Vaitarna Valley
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Surya Sub-Valley

Vaitarna Sub- Valley

Tansa Sub- Valley

Domestic and/or industrial MCM
Irrigation MCM
FIGURE 1.3: Industrial/Urban and Irrigation use in the Vaitarna Valley (in million cubic metres).
Source: Government of Maharashtra, Water Budgets (2003-2010), Irrigation Commission Report (1999).

Prior to the development of Bhatsa and Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Projects
in the Post-Colonial period, other reservoirs dating to the early Colonial period were
also constructed in northern Thane District for the exclusive purposes of Mumbai. The
execution of such projects was also facilitated by implementing new laws that denied
farmers in the neighbourhood of reservoirs access to water, even for domestic use. A
consequence of those and other construction projects was widespread displacement of
Thane farmers - along with several major legal claims to agricultural land which remain
unsettled to this day. Thus, since the early Colonial period, there have been successive
waves of activity in which farmers and agricultural communities in Shahpur, Dahanu
and Palghar blocks of Thane have been prevented from accessing local water and
consequently displaced. As well as preventing local communities from accessing water
from Bhatsa and Surya reservoirs, respectively, planning and construction work has
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been underway since 2012 for two new dams (the Middle Vaitarna and Pinjal Projects,
respectively). Similarly designed for the exclusive benefit of MMR, those projects have
also led to increased social and political ferment in Thane.
Given such dynamics, Thane District is historically known for its class-based
social movements, and has taken on great national significance among progressives
mobilizing around agrarian and environmental issues. For instance, since the early
1950s the Communist Party of India (Marxist) helped mobilize local tribal peoples
against agricultural working conditions nearing servitude - which led the Maharashtra
Government to enact land reforms. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Thane also witnessed a
number of significant movements led by marginalized tribal farmers defending their
timber and cultivation rights. However, poor implementation of land-ceiling laws and
regulations governing access to forests, resulted in only modest changes to relations of
production in Thane (Ambasta, 1998). The net outcome of such reform has simply been
to create a new class of peasant landowners, largely belonging to the Maratha Kunbi
community (Ambasta, 1998; Dewan, 1999). They (and the Vadavals in coastal Dahanu)
are a politically influential, socially dominant farming ‘caste-cluster’ who have led
mobilizations occasionally against new dams and industrial projects in Thane District.

1.3.2 Irrigation and the Transformation of Class Relations
in Thane District
During the past decade, urban expansion from metro Mumbai has increased
pressure on land and water resources across the MMR and exacerbated livelihood
difficulties already facing Thane farming communities there. Small-scale farmers in the
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district now face problems related to water scarcity such as depleted groundwater
aquifers and seasonal shortages of drinking water - as well as the looming prospect of
further displacement among communities directly in the shadow of new dam projects.
Indeed, growing scarcity of water poses new and immediate challenges for the future
development and present welfare of rural Thane farming communities. Moreover,
extreme variation in rainfall patterns - including a less predictable monsoon - has in the
past decade transformed what, for many, used to be annual single-crop, subsistence
farming into periodic episodes of drought (Menon, 2006).
Yet, such dire water ‘shortages’ for small-scale farmers starkly belies the fact
that, in recent decades, considerable funds have been invested to build two multipurpose
irrigation projects and a medium scale irrigation project (ostensibly to benefit Thane
farmers). Such projects were to irrigate over 50,000 hectares of land belonging to
mostly small-scale, marginal farmers (tribal and non-tribal). Yet, according to data from
the 2004-2012 Water Audit (Maharashtra Government, 2012) less than 10% of those
areas have actually benefitted so far (see Table 1.1). The incomplete works on canals in
Surya and Bhatsa Projects has also led to surplus water in those reservoirs, and an issue
of ‘underutilization.' For instance, in 2008-2009 an average of only 10% of agricultural
land was being irrigated by canals of the two large and medium irrigation projects.
Surya Project fared worst, compared to Bhatsa and Wandri Projects (respectively), with
under 10% of land in its Command Area irrigated. While utilization in small and minor
projects is far better than in large and medium projects, some canal water management
issues plague large and small projects alike. For example, just over half of the 7,564
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hectares of irrigable land in various areas of Thane's small and minor projects is actually
being irrigated. Thus, we see the 'problem of underutilization' in the management of
small and minor irrigation projects too (see Table 1.2). The tardy pace at which surface
and groundwater irrigation is being implemented in Thane District in the past 50 years
is reflected in the data of Table 1.3. It clearly illustrates how the amount of net irrigated
versus net sown area has not significantly increased during that period. Indeed, from
2001-2011 the amount of irrigated land in Thane District has dropped to just 1.97%.
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TABLE 1.1: Water Storage, Utilization and Underutilization in Large & Medium Irrigation
Projects in Thane District, 2008-09.
NO.

SUBJECT

LARGE
MULTIPURPOSE
DAM PROJECT

LARGE
MULTIPURPOSE
DAM PROJECT

MEDIUM
DAM
PROJECT

1

PROJECT NAME

BHATSA

SURYA

WANDRI

2

PROJECT LOCATION

SHAHPUR,
BHIWANDI (THANE
DISTRICT)

DAHANU and
PALGHAR (THANE
DISTRICT)

PALGHAR
(THANE
DISTRICT)

3

YEAR of PROJECT COMPLETION

(in progress)

(in progress)

1983

4

HEIGHT of DAM (in metres)

89

58.08 (Dhamni)
28 (Kavdas)

28.27

5

APPROVED HEIGHT of RESERVOIR
(in metres)

89

58.08 (Dhamni)
28 (Kavdas)

28.27

6

COMPLETED HEIGHT of
RESERVOIR (in metres)

89

58.08 (Dhamni)
28 (Kavdas)

28.27

7

APPROVED LENGTH of CANALS
(in kilometres)

67/50

29/47

8/17

8

COMPLETED LENGTH of CANALS
(in kilometres)

54/3.40

29/34

8/17

9

TOTAL CAPACITY
(in million cubic metres)

976

285.31 (Dhamni)
13.7 (Kavdas)

37.11

10

TOTAL CULTURABLE LAND in
COMMAND AREA (hectares)

48,910

30,547

4,038

11

NET CULTIVABLE LAND (hectares)

37,260

14,696

3,066

12

CULTURABLE LAND in COMMAND
AREA that can be BROUGHT
UNDER IRRIGATION after
PROJECT COMPLETION
(hectares)

23,000

14,696

2,044

13

IRRIGATED LAND AREA,
2008-09 (hectares)

2,038

1,701

600

14

WATER USE
(in million cubic metres)

15

DRINKING

604.2

24.56

-

16

IRRIGATION

60

200.71

35.93

17

INDUSTRIAL USE

2.5

47.83

-

18

POWER GENERATION

-

-

-

Source: Thane District Socio Economic Statistical Abstract, 2008-09.
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TABLE 1.2: Area of Underutilization in Minor Irrigation Projects in Thane District in
2009 (in Hectares).
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUB-DIVISIONS in
THANE DISTRICT

TOTAL
COMPLETED
PROJECTS

TOTAL
COMMAND
AREA

PRESENT
IRRIGATED
AREA

AREA TO BE
BROUGHT
UNDER
IRRIGATION

TALASARI

4

0

0

0

DAHANU

19

285

50

235

VIKRAMGAD

2

380

127

253

JAWHAR

30

495

0

495

MOKHADA

15

115

8

107

VADA

47

2407

1198

1209

PALGHAR

30

1412

654

758

VASAI

18

799

60

739

THANE

3

0

0

0

BHIWANDI

12

211

85

126

SHAHAPUR

80

2031

338

1693

KALYAN

16

728

419

309

ULHASNAGAR

0

0

0

0

AMBERNATH

15

440

412

28

MURBAD

85

2066

454

1612

TOTAL

376

11369

3805

7564

Source (for above): Thane District Socio Economic Statistical Abstract, 2008-09
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TABLE 1.3: Area Irrigated in Thane District in the Period 1961- 2011.

NO.

AGRICULTURE & 1960IRRIGATION
61

197071

198081

199091

200001

200910

201010

1

NET IRRIGATED AREA
(in 100 hectares)

50

40

220

70

204

204
(2001-0
2)

188

2

NET SOWN AREA
(in 100 hectares)

3570

4410

3330

4480

4067

4740

4740

3

NET IRRIGATED to
GROSS CROPPED
AREA (percent)

0.48

0.33

0.13

0.06

2.18

2.18

1.97

4

NET SOWN to NET
CULTIVABLE AREA

38.8

46.16

34.84

46.87

42.55

41.13

49.6

6

IRRIGATED to NET
SOWN AREA
(percent)

1.23

0.7

0.36

0.13

4.62

5.31

3.97

7

TOTAL AREA UNDER
CANAL IRRIGATION
(in hundred
hectares)

-

-

-

12

52

8

AREA UNDER WELL
IRRIGATION (in
hundred hectares)

437

299

104

480

186

138

71

11

AREA IRRIGATED BY
OTHER THAN WELLS
OR CANALS

12

11

112

2

54

31

-

N/A

N/A

Source: Maharashtra Govt., Various issues of Socio Economic Statistical Abstracts, 1960-61 until
2010-11, Thane District.

Like many rural parts of Asia, access to irrigation in Thane is vital to expanding
areas of land under cultivation. For small paddy farms in Mumbai's hinterland,
availability of irrigation water critically determines agricultural productivity (as well as
demand for workers). Derivatively, it also affects opportunities for agricultural workers
to gain bargaining power in seasonally-tight labour markets (Gidwani, 1996;
Vaidyanathan, 1999). Thus lack of access to irrigation water has reduced several Thane
farming communities to seasonal, highly casual labour forces in post-monsoon seasons.
Since the 1970s, water policies for Mumbai and Thane District have oscillated
between meeting urban and agricultural needs. But as local irrigation water is
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increasingly diverted to Mumbai, agrarian crises in Thane District have intensified
along with conflict over dwindling supplies. During the past five years even 'middle
farmers' in the District (who own 4-5 hectares of land and are in the upper tiers of the
peasantry) are also struggling to sustain their families (Interview, June 2006)1.
Massive demand for water by MMR has led to over-reliance on large dam
projects in Thane that has maximized water production for urban and suburban needs —
but also undermined sustainable irrigation for local, tribal farmers. The rural water
crisis, including rising rural-urban tensions over access, has thus driven new waves of
seasonal migration from Mumbai hinterlands to peri-urban areas (Punjabi, 2005; Gandy,
2008). The human dimension of the water crisis has been pivotal in recent politics of
the district. For instance, in most parts of Thane, farmers of Kunbi and tribal
communities historically often shared the same socio-economic status. In some interior
areas where large dam projects are completed, both communities have similarly suffered
water scarcity (for agricultural and domestic use) and displacement. But water shortages
in Thane now result in intensifying struggles between those communities over water
access. In that context, shortages have exacerbated nascent, inter-caste rivalries that
emerged in the post-1945 political mobilization of tribal communities.
As discussed, water made available by construction of Surya Project was to
irrigate lands of tribal farmers and mitigate the need for seasonal economic migration.
However, in 1998 a portion of water from Surya was officially allocated to development
needs in Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR) of MMR. Further, a 2009 decision saw more
water diverted from Surya to Mira-Bhayandar, a municipality of MMR (see Figure 1.1).

!20

Thus, today the historical, seasonal migration of small-scale, marginal (tribal)
farmers persists from November through April each year between Surya Command
Area, the coastal plains, and Mumbai. Moreover, Kunbi groups have also lobbied the
Maharashtra State Government (with some success) to re-allocate them irrigation water
already earmarked for tribal populations. And Kunbi farmers from coastal parts of
Dahanu have begun laying claim to water from Surya for irrigation (Navshakti, 2006).
As such, Surya Project is now the focus of an intense, intra-rural conflict over water. In
part, this is a result of logistics, i.e. geography-based differences in need. Yet it also
contains strong class/caste motivations, including simmering Kunbi resentment over
affirmative action policies aimed at supporting local tribal communities.
The intensification of such claims and conflicts highlight the critical issue of
water-access in the broader political economy of Mumbai-Thane region. They also raise
questions about how water is differentially used and valued by different groups,
depending on their respective geographical (and social) locations.
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FIGURE 1.4: Details of the Surya Command Area.

1.4

Geographical and Social Context of Thane District

1.4.1 Rural-Urban Contestation over Water, and the Sprawling
Influence of the MMR
One of the key developments of the past two decades in the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region is the fast-paced growth of the Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR) at
the northern fringes of MMR. From a population of 700,000 people in the 2001 census,
to 1.2 million in the 2011 census, VVSR is now the fastest growing (and 6th largest)
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town in Maharashtra State, as well as the fastest growing city in all of urban India
(Census of India, 2011). The VVSR was reserved as a green belt in the 1970s, but
controversially was opened up for urbanization in 1988. Subsequently, throughout the
1990s, more and more agricultural land - and even ecologically sensitive coastal areas were also re-zoned for urban development. Thus the re-zoning for urbanization of what
was previously designated agricultural land has also become the subject of ongoing
controversy in VVSR and the Mumbai region.
Urban research on the VVSR belt has confirmed that the role of organized crime
(including a prominent Vadaval caste-leader, Hitendra Thakur, from Palghar, Thane
District) has also been instrumental in 'grabbing land' from the local tribal community
(Punjabi, 2005). Thus, local ‘boss-ism,' and a nexus of politicians and gangsters, have
also been central in the water-politics of this area.
The rapid growth of the Vasai-Virar sub-region also reflects the urban
transformation of Greater Mumbai. Gentrification in this island city has meant that
populations of Mumbai and its inner suburbs - as well as migrants from others parts of
Maharashtra State - are increasingly moving to outlying areas such as VVSR (Bhagat
and Jones, 2013). Indeed, within the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, cities of VVSR are
growing the fastest, almost doubling their populations in a decade (see Figure 5, below).
Other towns in the MMR, such as Navi Mumbai (with 1.5 million people) and the town
of Thane, also host large populations. Significantly, it is also the location of Vasai-Virar
sub-region (on a major South Mumbai commuter railway line) that has led the towns of

!23

this sub-region to outpace all other towns outside Greater Mumbai, in terms of
demographic growth (Bhagat and Jones, 2013: p. 7-8).
One characteristic of the pressure that Mumbai's urban expansion has placed
upon VVSR is a chronic scarcity of potable water among the urban population there.
For more than a decade, until the 1990s, the town had to rely on privately owned water
tankers (a business dominated by local criminals and politicians), until the Maharashtra
Government decided to divert water there from the Surya Dam, on the grounds that
water was being under utilized in the Irrigation Project. However, contestation of that
diversion in Mumbai High Court by social movements in Dahanu resulted in VVSR's
access to Surya water being deemed temporary by the State Government. Although
Maharashtra State Government submissions to the High Court in the early 2000s
claimed that diversion of water from reservoirs on Tansa, Vaitarna and Bhatsa rivers in
northern Thane District would be temporary (High Court Affidavit, 1996), the VVSR
was unsuccessful in accessing water from those reservoirs. Subsequently, there were
also fresh attempts to source water from other parts of Thane District. However, the
mushrooming population of VVSR, along with a priority in State Government policies
on water for drinking use, has ensured that the Maharashtra Government has renewed
VVSR`s access to Surya water four times during the past 17 years.
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FIGURE 1.5: Population of Mumbai Metropolitan Region, 2001-11. Source: Census of India (2011).

Almost 75% of the demand for water in VVSR is now being met by the Surya
Project. In 2009, the State Government also decided to divert water to Mira Bhayandar,
a sprawling suburb of Greater Mumbai to the south of VVSR. But a growing resistance
of a section of the sub-region's rural population (in the western coastal belt) to ground
water mining has pushed the State to renew water diversions from Surya Dam (Punjabi,
2005). That has also led to a proposal for a new dam in Dahanu called the Susari
Project. All of these factors - including expanding populations on the northern fringe of
the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, and growth of towns in the absence of reliable water
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supplies - have set the stage for a very contentious scalar politics of water in the Surya
Command Area of Dahanu region, which is the subject of this study.

1.4.2 Topography of the Surya Command Area
The geographical area of the Surya Multipurpose Irrgation Project can be
divided into two parts: (1) the developed coastal belt (the bandarpatti) where various
commercial crops flourish; and (2) the area east of the Sahyadri Mountains (the jungle
patti).
The bandarpatti is about 30 kms wide, extending west from the railway line
situated at the foot of the Sahyadri range. The area has a fairly well-developed, fairly
evenly-distributed infrastructure including roads, transport facilities, banks,
cooperatives, schools, factories, etc. The main crops cultivated are fruits, vegetables and
paddy rice, which are sold commercially and consumed domestically. A fairly large
portion of this area enjoys good irrigation. The main farming castes are the Kunbis and
Agris, respectively; tribals do not traditonally inhabit the area. However, tribals do have
a regular presence, since they increasingly migrate from the jungle patti to satsify
demands of commercial crop farmers for cheap, abundant labour on their expanding
operations.
The jungle patti lies to the east of the railway line, extending up to the MumbaiAhmedabad National Highway. The land is barren during dry seasons and the hills are
thinly forested. Villages, which tend to be isolated and are sometimes inaccessible
during monsoons, are characterized by an almost total lack of infrastructure facilities.
The (virtually non-irrigated) subsistence-economy there is based on producing a single
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crop – paddy – with grass grown on some pasture land. Nearly 70% of the jungle patti
population consists of tribals who have historically lived in forested areas there. Today,
most tribals are agricultural labourers and small farmers, with few holding more than 5
hectares of land.
The Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project is located in the jungle patti area and
was designed to irrigate 24,000 hectares of land. Rainfall in the Surya Command Area is
very high (3,000 to 4,000 mm annually), making paddy the largest crop in the area,
under both rain-fed and irrigated conditions. Project planners did allow for some crop
diversification, and projected that 40% of the area's irrigation potential would
eventually facilitate commercial crops such as vegetables (Borude et al., 1986). Indeed,
the potential for surface irrigation to transform production relations in the region was
touted by other researchers during the construction phase of Surya:
Irrigation in Dahanu significantly affects the entire organization of
production methods of cultivation, the cropping pattern as well as the
relations of production. On the one hand it may lead to greater
differentiation in terms of proleterianization of the small and the
marginal peasant. On the other, the topmost class, the developed
technology, HYV seeds, etc. A few better off adivasi middle peasants
may improve their conditions my making use of the irrigation facilities.
Extension of irrigation in Dahanu and other talukas in Thane may be an
important factor in boosting agricultural production at least temporarily,
on the one hand, and in establishing clearer capitalist relations on the
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other. (Munshi, 1983, p. 221)
And yet, paddy remains the dominant crop in the Command Area today. And
even though the Surya Project has been funded under the Tribal Sub-Plan and was
intended to primarily benefit small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers, over time it has come
to cater to the needs of agricultural populations in western parts of coastal Dahanu. It
also irrigates the fields of Kunbi farmers in Saphale Village (Palghar block). And, as
discussed, it now also serves the needs of the rapidly urbanizing Vasai-Virar sub-region
on the periphery of Mumbai. Such persistent diversion of water from its originally
intended purpose is an issue that is currently being challenged in Mumbai High Court
by local activists.
Also, almost half of the total cultivable land in the Surya Command Area lies in
the middle of one of the District’s largest protected forest areas. The canals and subminors (water channels designed to convey water to fields from canals) of the irrigation
project criss-cross this forested area through a very hilly region, and irrigate only a very
small portion of agricultural land owned by tribal farmers. At several places, the canal
network and sub-minors are left incomplete due to non-clearances for construction from
the Forest Department. In contrast, the canal system is soundly in place near Vanai
Village (on the eastern side of the Project’s Command Area), where some sections of
the tribal community there have managed to benefit from irrigation water. Nearby, close
to the Mumbai-Ahmedabad Western Express Higway that passes through the Command
Area, a substantial portion of agricultural land has also been opened up for urban and
industrial development. That too creates further social, economic and environmental
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pressures on the tribal community there - who seldom find employment in new
establishments that arise.
A majority of inhabitants in the 105 villages of the Surya Command Area are
also some of the poorest in Thane District. The area is characterized by chronic poverty
and malnutrition; poor infrastructure; poor access to water for domestic use; and an
absence of basic literacy. Most of its inhabitants migrate to Mumbai and coastal Dahanu
from September to April in the post-monsoon season for seasonal employment.
While the Surya Command Area is populated by the tribal community, the
adjoining areas of Surya Project (in the western coastal belt of Dahanu and Palghar
blocks, on the Arabian Sea) are mostly inhabited by farmers of the Kunbi Maratha and
Vadaval caste-clusters. In contrast to the economic stagnation of the Command Area,
farmers from those communities have enjoyed a period of relative prosperity since the
land reforms and Green Revolution of the 1960s. That largely stems from their
proximity to Mumbai railway line, as well as from access to ground water for their
fields. Thus, Kunbi Maratha and Vadaval farmers have good connections to markets in
Mumbai where they sell their produce, and so have developed proximate relations with
the economy of the city. The farmers there rely mostly on tribal labour from the interior
of Thane (a majority of whom come from villages in the Surya Command Area) to work
their fields between November and May. After that, tribal farmers return to their own
fields to sow their monsoon crop.
However, that 'symbiotic' relationship is not exactly mutually enriching. The
tribal community continues to face exploitative practices from the larger scale,
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commercial, coastal farmers who pay them quite meagrely. Indeed, relations between
the tribal community and the non-tribal, coastal community have become antagonistic.
One of the leading social justice organizations in Thane District - the Dahanu-based
Kashtakari Sanghatana - has been at the forefront of organizing protests and marches
over the Surya Dam issue. During the past two decades they have also been organizing
seasonal labourers into a labour union.
In terms of land use, agricultural development is uneven in the Dahanu block.
Paddy is the main staple crop in the adjoining coastal belt, and is cultivated on 4,141
hectares in 32 villages there. Slightly above 53% of paddy production in Surya
Command Area is located on this coastal strip of Dahanu (even though there are a
greater number of villages in the interior of the Command Area, and in other tribal areas
of Dahanu block). In fact, that coastal acreage accounts for almost 24% of the total area
under paddy in Dahanu, which reflects very uneven agricultural development in the
region. Indeed, this extremely productive coastal area of Dahanu (about 6 km long by
12 km wide) is known as the ‘vegetable bowl’ of Thane District (Dewan, 1999).
However, in the past 5 years (because of proximity to the Arabian Sea), coastal
farmland has suffered from the intrusion of salinity into groundwater aquifers, which
has caused sometimes serious declines in agricultural production. The polluting
presence of power plants on Dahanu coast since the late 1990s (to feed Mumbai's
energy needs) have also adversely affected the agricultural economy there (Dewan,
1999). Consequently, to ameliorate their declining economic conditions, coastal area
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Vadaval farmers have made access to water from Surya Project a key point in their
demands of the State Government to help revive agriculture in their area of Dahanu.

1.5

Understanding Conflicts over Water in Thane District:
Urban-Rural or Intra-Rural Competition?

1.5.1 Questioning a Structural Interpretation of Water Politics in
Thane District
It is widely acknowledged by most social movement and political leaders in the
interior of Thane that the largely agricultural Kunbi community - now caught in a
downward economic spiral - has begun to recognize that problems of economic
underdevelopment faced by local tribal peoples are likewise affecting their own castegroup. In this sense, the Kunbi community now appears keen to forge a common
alliance with tribals against water policies of the Maharashtra State Government that
negatively affect both groups. This interpretation of current politics in the context of
crucial access to water was vividly conveyed by Vishwanath Patil of the Kunbi Sena
organization. Patil uses the term “Bahjuan unity” (lower caste unity) in various Sena
pamphlets and in public meetings to support an alliance between tribals and Kunbis
(Interviews, August 2006 & August 2008). Thus, two significant political organizations
in the District - the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Kunbi Sena - continue
to press the importance of common mobilization, and during the past two years have
even organized joint rallies of poor tribals, and Kunbis around water access in the Thane
District.
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However, during my fieldwork in Dahanu that interpretation of the District’s
water politics was contested by Brian Lobo of the Kashtakari Sanghatana (KS). The
Sanghatana is a social movement well recognized in India for its concern about the
welfare of Thane tribal communities, particularly in its advocacy on environmental and
developmental issues that affect them. Lobo and KS view the conflict over water in
Thane as unfolding in a different direction. His contention is that the tribals there are
economically worse-off than both the local Kunbi and Vadaval communities, who have
inflicted caste-ist oppression upon them in recent decades. As such, Lobo believes that
local tribals’ interests are distinct, and that they would not benefit from an alliance with
Kunbi or Vadaval communities around water issues. To buttress his claim, Lobo points
to developments in Dahanu, where Kunbi communities are increasingly claiming water
from the Surya Project that was meant to irrigate lands of the tribal community there.
According to Lobo, some of the non-tribal communities from coastal areas in Dahanu
and Palghar have even secured formal approval that the Maharashtra Government will
pipe water from Surya Project onto their lands. As such, while acknowledging how
Mumbai’s urban water demands have driven the dispossession of Thane farmers, Lobo
points out that irrigation water is also being diverted away from tribal users to benefit
rural, non-tribal farming communities such as the Kunbi (not just to benefit urban
Mumbai).
In Lobo’s view, this is evidence that one reason or another will always be found
to justify government water allocation policies that persistently dispossess Thane's tribal
peoples. In this sense, he emphasizes that such policies essentially serve urban and
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agricultural capital interests and that, therefore, Thane tribal communities will never
politically benefit from a 'class-based alliance' involving the Kunbi Sena and the
Communist Party of India (Marxist). According to him, the nature of existing relations
of production in that area of Thane simply outweigh the potential benefits of the
proposed alliance. In other words, the importance of the ongoing availability of large
numbers of marginal, small-scale, tribal farmers to work as labourers for Kunbi and
Vadaval farming caste-clusters on the Dahanu coastline makes it unlikely for tribal and
non-tribal political interests to coincide around the water issue. The relationship
between caste-clusters and the Thane tribal community constitute my focus in Paper
Three of this dissertation.

1.6

Research Questions and Dissertation Outline
Research literature on water politics in India and Asia has generally emphasized

that the intra-rural dimension of water conflict is characteristic of regions where water
resources are under pressure from growing, nearby urban demands. In that context,
competing demands for water also emerge within such rural areas, where there is always
a segment of the population with only small, subsistence landholdings who become
further marginalized in struggles over access to water (Mollinga, 2003; Janakarajan,
2004). However, the sizeable literature focusing on such intra-rural water conflict has
mainly focused on policy aspects of the problem, as well as a rather narrow definition of
water governance that relies on rules and government policy (Meinzen-Dick & Bakker,
2001). As such, the social, cultural and political-ecological processes involved in the
governance of water and irrigation remain largely obscured. Analysis of water
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management (and associated conflict) must consider wider sets of social networks,
political relationships, and cultural values and meanings that also underlie and inform
the norms and conventions surrounding access to water (Mosse, 2003).
With this dissertation on water politics in Thane District (India), I build upon
recent research that views access to water as a lens through which a variety of social
relations in local contexts become structured (and vice-versa). Within such literature,
caste-identity and the changing nature of caste interactions - as well as the manner in
which those are entwined with broader relations of production - are viewed as
determinants of resource politics and of agrarian change in India (Gidwani, 2000 &
2002; Mollinga, 2003 & 2010). Related literature on water research in the agrarian
contexts of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu similarly argues that it is the interface of such
relations of production with water institutions (including ways that such relations and
institutions have historically co-evolved) which critically shapes local water politics and
local water management practices (Dubash, 2002; Mosse, 2003).
My research project was guided by two central and interrelated questions:
1) What aspects of farmers' social and economic locations (within overarching
relations of production) influence their access to water? (For instance, do size of
landholdings influence access to water? Does proximity to canals? Do farmer's relative
class- or caste-positions affect access? And how is water scarcity experienced by
farmers in Surya Command Area?).
2) What are the rules, institutions and governance structures underpinning water
transfers from rural to urban areas (and water management more broadly) in Mumbai-
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Thane region? (For instance, what factors lead to water being [paradoxically] underutilized for agriculture in locations such as Surya Command Area? And, how do broader
structures and practices of water governance interact with the social/class divisions in
such rural areas?).
Building upon that research, my dissertation is presented in the form of three
manuscripts.
PAPER ONE uses a case study to illustrate a nexus of corruption among
politicians, engineers, contractors and a dominant local caste-cluster (the Vadavals), in
the context of a canal system of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (in the
agricultural belt of Dahanu, Thane District, Maharashtra). That paper begins with a
critical analysis of Robert Wade`s work on the corruption nexus he observed at the
Andhra Pradesh Irrigation Department (Wade, 1982 & 1985). Through my own
ethnographic research on divisions and tensions inside the irrigation bureaucracy at
Dahanu, I learned that the rational choice framework employed by Wade - including his
conceptualization of 'the corruption nexus' - was useful. Yet, I have also argued that it
was insufficient for analyzing and understanding the motivations of main bureaucratic
actors within that corruption nexus. Therefore, while not entirely dispensing with
Wade’s arguments, my first paper asserts that the hierarchy between engineers at
various levels - and the incentives that motivate them to participate in or refrain from
corrupt practises - were not sufficiently investigated in Wade`s research. And, as such,
the overlapping interests and relations of rural elites with politicians and Irrigation
Department staff have not yet been well understood. Through a narrative analysis of
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interviews I conducted with department engineers, Paper One emphasizes how the rural
poor in Dahanu (mostly small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers) have been most
disadvantaged by that nexus of corruption.
Thus, while critiquing Wade for not recognizing the serious impact of
hierarchies and potential conflicts within ‘the bureaucracy,’ my paper also confirms
Wade’s insight that (in its developmental role) the Indian State remains inhibited by an
increasing entrenchment of the corrupt nexus connecting bureaucrats, politicians,
contractors and rural oligarchs.
As a study of water politics in the Mumbai-Dahanu region, Paper One also
presents new ethnographic research concerning the local and regional politics of water.
Indeed, the water made available by the Surya Project is at the heart of fierce, ongoing
competition between Vasai-Virar sub-region and (tribal and non-tribal) agricultural
areas of Dahanu. As well, the commercialization of local water is a result of increasing
demands from urban and industrial areas of Mumbai - and a major factor facilitating the
local corruption nexus which resembles that described by Wade.
PAPER TWO applies field research and ethnographic observations to explain
the politics of water access and of the provision of basic water entitlements for domestic
use in villages of the Tansa-Vaitarna water district. That water district happens to be the
main source of water for Greater Mumbai and other towns in the MMR. This paper
attempts to answer the question of how the city of Mumbai has come to exert such
enormous influence over local water policies (officially the purview of Maharashtra
State) within and beyond the boundaries of MMR. Ironically, that influence coincides
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with the State's apparent inability to meet basic water needs of rural populations in
watersheds of Thane District. It is not insignificant that this water district is primarily
controlled by Mumbai Municipal Corporation (in tandem with the Forest Department).
Thus, the second paper traces the original decision to reserve unexploited water
resources in Thane District (for the anticipated future use of Mumbai) to a key debate
from the mid-1940s. It also traces the subsequent (yet retroactive) territorial extension
of jurisdiction arising from that decision to deliberations of the 1950s and 1960s. The
paper also shows how the subsequent creation (in the 1970s) of a 'hydrometric area' for
Mumbai Metropolitan Region further exacerbated rural-urban water conflicts. In that
context I drew upon Elinor Ostrom`s socio-ecological systems framework, and her
action situation analogy to identify how local ecological, economic and legal factors
constrain the outcomes of local government efforts to provide rural water access to
villages in the T-V water district.
PAPER THREE emphasizes agrarian change and politics of the commons in
Dahanu, after the onset of canal irrigation from the Surya Project. That paper utilizes
interview and survey data, as well as maps from the local Irrigation Department. It also
makes use of information gleaned from legal affidavits about local challenges over land
and water access, involving small-scale, tribal farmers and commercial Kunbi and
Vadaval agriculturalists. All of that data provides evidence around which a cohesive
narrative about the politics of resource conflict in two villages of Dahanu is presented.
The main finding of Paper Three is that in both of those villages land has also been
central to conflicts over resources - even as water from canal minors at the head, middle
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and tail reaches of the system has been increasingly monopolized by commercial
farmers of Vadaval-caste. Paper Three thus identifies the importance of a land-water
resource nexus, and examines the social and political paradoxes that accompany the
introduction of new water technologies (as implemented by Vadaval commercial
farmers to help them conserve water resources on their holdings). The paper also
critically analyzes the canal technology prevalent in the Surya irrigation system, as well
as political claims about wasted and under utilized water there. Studying how intra-rural
water conflict results from (or is exacerbated by) the pressures of geographically distant
urbanization also urges us to answer important contextual questions about the major
actors who are facilitating changes to the 'waterscape' of Mumbai-Thane region.
Overall, my research into the issues described above has yielded significant
insights about contestation of water rights and access - including the commodification
of water and the political dimension of conflicts - all situated within local,
environmental contexts. Insofar as there has not yet been a substantial treatment of
water conflict (in this way) in the context of the rural hinterlands of a major Indian
metropolis, this doctoral research represents a significant step forward.
Situated within the frameworks of human geography, institutional theory and
political ecology, this dissertation project has focused on contributing an integrated
understanding of the social and economic geographies of development, as well as the
politics of resource conflict, all within the context of the rural hinterland surrounding
the City of Mumbai and its Metropolitan Region.
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Notes
1. The 'tribals' in this context refer to those communities in Thane District who have
been categorized as Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution (i.e. eligible for
what North Americans call 'affirmative action'). Historically and culturally in India, the
term tribals refers to communities who comprise the (substantial) indigenous minority
of India's population. Several tribal communities in India follow their own tribal
religions which are different from the mainstream faiths. Also known as Adivasis,
tribals are particularly numerous in Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal and the
western Indian states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Such communities are direct
beneficiaries of affirmative action policies. For example, they are entitled to reserved
electoral seats in the Indian Parliament. In Thane District there are three ridings (seats)
in the state assembly reserved for representatives of tribal communities, and one riding
reserved for them in the Indian Parliament. According to the 2001 Indian Census there
are about half a million tribals living in rural parts of Thane District.
2. Interview with Mr. Raju Paranjpe (June 2006), local politburo member and state
politburo leader for Communist Party of India (Marxist), Thane District. Interview with
Mariam Dhawle (August 2008).
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2.

Methodology
In this chapter, I will present the methodology that guided the overall field,

archival and library research that informs this dissertation. This includes the
justification of researching the canal system in two villages as the unit of analysis, the
strategy of following the water within the Surya command area and to other parts of
Thane district, and finally a description of the analysis of data gathered during the
research.
I begin with a general description of the methodology (in Section 2.1), where I
will outline the reasons for my use of qualitative methods. I provide details on the time
spent around field, archival and library research during field research in 2006 (Section
2.2). I follow this up by providing the rationale for choosing the canal system in the
Surya project as the unit of analysis (Section 2.3). A description of the methods chosen
to interview engineers who manage the irrigation system for the Surya project is
presented in Section 2.4. A description of field research in the Tansa- Vaitarna water
district conducted in 2006 and in March 2008 in the interior of Thane district follows in
Section 2.5. From Section 2.6 until Section 2.9, I provide more details about the
sampling strategy and field and library research. Finally, I conclude this chapter in the
last two sections by explaining the methods used to analyze the data.

2.1 Qualitative Methods: Human Geography and the
Political Economy of Water in India
This dissertation relied on qualitative research methods for gathering fieldwork
data. Research on the human geography and political economy of small town and rural
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India respectively provided a methodological model for my research (Chari 2004;
Dubash, 2002; Gidwani, 2000, also see Introduction to the dissertation for further
background). While Chari’s work is on labour and the politics of capitalist accumulation
in a small town of South India, Gidwani and Dubash’s ethnographic research on
irrigation focuses on the ecological and cultural dimensions of agrarian change in
Gujarat. Their research used a combination of methods, largely to triangulate findings
from various modes of data collection, and revolved around a central ethnographic
fragment discerned and unearthed in an earlier phase of fieldwork. In this thesis, I
examined how the various narratives and findings on the politics of water and the
impact of urban expansion on water governance square with existing theories of water
politics in the Mumbai region and also other metropolitan regions in India. My
fieldwork adopted a contingent, open–ended and process-oriented approach, one which
tried to develop an understanding of the role of institutions, rules and the formal and
informal mechanisms of water governance. It combined this institutional analysis with a
study of social relations in the rural communities in the water districts outside Mumbai
through interviews and survey research.
In the context of Thane district, my earlier fieldwork in June-September 2006
identified the perception of declining economic status within the Maratha-Kunbi
community as a central feature of the recent political economy of social relations.
Interviews conducted with leaders of the community revealed that the Maratha-Kunbis
and Vadavals had begun to contend that contesting the inequity in the distribution of
water between Mumbai and Thane was key to reversing their flagging economic
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fortunes in agriculture. Further interviews conducted with farmers from both the
Maratha-Kunbi and Vadaval communities also revealed that they had started perceiving
the tribal community as sharing their sense of crisis, which emanated from an unremunerative agriculture, seriously affected by the lack of water access. “Aamhi
Maratha-Kunbi pan Adivasi sarkhya jalo” (the state of Maratha-Kunbis has started
resembling the economic condition of the tribals) is a cryptic comment in Marathi,
which is often heard in conversations with political leaders and activists from the
community in the district. Along with this is the demand of the Kunbi Sena, which
represents Maratha-Kunbis to place access to water, land and employment at the centre
of the new resource politics in the district and the Konkan region. However, in contrast
to its stated objectives of attaining ‘farmers unity’ in Thane, the Maratha-Kunbi and the
Vadaval communities in the coastal area of Dahanu under the aegis of their separate
caste associations had also sought to consolidate their numbers and demand water for
farmers from their own caste groups. They tried to use their influence to garner a share
of water from dam projects at the expense of the tribal community (Navshakti, 2006).
With this background information on social relations between the tribal and non-tribal
communities from various parts of Thane district, I had focused on researching both
social relations and the institutions that had evolved around water governance in the
region during the 2006 trip.
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2.2

Research in Regional Planning and Government Offices
on Water Governance
The role of water institutions and social geography became quite central to the

dissertation’s three papers after the first fieldwork trip to the Surya command area in
2006. Data gathered during the interviews with metropolitan planners and engineers
during this trip also led to some of the research questions around formal and informal
water governance in this dissertation. The “abundant” availability of water and
underutilization of irrigation quotas in Thane district was pointed out by both
metropolitan planning officials in the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development
Authority (MMRDA) and the Irrigation Department in Thane. This data gathered from
interviews later led to research in the metropolitan planning reference libraries on the
history of water planning. Here, various committee reports on large dam and canal
projects in the Western Ghats and the regional planning aspects of urbanization were
researched. Since these reports were from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the importance
of developing a more contemporary picture of water management through field research
surfaced. At the same time, the information from these reports (on the early experiences
of communities in the Konkan Western Ghats with irrigation) provided a very useful
window into my observations during field research in 2008.
This later informed my overall methodological strategy when I was reading and
analyzing more contemporary metropolitan planning and Irrigation Department reports
on water. I used some of these early insights on local water politics and information
gathered from an analysis of both planning and irrigation reports to pose pointed
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research questions around social relations, institutions and water politics. The
incomplete state of the Surya irrigation project, the continued “underutilization” of
irrigation water, the issues around access to irrigation water which vary from social to
physical factors and the relationship between the tribal and non-tribal communities led
me to devise a research design based on two villages in what became a study of regional
water politics. At the same time, this dissertation did not plan on producing village
studies. The choice of two villages (Sakhare and Vanai) in Dahanu was primarily used
to address research questions around the underutilization of water in systems such as the
Surya.
The rest of this chapter outlines the fieldwork strategy that was employed during
research for this dissertation. I begin with providing some social and geographical
context to justify the rationale behind my choice of the canal system as a unit of
analysis. I then move on to providing more justification about my strategy to using open
ended interviews for my research on water governance in the Surya command area and
other parts of Thane district. I finally end with a section that describes the analysis of
qualitative and survey data for this dissertation.

2.3

Canal Irrigation as the Unit of Analysis

My ethnographic investigation over a period of four months in the summer of 2006
in the Surya command area revealed that the incomplete condition and the poor
maintenance of the canal conveyance system, and the increasing per capita water
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demands of the Mumbai Metropolitan region were the major causes of underutilization
of irrigation water in the Surya project 1.
For the purposes of my fieldwork and in order to answer my research questions
around water politics in papers one and two, I divided the command area of the Surya
irrigation project into two ecotypes. Most of the Vadaval farmers in the coastal area,
who belong to caste Hindu communities, have large land holdings which are mostly
irrigated by groundwater and are officially outside the Surya project command area. On
the other hand, the interior areas which lie eastward, within the command area, are
dominated by members of the tribal community, but have seen Vadaval farmers lease in
land in the horticultural belt around the village town of Vangaon. Within these two
ecotypes (see Fig 2.1, Zones I and II), detailed qualitative information was available for
one village, Sakhare, located at the upper reaches of the canal system of the Surya, and
qualitative data was available on Vanai village, which was downstream on the canal.
Both villages lie in the Dahanu block of the Surya command area. Sakhare
village was located in an area that has been the focus of a study on agrarian change by a
University of Mumbai sociologist in the 1980s (Munshi,1983). This study was very
useful as a baseline survey for my research. Ethnographic data on class relations was
also available on this area from this study. The district census which is done once every
decade is another useful source of data on population and agricultural land. My initial
interviews with Surya dam project staff revealed that some of the richer Vadaval
farmers have been default beneficiaries of the irrigation project because of the higher
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groundwater tables in the village and the consequent prosperity they have come to
experience.

!
Figure 2.1: Agro ecology situation in Thane district. Source: Irrigation
Department, Thane Irrigation Circle.

The access to groundwater had played a role, but their access to canal irrigation
has further enabled them to improve their prospects in horticulture.
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Very little ethnographic data from the past was available for Vanai village. My
choice of this village was facilitated by a local NGO, the Kashtakari Sanghatana, which
had a strong presence in the village as they had developed a grassroots presence for
advocacy work done on behalf of the tribal poor. Vanai lies in the lower reaches of the
canal system of the command area of the project and some tribal farmers have benefited
from irrigation water of the project, while there are substantial segments of the village
which had not experienced access. Both villages also had a significant seasonal migrant
population which travels to other parts of Thane district for work. Moreover, given the
history and the formation of caste and class-based identities in the district, the
importance of studying social dynamics in the aftermath of irrigation proved to be very
insightful. Sakhare and its surrounding settlements in Dahanu are at the centre of an
interesting, evolving regional water politics where the farmers from the coastal parts are
increasingly laying claim to the canal water of the Surya irrigation project due to the
their political influence in the state capital in Mumbai. In addition to the conflict on the
canal system, this imparts an interesting intra-rural caste and class dimension to water
politics in the region.
I chose villages purposively, with the main criterion being the strength of
contacts in both villages and the possibility of obtaining credible information. The
location of the villages on the canal system played an important role in my decision.
Sakhare was located in the northern reaches on the Palghar Branch Canal 2 while Vanai
was located on the southern reaches of the same canal. Both Sakhare and Vanai villages
have benefited from irrigation water, but these villages also witnessed the inward
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movement of Vadaval farmers from the coast who had leased in or purchased
agricultural land for horticulture. Moreover, both villages are at the centre of a fast
changing rural landscape, are geographically central to major transport routes, and lie
on a geographical continuum (the right bank canal coming down westward from the
mountains extending from Suryanagar across the Western Express Highway via Sakhare
to Vanai on Palghar Branch 2) which allowed me to “follow the water” as part of my
methodological strategy to study regional water politics.
Access to irrigation water has historically been an important marker of class
relations in agriculture in Dahanu. The following quotation from a 1983 ethnographic
study of a village neighbouring Sakhare (pseudonym used: Gavatgaon in Munshi, 1983)
highlights the importance of water to production relations in the villages in this belt.
While livestock and implements, especially the plough and bullocks
which are necessary for cultivation may be borrowed on standard terms
from the rich of the village, water remains a serious problem. The
marginal peasants, the poor peasants and some middle peasants are
entirely dependent on the rain water as the only source of irrigation.
Wells are an extremely expensive proposition beyond the capacity of
these classes. A few of the middle peasants, all the rich peasants and
most of the landlord-trader-creditor own a well and a motor pump each,
some even two. As a result, those without a well cannot grow a second
crop, and get only one crop of rainfed paddy. Even more important is the
harsh truth that the vagaries of nature which may affect all, may spell
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ruination for the small peasants. “Last year the rains failed, we did not
get even the seeds we sowed. (Munshi, 1983:213)
In Sakhare, there was a rich segment of Vadaval farmers who have done well in
horticulture in Dahanu. Each farmer from this community on average owned more than
twenty hectares of agricultural land and had good access to groundwater irrigation
(Question 1 in the introduction chapter of this dissertation around the relationship of
land ownership to water access). Using the study by Indra Munshi (Munshi, 1983) as a
baseline, the canal system was the unit of analysis in this village. Both my fieldwork in
2006 and past research such as Munshi’s dissertation documents that this rich segment
of farmers have been the mainstay of the rural economy in Dahanu, since they have
marketed their vegetable produce in various parts of India and the Middle East. These
farmers who belong to the Vadaval community have good access to credit, a ready
supply of tribal labour for their agricultural operations and command political influence
in the state capital, Mumbai, which they have used from time to time for their
commercial interests in horticulture. Vanai village was more homogenous in its ethnic
composition and a majority of inhabitants are small and marginal tribal farmers who
own up to two hectares. Like Sakhare, the village population was divided between
farmers who had large land holdings and came from outside the village and tribal
farmers who were from within the village. So access to water is an important marker of
production relations in agriculture in the village.
Canals constituted the major form of irrigation in Vanai village and the
experiences of farmers with water availability and scarcity can be elicited only with an
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extended stay as temporary resident in this village. In this village, as in Sakhare, the
canal system was the unit of analysis. Canals are better maintained at certain points than
others, depending in part on the political and social connections of the farmers. All these
factors affect utilization of canal water and often contribute to the varying economic
fortunes of farmers. The two research sites were part of the official beneficiary area of
the Surya irrigation project. There is a major dimension of variance across the two
communities in the two villages and purposive selection within these villages enabled
me to seek answers to the questions on water access and its relationship with the state of
production relations in this region. While I chose these villages for further field research
in 2006, an IDRC grant made it possible for me to return to India at the end of 2007. I
returned for field research in Thane district at the end of December 2007 and stayed in
Dahanu until September 2008 to cover the irrigation season between November 2007May 2008. The latter research trip involved a prior round of semi-structured interviews
in the villages with farmers and engineers and a survey that was administered to farmers
in both Sakhare and Vanai in May, 2008. I had made initial contact with engineers in the
Thane Irrigation Department as well as the Surya irirgation project in 2006. While the
frequent transfer of executive engineers with whom contact was initiated meant that I
had to renew my contacts with new personnel, my strategy being to write persistent
letters to the Thane Irrigation Department seeking access to the Surya project, finally
met with a positive response in January 2008.
Given that a pure focus on production relations is insufficient (Harris, 1982;
Mollinga, 2003), the role of the state, in particular, the local Irrigation Department in
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water development in this area was closely examined for it to serve as an important
background to the study of canal irrigation in this dissertation. My interviews with
engineers constitute the focus of paper one. The methods and the context for this
component of the research are outlined in some detail in section 2.4 below.

2.4

Following the Water: Institutions and Politics in the
Surya Project
Throughout my research in Dahanu in 2006 and 2008, engineers from the Surya

project had repeatedly drawn my attention to the fact that canal irrigation in villages
such as Sakhare and Vanai faced tremendous challenges from the terrain and how this
had come in the way of the project’s ability to meet its objectives. These constraints had
also led to a high underutilization of water. Therefore, I chose not to restrict myself to
studying canal irrigation within villages, but also observe irrigation rotations on the
main canal level. A schedule of canal rotations from November 2007 until May 2008
was shared with me by the Irrigation Department. Since one of the villages (Sakhare)
was located on the junction of the Palghar Branch and Dahanu (main) canals, I kept a
diary on whether the actual water rotations adhered to the schedule. This gave me
important insights into the political economy of water in the entire region where the two
villages were located. The Irrigation Department shared several reports with me on the
state of the project, environmental reports and a socio-economic survey from 1996.
Some of these reports had a description of the state of the canals, experiences of farmers
with the early reception of canal technology in this area and the early technological
rationale behind the water conveyance systems in the Surya project. These reports also
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gave me important information on water diversions outside the project’s command area.
Interviews with engineers were used to verify some of my observations both on the state
of the main canals, but also some of the irregular events (such as the stoppage of water
rotations on the main canal in May, 2008).
I interviewed ten engineers (of various ranks) and while most of the names used
in this dissertation are pseudonyms, I made sure that I do use their ranks to describe the
politics and responsibilities within the administrative hierarchy of the department (see
Paper One). I also established a rapport with other employees of the irrigation project to
triangulate my interviews with engineers. For Paper One, which describes the role of
engineers, I have used a narrative style combining interview data with an analysis of the
local Marathi media reports on corruption in the Surya project. It was impossible to
understand all the layers of corruption because of the sensitive (and potentially
dangerous) nature of the problem and the implications it had for my own safety in the
field. But one that constantly came up was the resentment of the lower level of
engineers towards their counterparts at senior levels. I made several notes from my
interviews in June 2008 that helped me piece together the account of institutional
corruption. The interview data gathered from fieldwork was brought into its proper
perspective only after the state wide Maharashtra irrigation corruption scam was
unearthed in 2012, which was also covered in the national press in India. The analysis
of the persistent problem of graft in the Maharashtra Irrigation Department by the
national and state level media helped me place the formal and informal politics of water
transfers in the Mumbai-Thane region in a broader political context. It also helped me
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confirm findings from the coverage of the local Marathi media in Dahanu (in 2008) on
the poor maintenance of the canal system and the corruption in the Surya project.
The open-ended nature of my field research and research with engineers helped
me understand water governance issues and the reasons behind underutilization at the
main canal level. The political pressures on executive engineers in the Surya project
came up a lot during conversations. While they were unwilling to talk about their
experiences initially, they often opened up to conversation when they were close to
being transferred to other locations in the state of Maharashtra. The socio-technical
nature of canal irrigation and the political dimensions of water management emerged
powerfully during these interactions. These conversations helped me place the reports
on water underutilization made available by the Irrigation Department in their
appropriate social context. Finally, this research on the irrigation bureaucracy helped me
answer the question on formal and informal mechanisms of water governance in the
region (see Introduction for Research Question 2).

2.5

Study of Tansa-Vaitarna Water District

The Tansa-Vaitarna water district entered the scope of my field research in the
context of a major agitation on water in the interior of Thane district in February and
March 2008. This agitation was a continuation of the protests against water scarcity that
had been going on in the interior parts of Thane district throughout the 2000s. I had also
travelled to this area in the summer of 2006. A study of this area was carried out mostly
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through key informant interviews with planners, municipal engineers, activists, and
conservation officers in the Tansa Wildlife Sanctuary and political leaders in the water
district and Mumbai in 2006 and 2008. Newspaper archives, planning reports, and dam
project reports were also gathered to draw a picture of the causes of the water conflict in
this area that revolved around the growing water demand from Greater Mumbai and its
impact on the basic water needs of the villages in the area. The T-V water district is
located 80 kms north east of the Dahanu area, but its significance to the water security
of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region and Greater Mumbai in particular, drew me to
travel to this region and gather information on the situation with rural water
entitlements.
Laws and governance entered the discussion during my interviews in this region.
However, given that the local engineers at the dams in the T-V water district were not
authorized to speak to researchers, I had to interview engineers and municipal officials
in Mumbai at the headquarters of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. The Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority’s planners provided information on the
city’s water rights in Thane district and their library had several reports that were useful
in helping me understand the water planning in this area. I also made careful notes from
my interviews with engineers and planners in their offices.
For my research on the T-V water district, three regional planners at the Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA), one forest conservation
official, three engineers from the Irrigation Department in Thane, three municipal
officials from the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and four political leaders belonging
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to various parties were interviewed. I have chosen to keep all their identities
anonymous. They shared some of their own experiences in dealing with water scarcity
in the T-V water district and spoke at length about how the entire area was committed
for Greater Mumbai’s urban use. The Irrigation Department in Thane district had shared
with me reports of the Bhatsa Multipurpose project, one of the largest projects in Thane
district. The objectives of the project were outlined in this report and the rights of the
local population also found a mention in this document. Dam project reports (DPR`s)
for the Surya project (Dahanu, Thane), the Kal project (Raigad district) and the Bhatsa
project (Shahpur,Thane) helped me understand the local rights situation in the T-V
water district better. I used these dam reports to place the water rights situation in the TV water district in a regional context. These dam reports also helped me understand the
engineering rationale behind the planning of the five urban water supply dams in T-V
water district.
Crucial material on the planning of the T-V water district was gathered from the
University of Chicago’s Crerar Library and the University of Chicago’s South Asia
collections in the summer of 2009. Archives of the Times of India’s Bombay edition
1954 at Robarts library’s Media Commons also helped place the long term evolution of
the water district in context. These were supplemented by Claude Inglis`s original
article that was found in an 1945 issue of an old Indian engineering journal in the
basement of Gerstein Science Library at the University of Toronto. The absence of data
from one single source was thus compensated by accessing these different sources of
information. Information on water use statistics in the Water Budgets from the State
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Government of Maharashtra and the various planning reports from the Mumbai
Metropolitan Planning Authority were used to confirm, verify and and validate findings
obtained from interviews with engineers and urban planners on the water problem in the
T-V water district. Information from all these sources was triangulated through an
analysis of the media coverage of the water district in newspapers in Mumbai city and
Thane district.

2.6

Research Design for Village Interviews
The core of my methodology for the study on canal irrigation is based on semi-

structured in-depth interviews with villagers and a sample survey on water access on the
canal system in both villages. However, since conducted face to face, observation of
agricultural practices, the state of dwellings in villages and the geography of settlement,
maintenance of canal systems and wells and group relations played a supporting role.
Most villagers are not trusting of filling out interview schedules or survey
questionnaires in India and therefore I had to make handwritten notes with the help of a
research assistant. Moreover, since water is a much contested resource and a source of
political tension in the command area of the Surya project, qualitative research
remained the best way of eliciting responses on access to irrigation. I conducted these
semi-structured interviews (with my knowledge of the local language, Marathi) and
observation with farming communities and their experiences with water scarcity in
order to construct a picture of political and economic changes and livelihoods in the
project area.
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A census of farmers from the irrigation project in both villages was gathered
from the data shared by the Irrigation Department on the canal minor systems in
Sakhare and Vanai. The Department also maintained topographical maps on the canal
minor system that were used to mark the locations of the large Vadaval farmers on the
canal system. Later these maps were used to map social differentiation in the villages.
Before conducting a 35% random sample survey with farmers who owned or leased
land on canal systems in both villages, an earlier round of semi-structured interviews
was conducted as part of a snowball sample on experiences with water scarcity on canal
minor systems. Purposive snowball sampling was used to choose farmers for the first
round of semi-structured interviews. 50 farmers (mostly heads of households were
interviewed) in each of the snowball rounds in both villages during the irrigation
season, December 2007-June 2008. A total of 154 farming households were covered in
this entire period. In the later survey round in May, a 35% random sample of farmers
based on their landholdings was created from the census and the survey (attached in
appendix) was administered after the snowball survey was completed. Farmers who
owned, leased or accessed land plots which were two or less hectares were classified as
small and marginal farmers (Mollinga 2003). Farmers who owned or leased ten hectares
or more were categorized as large farmers. Access to land holding data and the stark
inequality in land ownership and control made the task of researching social
differentiation easier. Questions in both rounds focused on access to the canal system
and experiences with access to water. Care was taken not to repeat the survey with
farmers who were interviewed in the earlier qualitative snowball round. I chose only
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those farming households which listed agriculture as their main occupation. The survey
questionnaire and the interview schedule are attached as an appendix to this thesis.

2.7

Qualitative Interviews
Semi-structured interviews with farmers and engineers were conducted only

after a social rapport was established. In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also
conducted open-ended conversations which were used to supplement information from
the interviews. These conversations took place at farmers’ homes, in their fields and in
public settings such as local grocery shops, tea shops (cafes) or the local dairy
cooperative. Interviews with the engineers of the Surya project took place at their
homes (often in Mumbai) and in tea shops. Respondents tend to be open during
informal interviews and people in rural India are are eager to chat when one runs into
them in the village. Such interviews and conversations were supplemented by continued
analysis of secondary data, such as maps and agriculture data, procured from the village
revenue officer and the Irrigation Department, on land and water use.
I used village maps that indicate type of irrigation facility and which are
available from the canal officer. Information from these sources were used to provoke
discussion with farmers about patterns of water use and also to place material gleaned
from interviews in their appropriate physical context with help of maps of the canal
minor system in the villages. During my stay in the villages, I also observed local
village society in an anthropological mode of investigation, focusing particularly on
social relations between various castes and classes of farmers, the role of water and land
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institutions and the experiences of farmers with water access on the canal system in the
villages. Most of the recent ethnographic research done on irrigation in agrarian studies
in India on which this study is modelled has been done with the help of a long extended
stay in villages as a temporary resident (Dubash, 2002; Mollinga, 2003). I have also had
work experience in Thane district as a social worker, which makes me familiar with the
customs, language and mores of the tribal, Maratha-Kunbi and Vadaval communities.
Since I often stayed in the two villages in this period, the economic polarization
between the tribal community and the Vadavals became far more obvious. I simply
chose to be an observer and not openly participate in the various political agitations and
lobbying around water which take place in the district. I was present only at one protest
meeting in Dahanu in August 2008 as an attendee, but this was primarily to take notes
on a new anti-dam movement. Nevertheless, I did depend on second hand accounts of
such political activity through local newspapers and activists, which provided me with
more clarity on the broader politics of water in this particular area in Dahanu block.
These are aspects of water politics which can only be discerned through fieldwork and
such ethnographic presence. Ethnography in this context is more about a mode of data
collection where fieldwork is central and pays attention to the interlocking of multiple
socio-political sites and locations in Dahanu and Thane district (Gupta and Fergusson,
1996).
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2.8

Logistics of Qualitative Research
A record of the names of respondents throughout the fieldwork was maintained,

along with the time and location at which I spoke to them and their contact address.
Some of the names of the respondents, especially engineers were kept confidential to
meet the research and ethics protocol of Western University, where this dissertation was
drafted. Some farmers also wished to stay anonymous, though a majority were
comfortable giving their names. The politically sensitive nature of fieldwork in this area
also meant that I have assigned pseudonyms to people who made such requests.
Two further kinds of records were kept while conducting this research:
1) A field note log where I jotted down notes from an interview as the
communities were not comfortable on my reliance on tape recorders. Notes were also
taken to assist in debriefing myself after an interview about the encounter – the nature
of context and interaction in situations relevant to the research. This log included notes
on any ad-hoc encounters with participants (e.g., a social gathering attended by many
participants).
2) A research diary was maintained. The diary was a record of how I tried to
obtain interviews, my encounters with farmers and my concerns and further questions
that arose during the research process. I also included comments on my shifting
positionality during the interviews and recorded my initial reactions to the interview
sessions. Although some of this information was jotted down in my field note log, the
research diary recordings provided context to the interview process.
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I see these methods (semi-structured interviews combined with field log and
diary) as the most appropriate in seeking to answer my questions around access to
irrigation water and experiences with water scarcity. Ethnographic approaches
complement surveys because village economies and economic relationships within and
between villages are embedded within social relations, and these are best understood
through the sort of in-depth “thick description” that an ethnographic approach can
provide. Given the centrality of caste-based politics and institutions in the distribution
of water in this context, the use of such qualitative research tools were key to
understanding the socio-political processes which underlie access to water.

2.9

Timeline of 2008 Field Research and Organizations that
Helped in Research
In between the stay in villages, the period January-February 2008 was also used

to gather reports and data from district offices on irrigation. Secondary information on
land records was gathered from the village revenue officer on landownership within the
village. Data on net sown area and irrigated area (from canals and wells) in villages as
held by the Surya project irrigation office. I gathered data for the last ten years and this
helped me make some broad observations on changes in cropping patterns and agrarian
structure in the villages. I also renewed contacts with organizations such as the
Kashtakari Sanghatana in Thane district once I returned for field data collection to India
in December 2008. Prior contact was established during an earlier field session in 2006.
Other organizations with which I renewed contacts during the 2008 field research are
the Maratha-Kunbi Sena, the Kashtakari Sanghatana and the Communist Party of India
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(Marxist) as well as individuals such as Mr Navneet Shah who lives in Palghar block
and was central to the legal advocacy efforts on the Surya dam issue. Further
information and progress on the advocacy front was gathered from these organizations
and individuals and their respective opinions and evaluation of the local politics was
sought and analyzed to summarize the developments around water politics in the area in
the past year. Due to the presence of the Surya project, the Dahanu area is at the centre
of an intense political contestation around water. It was vital to update my
understanding of the social, political and economic context through my access to these
individuals and organizations. It also helped me develop a better understanding of the
rural context which I was going to research. All the above mentioned organizations and
individuals maintained good written records and documentation of the media coverage
of the issue, which was also accessed and provided the much needed context for my
interviews and ethnographic research. This part of Thane district had been witnessing
social and political ferment over water throughout the 2000’s and local newspapers
covered the events around water very well. Such secondary accounts from the media do
not address any research questions on their own, but supplement and provide broad
support to the data gathered from semi-structured interviews with villagers, engineers,
officials and activists.
The bulk of interviews, surveys and ethnographic research in Dahanu block
were conducted between January and June 2008. I also stayed for a brief period in both
villages during this period. Most of the interviews and the surveys were conducted
before the start of the monsoon (rainy) season in June, 2008.
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2.10 Analytical Strategies
All names of farmers, engineers, planners and most politicians provided in the
dissertation from the interview and survey data are pseudonyms. This was in keeping
with the ethics protocol of Western University to impart anonymity to all respondents.
All interviews that inform the three papers were first hand written in the local language,
Marathi (with the explicit permission of respondents) and duly transcribed. Respondent
confidentiality was strictly preserved at all stages during transcription. Interview data
was supplemented by field logs. A monthly report submitted to my PhD Committee also
helped me summarize fieldwork. These data were ordered and interpreted using the
qualitative data management software package NVivo. At the end of all the interviews,
interpretative reports were built on the descriptive reports to suggest what findings
might mean and take alternative explanations into account. Themes arising from the
interviews (corruption, land grabbing, fencing of canals, hydrometric area, laws,
Mumbai) were coded with different colours and different answers were given to
different colours. A count of the various themes (e.g. land, political contacts, water,
canals, rules, rotations, corruption, outlets) which emerged, was maintained. I kept
electronic copies of the data on a computer so as to make analysis easier later. In terms
of coding, I reviewed data documents, stored electronically, line by line, developing
codes to represent themes, patterns and categories. Discourse analysis guided my
conceptual development of the themes, patterns and categories, which emerged as the
data were transcribed. I often returned to the conceptual and empirical literature around
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water in human geography, political economy and agrarian studies for guiding my
further fieldwork strategy.
Due to the lack of literature on irrigation in this region, I had to rely majorly on
the reports provided to me by the Irrigation Department and the reports I found at the
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) during my
fieldwork. Thus, though my approach was inductive, this does not mean that I
approached fieldwork devoid of any theoretical expectation. I deployed both
institutional theory and tools I had learned from political ecology to determine
situations that appear anomalous and aimed to reconstruct theory to address these
anomalies as fieldwork proceeded. An instance of this was my attempt to develop a
grasp of the rules that were used to regulate canal irrigation in this area around Mumbai.
As secondary literature on Konkan irrigation was lacking, I relied on making very
detailed notes from my conversations with engineers and villagers that eventually
helped me write Paper One and Paper Three in this dissertation. Comparisons of the
Konkan with research literature on the drier canal irrigated regions of interior
Maharashtra and India helped me understand the formal rules and also the informal
norms that influenced the day-to-day governance of water in the Surya project.
All hundred interviews with farmers in both villages during the first round
(where I had snowballed respondents) gave me a clear idea of the causes behind the
scarcity on the canal minor system. A map that provided a layout of the canal minor
system from the Irrigation Department for Sakhare village was printed and plotted on
the basis of crop patterns with the help of local villagers. The map was used to verify
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claims made by farmers in this round of interviews. Canals and large farms were traced
on the map by actually walking through the entire length of both villages. Since most
canal sub-minors were breached at certain points and fenced off into large farms, and
the latter were inaccessible to outsiders, accounts narrated by neighbouring farmers and
wage labour who worked on these farms were used to develop a picture of social
differentiation and water conflict. Often, the large farmers invited me to their farms, but
the access was limited to viewing the vegetable crops and wells. The sub-minors and
canal minors (that were government property) were concealed from my view, however I
did manage to take one picture of how water was stolen on a canal minor from within a
large farm that had illegally encroached on the system. Visits to other villages in the
horticultural belt confirmed that this was part of a widespread pattern of water grabbing
in this entire area.
The first round of interviews was conducted at the head, middle and tail reaches
of the canal minor system in both villages. It helped me answer questions on how
location on the canal minor system was a major determinant for the small and marginal
tribal farmers in their access to water on the system. However, for the large farmers, due
to their control of land on various reaches of the canal minor system, location did not
really matter. The interviews also revealed difficulties with the canal system and the
heavy flow of water that was experienced by both tribal and the large non-tribal
farmers, an aspect that would not have been revealed, if I had relied purely on a closed
ended survey questionnaire.
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The produced nature of water scarcity became obvious during this first round. At
the same time, the theory and empirical research on Indian canal systems did not help
me a lot during field research as the canal system was designed to meet water on
demand from farmers. More importantly, the system also witnessed massive wastage of
water. Therefore, I relied on developing good field notes and also took pictures that
were later used to understand experiences of farmers. These notes and pictures became
useful after the publication of Bruce Lankford’s book (Lankford, 2013) that dealt
critically with the conventional academic and policy analysis of the wastage of water
and underutilization in irrigation systems and water policy. The Surya canal system was
a productive irrigation system where water was available for a second paddy crop, but
suffered from underutilization. While it had some protective features, it was a project
designed mostly to increase agricultural production in a water rich belt.
Lankford’s theoretical understanding of water wastage in irrigation systems like
the Surya arrived only during my writing stage, but proved to be very useful in
developing the institutional and political-ecological framework that informs this
dissertation. It also became useful in understanding the phenomenon and politics of
water underutilization (see Paper Three and Question 1 & 2 in the Introduction). Thus,
the detailed field notes on scarcity (in the context of massive water wastage on the canal
systems) from the interviews and observation during this round eventually proved to be
very beneficial.
During fieldwork, analysis of the qualitative data from the earlier round of
interviews helped me develop a picture of social relations in this area and a survey
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questionnaire for the next round was developed in April, 2008 for the two villages under
study (attached in the Appendix). While the first round of interviews was very useful
and yielded a lot of information on experiences with water access on the canal system, I
saw the importance of a survey round to triangulate findings from my interviews with
engineers and farmers and their experiences of water scarcity and management on the
system.

2.11 Survey Data: Triangulating the Interview Data
Since the canal system in the villages was the unit of analysis, a census of
farmers on the canal minor system according to land ownership was created from the
data provided by the Irrigation Department. The methodological strategy followed for
this round of research was based on Mollinga (2003). The village command area was
subdivided into sub-commands on the maps provided to me by the Irrigation
Department. Canal Minors that were chosen for the sample survey were different from
the minors and sub-minors that were covered in the semi-structured interviews. Once a
census of beneficiaries was developed, a total of 31 farmers (in both the small and
marginal and large categories and based on a 35% random sample of the census) were
surveyed on two canal minors in Sakhare. Similarly, a total of 23 farmers (based on a
random 35% sample of the census) were surveyed on the canal minor system in Vanai.
All rice cultivating small and marginal tribal farmers in both villages came
under the small and marginal category as they owned or accessed less than 2 hectares of
agricultural land which was often sub-divided between family members. There wasn’t a
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single large landholding tribal farmer who grew commercial crops in this particular
region. The large Vadaval farmers (who owned more than 10 hectares of land on
average) had already been identified during the earlier round of interviews. The
objective of this round was to investigate water access on the canal system and verify
findings made during the earlier round of semi-structured interviews. Data on questions
relating to water access (non-access to irrigation water) on the canal minor system was
tabulated from the survey in the second round in the villages and is presented in the
tables and empirical analysis in paper three, which deals with canal irrigation.
Responses to specific questions on water were counted and the reasons behind lack of
access to water (unlevelled land, enclosed canal, poor maintenance of canals, cattle
problem etc.) were categorized. Other socio-economic data not directly related to access
to water was gathered during the survey, but is not used in this dissertation.
The surveys were conducted with the help of a research assistant who was
familiar with the geography of the canal minor system and the issues with water access
and land titles in both villages. The experiences of farmers with issues relating to access
to the canal system were also collated during the socio-economic survey. These were
later assembled and triangulated with the findings from the earlier round of qualitative
interviews that were conducted during the snowball round. The survey round mostly
confirmed the findings of the earlier round of interviews on water scarcity, but yielded
some additional information on the loss of land by tribal farmers on the canal system.
Data on the extent of landownership of large farmers in both villages had been
gathered during the initial snowball round, but was confirmed with more recent revenue
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tables that were made available from the engineers. The revenue tables also revealed the
presence of conjunctive use of water by the large farmers who had constructed wells to
tap into the re-charge of groundwater made possible by canal irrigation.
During the survey round itself, I also sought information on the experiences of
the villagers with the engineers. This was done to verify the information provided by
engineers on the canal system and their own impressions about the rural population. My
stay in the villages and the informal conversations yielded rich information on the
irrigation engineers, the guards on the canal system and the maintenance work on the
canals. Most members of the tribal community were conspicuous by their absence from
employment in the Irrigation Department, at the same time, since they worked as wage
labour on maintaining the main canal levels, they were well informed on the quality of
the maintenance work and the water rotations on the canals.

2.12 Conclusion
Field research undertaken as part of this dissertation was closely complemented
by library and archival research (already outlined above). The narrow specialized
research on the Konkan region`s irrigation by local economists (Mitra, 1990) provided
some empirical data, but was more of a hindrance in understanding local water policy.
Policy and committee reports, archival data and the easier availability of data on the
internet on issues around Maharashtra irrigation helped me more in framing the
arguments and developing a historical understanding of how water policy had evolved
in this region. This policy dimension finds its place in all three component manuscripts
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in the dissertation. This became especially important when I was drafting the
dissertation, as one of the objectives was to understand the role, governance and policy
had played in shaping the water conflict in the Mumbai-Thane region. The focus on
institutions was greatly enabled by access to historical data on the Mumbai water supply
system (made available from libraries in the UK, US and Canada) that was woven into
the dissertation`s theoretical framework.
The qualitative methodological tools and strategy that informed research for this
dissertation proved to be very useful in developing a broader institutional-geographical
profile of the water situation in Mumbai-Thane region. At the same time, I was unable
to utilize the rich census data that was available because of the focus on social and
political processes that underlie water access in this region. However, where possible,
background statistics on local demography and water use from the Indian Census, Water
Budgets of the Government of Maharashtra and reports provided by the Irrigation
Department have been provided throughout the dissertation. This will give the reader an
idea of the changing geography of water utilization in the Mumbai-Thane region.

Notes
1.Underutilization of irrigation water in a particular project is measured in two ways. If
the actual irrigated area irrigated under different crops during a season turns out to be
less than the area visualized, proposed and designed by project planners to be irrigated
during the season, then it may be termed underutilization. Alternatively, if the volume of
irrigation water used by farmers during the season turns out be less than the quantity of
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water designed to be supplied during that season, it may be termed underutilization
(Mitra 1986, 1990; 1998).
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3.

Canal Bureaucracy and the Corruption Nexus around
Water in the Mumbai Hinterland: Questions for
Development and Governance in Maharashtra, India

3.1

Introduction
As a case study of an irrigation project, this paper examines corruption in the

context of the Surya Dam Project located in the Konkan, west coast region of
Maharashtra State, India, just outside the boundaries of the Mumbai Metropolitan
Region (MMR). Surya is one of six large dam projects constructed since the 1980s, and
was designed as a multipurpose dam to tap the waters of a major and important river
outside Mumbai. Its primary purpose was to produce hydropower and irrigation for
24,000 hectares of agricultural land in a predominantly tribal belt of Konkan. Yet it has
also come to supply one of the fastest growing peri-urban regions of Mumbai with
water for domestic and industrial use - especially two urban townships of the MMR.
The paper begins with a review and evaluation of existing literature on
development and political economic corruption in India. From there it can be argued
that, to understand the politics of water in that context, it is also essential to understand
the role of the lower level bureaucracy in greater detail. In particular, lower level
engineers tend to be the chief instruments and purveyors of development benefits from
large multipurpose dam projects to rural populations. One of the objectives of the paper
is to provide a general theoretical background for a critique of existing literature on
water-sector corruption in India. This paper will thus examine a range of theoretical and
case study research on corruption, by a wide range of social scientists. It will also
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analyze the organizational structure of Surya project, as well present a case study on
chronic corruption in the Maharashtra Irrigation Department. This paper concludes by
making a case for a more layered understanding of the lower level bureaucracy
(including its treatment of lower caste and tribal communities), as well as for reform of
governance in irrigation projects. The conventional understanding of the politicalbureaucratic nexus around corruption in irrigation projects in India has been firmly
represented in Indian social science scholarship by Robert Wade’s classic papers of
1982 and 1985 (Wade, 1982, 1985). While acknowledging the strengths of Wade`s
arguments, this paper points to the weaknesses in his use of the rational choice
framework to explain the behaviour of junior bureaucrats who are unwilling or are
uninterested in transfers to other locations. The chapter identifies possible reasons for
junior bureaucrats not to seek promotions or transfers because of the potential for
skimming off developmental subsidies in economically backward areas. In the context
of this paper, I highlight the nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and rural oligarchs who
project a myth of undeserving poor tribal farmers in helping justify water diversion to
urban areas.

3.2

Corruption and Bureaucratic Transfers:
Rational Choice, and Ethnographic Research on
Corruption in the Water Sector of India

3.2.1 Geography of the Project
Historically in the state of Maharashtra, areas of low rainfall have been the focus
of large dam building projects. Since the Colonial period, such projects have been
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concentrated in the Western Ghats and the drier, southwestern region, to benefit interior
areas. Dams built on the eastern end of the Western Ghats mostly conveyed water to
agricultural fields of Western Maharashtra via long aqueducts, ensuring that the drier,
southwestern parts of the state were sheltered from threats of drought (Government of
Maharashtra, 1984; Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Government of Maharashtra, 1999).
However, by the late 1960s and 1970s, new engineering technologies made it possible
to build large dams in western parts of the Sahyadri mountain range (part of the Western
Ghats) in coastal Konkan region. Subsequently, this potential was publicized and
projects for irrigation in this region were expanded (Government of Maharashtra,
1981a, 1981b).
Until then, dam projects in the Western Ghats around Mumbai had mainly
focused on building medium, independent reservoirs to supply water and
hydroelectricity for the city. Constructed at a huge cost of millions of rupees, the two
large storage reservoirs of the Surya project were completed in the late 1970s, while the
staff quarters and divisional offices (where I conducted field research) were completed
in the early 1980s. Like many large, multipurpose projects in Maharashtra State, the
canal building work for Surya was obstructed by hilly terrain and a lack of
environmental clearances from the Forest Department. It was only in the early 1980s
that the project began to provide irrigation for about two thirds of the command area
and only in the late 1990 was a greater area brought under irrigation. More than three
quarters of the canal works for Surya project are now complete, but the rest remain
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unfinished due to a continuing lack of environmental clearance for raising the height on
one of the project reservoirs.
Currently, most of the project income comes from urban and industrial revenues,
while the bulk of water storage remains utilized for canal irrigation. At least 20% of
total water from the two Surya reservoirs is conveyed to industrial areas just outside
metropolitan Mumbai, including one of the fastest growing townships in the MMR. As
such, the Surya project has become a lightning rod for contentious water politics in the
region. This involves, on one hand, NGO’s and social movements representing rural,
mostly tribal, agricultural communities. On the other hand are real estate lobbies with
an interest in profiting from the urban expansion of the MMR at its fringes. For local,
tribal farmers, access to canal irrigation from a large project like Surya facilitates a
second yearly crop, which reduces their dependence on seasonal migration. Access to
such irrigation also enables them to diversify food grains production to include
vegetables, fruits and other cash crops. It is estimated that such irrigation also helps to
reduce poverty by about 50%, compared to Maharashtra households without access to
irrigation (Panda, 2007).

3.2.2 Wade's Research on Corruption
Robert Wade’s classic studies of corruption in the bureaucrat-politician nexus set
the standard in the field of development studies for research on corruption and
governance (Wade, 1982, 1985). Wade’s framework for studying reasons behind
bureaucratic corruption is especially useful and important here, when we consider
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methodologies and theoretical framings in the specific context of Maharashtra and the
MMR. This analysis and summary of Wade's work begins with a review of his methods
and theory, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. It then lays out the foundations
of an alternative strategy that provides for a more context-specific account of
bureaucratic corruption.
Two of Wade's papers are rooted in ethnographic research conducted on the
canal system and irrigation bureaucracy in Andhra Pradesh, India during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Wade sought to analyze the reasons behind the sub-optimal
performance of large scale canal irrigation systems in India by combining a focus on the
governance of water distribution (on the main canal level) with the administrative
functioning of the state Irrigation Department. He later used these findings to produce a
generalized framework that focused on transfer turnover to explain the
underperformance of the Indian state in overall economic development (Wade, 1985).
Borrowing extensively from disciplines as diverse as economics, political science,
social anthropology, public administration and irrigation science, Wade`s framework for
understanding the bureaucratic-political nexus in Indian irrigation highlighted how
corruption has been facilitated by a market in public office (Wade, 1985). Wade’s main
argument was that the control exercised by politicians over the postings of bureaucrats
has engendered a corrupt, hierarchical structure, where bribes become exchanged for
lucrative postings. That, in turn, results in a distorted and malevolent structure of water
governance.
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That structure facilitating the exchange of bribes has had negative implications
for the performance of irrigation systems in modern India. Another important
contribution of Wade’s research is his policy prescriptions for reform, to mitigate the
negative impact of the politician-bureaucrat nexus - which still inform policy research
on administrative corruption in India1.
Wade identified five major causes underlying the persistence of corruption in the
Indian irrigation bureaucracy. According to him, some causes can be generalized, while
others are very specific to the irrigation sector. First I will examine whether the causes
identified by Wade still persist in the contemporary Indian water resources sector. Then
I will review the social sciences and policy literature on corruption that pertains to
Indian development.
Wade's five underlying causes of political-administrative corruption in the
irrigation sector are as follows:
•

Electoral institutions that amplify pressure toward corruption and make it
systemic;

•

Political control of the irrigation bureaucracy through transfers of
bureaucratic staff;

•

Lack of user participation and control in irrigation projects;

•

Scarcity of water resources;

•

A wide gulf (in education and status) between Irrigation Department officials
and rural, user-populations.
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Today, all of the factors observed by Wade that characterize poor governance
continue to persist in the public administration of Indian water agencies. And elections
and election funding remain as major factors underlying the Indian politician-bureaucrat
nexus (Government of India, 2007). Politicians also continue to exercise their control
over water-sector transfers and regulation in order to earn rents, which then fill ‘war
chests’ that help them maintain or expand their power during elections, or after
fragmented electoral outcomes (Das, 2002; Debroy and Bhandari, 2012; Corbridge,
2013). Indian daily newspaper reports of politicians with wealth and assets
disproportionate to their declared sources of income also indicate that political power is
used to amass wealth. Thus, Indian politicians' influence and control over bureaucratic
transfers persists at several levels (Jenkins and Goetz, 2005; Heston and Kumar, 2008) despite recommendations of the Second Administrative Commission which
recommended reducing such political involvement in the bureaucracy (Government of
India, 2007, Ch. 6).
In terms of Indian water-sector reform, Wade`s advocacy for greater userparticipation in irrigation planning has seen only limited success (Ballabh, 2008; Joy
and Paranajpe, 2008; Vaidyanathan, 2010; Shah, 2012). Although some canal-irrigated
parts of the country have witnessed some successful participation by farmers’ wateruser associations, such involvement in large irrigation projects has generally failed to
bear fruit in large parts of rural India that are serviced by canals. The consequence of
low participation at the local level, and farmers' inability to administer water systems
they rely on, is that the water-resources sector remains largely centralized, and tightly
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controlled and regulated by the irrigation bureaucracy. In this context, scarcity of water
resources in India also persists as an influential factor.
Table 3.1: Average Annual per capita Water Consumption in India
Source: UNICEF (2013)
YEAR

POPULATION
(in millions)

PER CAPITA AVERAGE
ANNUAL AVAILABILITY
M3/YEAR

2001

1029 (2001 Census)

1816

2011

1210 (2011 Census)

1545

2025

1394 (Projected)

1340

2050

1640 (Projected)

1140

The rapid growth of Indian cities, along with increased cultivation of waterintensive commercial crops (including more harvests per year) has only exacerbated
stress and inter-sectoral competition over control of water in several parts of India (see
Table 3.1) (Joy et al, 2008b; UNICEF, 2013). Interestingly, recent political-ecological
studies on water by anthropologists and geographers emphasize that local scarcity of
water may often be artificially produced (Swyngedouw, 2004; Mehta, 2005; and UNDP,
2006). Such literature broadly considers how water scarcity has been created/produced,
both materially and discursively.2 (Mehta, 2005, p. 9). However, produced scarcity is a
concept that remains under-utilized in water policy literature. A goal of this paper is to
illustrate the role of the politician-bureaucrat nexus in creating such scarcity; how that
dynamic supports a myth that poor, tribal communities are unable to use water
efficiently for irrigation; and how these help justify diverting water to rapidly growing
metropolitan regions. Finally, the wide gulf that Wade highlighted (Wade, 1982)
between bureaucrats and farmers, in terms of social status and ability to navigate
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administrative bureaucracy, remains true of rural India. While some scholars have
attributed this to India's particular evolution and local level structural factors (HarrisWhite, 2003), recent anthropological and political economic studies support Wade’s
view of corruption and dysfunction in rural India as a result of socioeconomic
differences between upper- and middle-caste government employees, and poor, lowercaste citizens (Shah, 2010; Dreze and Sen, 2013, Ch. 4; Harris and Jeffrey, 2013).
However, although the strengths of Wade’s analytical framework remain, his
analysis of the corruption nexus in the irrigation sector relies primarily on a model of
bureaucratic behaviour in which the influence of non-economic factors is excluded.
Both his 1982 and 1985 papers also use a theoretical framework influenced by public
choice literature.3 The underlying assumptions there are that bureaucrats and politicians
are self-interested, rent-seeking actors solely motivated to maximize their budget
allocations, from which they regularly siphon off funds. To a large degree, with minor
variations, this simple framework informs Wade’s research on corruption. It also
informs his framework on how bribes are exchanged, and transfers and lucrative
postings are traded, at various levels of the irrigation bureaucracy with collusion from
elected politicians. The diagram below illustrates the structure of bribery that facilitates
the flow of funds and gifts-in-kind between: 1) various ranks of engineers; 2) senior
engineers and politicians; and 3) farmers, engineers and other irrigation staff, which is
primarily funded by the theft of resources from operations and maintenance contracts
(see Fig.3.1, below).
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Figure 3.1: Diagram showing the power structure of an Irrigation Department, and the upward and
downward flow of bribes and transfers/postings in Wade`s framework. Illustration by this paper’s author
based on (Wade, 1982 & 1985).

Corruption is also exacerbated through the illegal distribution and sale of scarce
water, which is in turn facilitated by the subversion of rules on the canal network. The
entire explanation is embedded in a framework of how power relations and money or
non-monetary exchange flow upwards within the irrigation bureaucracy and the
political structures of water governance (Wade, 1985).
In addition, Wade’s theoretical framework on corruption synthesizes political
and economic approaches to corruption. The political aspect of Wade’s model relies on
an understanding of formal political structures (i.e. a competitive electoral system) as
the dominant independent variable. Complementing this, the economic aspect of his
model helps us understand the willingness of a bureaucrat to sell official goods in an
informal market driven by scarcity. However, as the political scientist Robert Price
writes in his account of administrative corruption in Ghana, there remains a problem
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with such a model. Specifically, economic and political approaches to understanding
bureaucratic corruption are not by themselves sufficient to help us understand why a
bureaucrat is willing to participate in corruption (Price, 1975). In other words, Wade’s
approach does not sufficiently anticipate the extent to which corruption can take
complex cultural and organizational forms, and so ignores the influence of certain
contextual factors. For instance, the hierarchy of the Irrigation Department in Wade’s
research is presented as a structure that functions independently of contingencies that
are a feature of local politics, such as the social background, aspirations and training of
engineers; the social and official hierarchies within the bureaucracy; and the history and
geography of water resource development in the region.
An alternative view is that, through his ethnography of the Irrigation
Department, Wade was actually attempting to develop a framework to explain the
dysfunctionality of the developmental state in India more broadly. In fact, Wade himself
acknowledged in his 1982 paper that, while his study on corruption may generally
reflect the state of irrigation governance and administration in India, the corrupt
administration-political nexus in irrigation might also manifest itself differently in other
settings (Wade, 1982, p. 292).
Thus, while Wade’s ethnographic work is partly informed by social and
geographical particulars of Andhra Pradesh (where he conducted field research) and the
influence of certain agro-ecological circumstances surrounding water politics, he does
not address how the nexus integrates with patron-client relations in the local state (Khan
and Sundaram, 2000; Harris-White, 2003). That omission may partly be due to the
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anonymity Wade needed to extend to the main actors and to the irrigation project itself
in his ethnography. As such, Wade’s account of corruption largely relies on interviews
with senior executive engineers, and his 1982 paper communicates a certain kind of
deference that assistant engineers, section officers and supervisors are expected to
afford their senior engineers. It follows, then, that this dynamic could be changed by the
cultural dynamics and local politics of a different context, i.e. where water scarcity is
not a defining factor in the design of an irrigation project, and where junior engineers
are not motivated by promotional opportunities.
Therefore, in general accounts such as Wade`s, which are informed by rational
choice and seek universal and parsimonious explanations, the complexity of individual
motivations and of administrative and political decision making processes are
necessarily excluded. For example, variations in personal identity and interpersonal
relations are underemphasized, in a perspective that prefers to see decision-making as
predictably stable over time, among individuals commonly motivated by rational,
instrumental, utility-maximizing priorities (Griggs, 2007). However, rational choice
alone cannot explain how self-interest develops or may evolve (Marglin, 2008), and
thus, socio-historical and discursive frameworks remain useful (Mollinga, 2008)4.
Besides, if we need to understand corruption as a social problem with many layers,
highlighting local configurations of corruption could be crucial for effectively
informing policy (Corbridge, 2013). Table 3.2, below, highlights methodological
differences between researchers who rely more on qualitative and case study methods
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(i.e. anthropologists, geographers), versus those who develop more formal approaches
(i.e. economists, political economists).
Table 3.2: Corruption in India: Various Methodological Approaches to Research, Across
Disciplines.
APPROACHE
S

FOCUS and
METHOD

CAUSES

ADVOCACY

AUTHORS

PRINCIPAL
AGENT
APPROACH
(Economics)

RATIONAL
CHOICE and
INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH
(Economics, Economic
Anthropology, Political
Economy)

DISCURSIVE
APPROACH
(Social and Cultural
Anthropology, Human
Geography)

ETHICALECONOMIC and
COLLECTIVE
ACTION
APPROACHES
(Economics,
Political Economy,
Human Geography
and Anthropology)

Institutional and
Incentive
Structure; selfinterested actors.
Models

Bureaucratic political
nexus; budget
maximizing
bureaucrat; rules of the
game and institutions;
self-interested actors
Ethnography

Socio-cultural norms,
individual subjectivity.
Ethnography and case
studies

Public Action, social
norms, governance
of monopolies,
social justice,
politics of
citizenship,
affirmative action.
Case Studies

Information
asymmetry,
uncertainty,
hierarchy of
organizations and
risk, natural
monopolies

Over centralization,
hierarchies, lack of
transparency, public
sector monopolies,
scarcity, transition
societies

Neo-Patrimonialism,
patron-client relations

Lack of enforcement
and punishment,
corruption as a
problem of public
ethics in a fast
transforming society.

Changing the
incentive structure,
institutional
reform, reducing
distortions arising
out of resource
allocations,
electoral
competition and a
system of checks
and balances

Decentralization,
access to information
and collective action

Social Change and
transformation

Legal democratic
reform, Role of
Media in exposing
corruption,
strengthening
investigative
systems,
decentralization,
transparency, audits
& accountability

Ajit Mishra,(2005)
Kaushik Basu,
(2011)

Robert Wade (1982 &
1985)

Akhil Gupta,(2012)
Alpa Shah (2010),
Stuart Corbridge, et. al
(2005)
Kumar and Corbridge,
(2002)

Jean Dreze and
Amartya Sen (2013)
Stuart Corbridge,
(2008) Jonathan
Parry (2000)
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3.2.3 Critiquing and Reformulating Wade’s Framework
Overall, most of the factors that Wade identified through his own research on
water-sector corruption in India remain relevant. What essentially makes corruption
common in many Asian countries with large canal systems is that it is almost impossible
for cultivators to assess water availability independently (Transparency International,
2008, p. 68-69), or to assess the performance of government bureaucracies. For
instance, irrigation management agencies are not accustomed to sharing information for
the sake of transparency. And with bureaucrats firmly controlling information that
remains inaccessible to irrigators, opportunities open up for corruption. For example,
large irrigation subsidies for both construction and maintenance are generally provided
to bureaucracies in the form of maintenance budgets, without a direct link to
performance or output. Then, construction and maintenance tasks are privately
outsourced with insufficient accountability for results. As such, large scale dam and
irrigation projects are unlikely to succeed unless incentives for corruption among
various stakeholders are reduced.
A prime illustration of this culture of non-transparency is the discovery of a
recent irrigation scam in Maharashtra State (Jog, 2012) in which a nexus of politicians,
contractors and bureaucrats are allegedly involved in fraudulent transactions amounting
to hundreds of millions of dollars. On the whole, 14 billion dollars have been spent on
dams and canal systems for irrigation since 1999, yet practically this has only increased
Maharashtra's irrigation potential by a minuscule 0.1%. Government audits reveal that
root causes for such underperformance comes down to poor project governance,
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especially through processes that inflate costs. For example, Indian and Maharashtra
media have reported of the recent scam that projects were often approved at lower cost,
and then costs were gradually increased based on rationales such as augmenting project
capacity, or improving the poor state of existing infrastructure. Given the crucial
importance of water, and the importance to economic development of its fair and
equitable distribution, the entire issue of effective governance over water resources in
India has become an important subject in the public policy domain (Shah, 2012 for a
review).
Yet, public ownership of water resource development makes reform
institutionally challenging. Writing about the challenge posed by corruption in India`s
government and public service agencies, Pranab Bardhan (an economist) framed the
situation squarely within a post liberalization environment defined by growing
industrialization and political fragmentation:
Several scholars associated corruption with the excessive regulation of
the Indian state and there was also a belief that a reduction in regulation
would reduce the incidence of corruption in the bureaucracy and also
undermine the bureaucratic-political nexus. While economic
liberalization has meant a significant reduction in the discretionary
power of the central bureaucracy, particularly in trade policy and
industrial regulation, the state governments still retain a great deal of
leverage on the industrial sector at the ground level through their control
of land, water and electricity and labour and environmental standards. It
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is in the regulatory apparatuses of the state and local governments that a
lot of the corruption in contemporary India is concentrated. (Bardhan,
2012: p.4)
This paper describes just one instance of the corruption nexus, situated in an
important tribal belt in coastal, western Maharashtra, India. I am not attempting as
comprehensive or ambitious an explanation as did Wade, through his study of the
corrupt administrative-political nexus and market for transfers. Indeed, my original
research plan did not even focus on corruption in the bureaucracy. Rather, my field
research primarily aimed to better understand the social, economic, cultural and
geographical impact of a large irrigation project on a rural society located in the
hinterland of a large metropolitan city. However, in the course of my ethnographic
research I frequently encountered endemic corruption in the state Irrigation Department.
I also observed the persisting, generally poor state of the canal system - despite its
massive maintenance budgets. Local farmers also repeatedly described to me their own
encounters with bureaucratic corruption. And, during my research, the Maharashtra
media’s reporting of corruption in the irrigation project pertinent to my study provoked
several interesting insights for me about this phenomenon.
By focusing on corruption, I am also responding to recent pleas by both
economists and other social scientists for more case studies to help us understand this
phenomenon of corruption better. For instance, advocating for more case studies on
corruption in the water resources sector, Peter Mollinga has written:
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We need such analysis to understand better the structural dynamics of
the sector, which includes the systemic features of corruption and many
other issues to engage more effectively with the policy process and to
establish more constructive engagement among the interest groups
concerned. (Mollinga, 2008: p. 346)

3.2.4 Organizational Structure of the Surya Project
In many ways, the hierarchical structure of Wade’s Irrigation Department in
Andhra Pradesh mimics itself in Maharashtra. Given that the Surya project was handed
over for at least a decade to the Command Area Development Authority, there is some
overlap between the general structure for the Maharashtra Irrigation Department and the
organizational structure of the Surya Project (see Fig. 3.2, below). Within the Surya
Project there is one division under an Executive Engineer, who is responsible for the
maintenance of irrigation works and management of irrigation in the field. The
Executive Engineer is responsible for executing irrigation policy as per the
Superintendent Engineer’s directives. The Superintendent Engineer in the Irrigation
Circle Office is the administrative head at the regional level. He has full authority to
sanction the allocation of irrigation water in the region for different purposes, and
approves the annual utilization of storages, as well as the irrigation program from yearto-year. The Executive Engineer of the project plays an important role in the day-to-day
supervision, management and regulation of canals. He is assisted by: a) Assistant/
Deputy Engineers; b) Sectional Officers; c) a Canal Officer; and d) Measurers.
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Operations and maintenance tasks remain the responsibility of the project's construction
wing. Within the construction wing, each division has a subdivision that is entrusted
with operations and maintenance tasks.

Figure 3.2 - Organizational Setup of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project. Source: WAPCOS (1996).
Socio Economic Survey Report: Evaluation Studies for Command Area Development Programme New
Delhi. Surya-Maharashtra. New Delhi: Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd.

Contrary to Wade (who in his Andhra Pradesh study posited a correlation
between corruption and a high turnover/transfer rate of engineers), my Maharashtra case
study argues that the Junior Section Engineers and Canal Officers on Surya Project have
largely avoided transfers to other locations and managed to keep their positions in a
tribal belt for two decades. Lower level bureaucrats tend to be information-rich, have a
good understanding of how local society and politics work, and by virtue of their
residence in the command area of dam projects often have close relations with the
dominant caste-groups in rural/tribal regions of India. I use the term ‘recalcitrant
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bureaucrats’ to explain both the resilience and the ability of these Junior Engineers to
retain their posting in a tribal belt for such an extended period. I attribute their staying
power to their ability not only to earn unofficial rents from corruption, but also their
skills at navigating the administrative system and local politics.
This case study thus focuses on lower level bureaucrats who prefer to remain in
tribal areas of Maharashtra and who are central to the entrenched nexus between local
bureaucrats, politicians and powerful economic interests (Meeta & Rajivlochan, 1997).
Such recalcitrant bureaucrats in water departments prefer to remain in their locations
because their particular regions attract huge subsidies and cash transfers from the state
and central governments. To their further advantage, such regions usually have illiterate
populations, weak structures of checks and balances, and administrative systems that
continue to function in isolation from other systems of self-government that have
evolved in tribal areas of Maharashtra since the late 1970s.
This administrative structure is important to analyze and understand if one is to
gain a better grasp of how and why development projects in tribal areas often fail to
deliver benefits to local people there. This case study should also be considered in the
broader context of political and social ferment within contemporary irrigation politics in
Maharashtra, including growing contestation and disputes between cities, rural
hinterlands, and various other regions in the state over allocation of water resources
(Wagle et al, 2012).
Within this study I present data on the resistance of this lower section of the
Irrigation Department bureaucracy towards the stratagems of Senior Engineers,
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highlighting fissures between executive-level Senior Engineers and lower-level Section
and Assistant Engineers. This focus on lower-level bureaucrats supports and affirms the
recent direction that geographers and anthropologists (Corbridge et al, 2005; Shah,
2010; Gupta, 2012) have charted in researching frontline bureaucracies responsible for
supervising and administering welfare and development programs in rural India. This
approach is crucial in order to understand the role of lower-level bureaucracy in rural,
tribal areas of India which has often been blamed for poor development outcomes
(Government of India, 2008; World Bank, 2011; Meeta & Rajivlochan, 1997).
Moreover, this study has been conducted in the context of a productive irrigation
project. Unlike protective irrigation projects, in a productive irrigation project water is
not rationed, and is available to meet revenue and food production objectives.
Productive irrigation is characterized by high irrigation intensity, is demand oriented,
and production is geared towards the marketplace. The operational design and
organizational structure of productive irrigation projects are geared towards meeting
demand for water, which is not scarce in this context (see Table 3.3, below, to further
understand the difference between protective and productive irrigation).
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Table 3.3: Protective and Productive Irrigation - Source: Narain (2003)
TECHNICAL
CHARACTERISTICS

PROTECTIVE IRRIGATION

PRODUCTIVE IRRIGATION

Low (around (100%)

High (200% and more)

High (low water supply)

Low (meeting crop water
requirements)

Low water demanding (Sorghum, millet,
oilseeds, so forth)

High water demanding
(rice, sugarcane)

Supply-oriented

Demand-oriented

Planned scarcity requiring rationing

Planned sufficiency, no
rationing needed

Prescribed, or controlled by government
(except warabandi system)

Farmers choice

WATER-FLOWS;
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS

Constant

Varying with demand

YIELD OPTIMIZATION PER
BENEFITS

Unit of water spread

Unit of land concentrated

MAJOR OBJECTIVE

Food security/poverty alleviation

Agricultural growth

FARM LABOUR

Emphasis on family labour

Emphasis on wage labour

ORIENTATION

Towards subsistence

Towards the market

IRRIGATION INTENSITY

DUTY (acres/cusec)

CROPS

OPERATIONAL DESIGN;
ORGANIZATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS

WATER AVAILABILITY

CROPPING PATTERN
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3.2.5 The Centrality of the Lower Level Bureaucracy
This case study focuses on divisions and tensions in a local irrigation
bureaucracy in the broader context of researching the Surya Dam Project at the main
canal level. This case study emerged from my dissertation research, which largely
focused on the impact of a large surface irrigation project in a small agricultural belt
upon the local tribal community. My units of analysis were two villages located at the
middle and tail-end of the main canal system. My research used mixed methods
including semi-structured interviews; ethnographic research; and review of newspaper
articles from 2008 that focused on the activities of Sub-Divisional Officers, Section and
Assistant Engineers, and Technical Officers in the irrigation bureaucracy. While
conducting qualitative interviews and surveying farmers who experienced water
scarcity, I also came across numerous media reports of chronic corruption in the Surya
Project. Most of the newspaper articles focused heavily on corruption in the irrigation
project, including accounts of corrupt practices related to canal system maintenance
contracts.
My examination of the engineering bureaucracy was largely centred around
junior-level officials (mostly Section Engineers and Canal Officers) who had risen
through the ranks yet in some cases remained posted to the Surya Project for more than
twenty years. My research of junior-level officials was conducted at a Sub-Divisional
Office where engineers of various ranks were interviewed. My focus on the junior ranks
of the bureaucracy is deliberate. While I enjoyed close access to senior (executive-level)
engineers, two of the Executive Engineers I interacted with commuted to suburban
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Mumbai and so could not devote enough time to my queries. In contrast, the juniorlevel of the bureaucracy resided on-site in living quarters constructed by the dam
project, and were always available to answer my questions.
This lower segment of the bureaucracy has tremendous clout in the
implementation of project goals because of their familiarity with everyday, local politics
and their experience with micro water management in command areas of irrigation
projects. Their mastery and application of operational routines thus puts power in the
hands of such Section Engineers, who have little formal authority in the department’s
hierarchical structure, but who still exercise significant control over implementing
policy day-to-day. These frontline staff carry out day-to-day tasks for the Irrigation
Department, enjoy discretion in how they implement project objectives, and are
information-rich because they know the farmers and other local stakeholders well. In
that sense, they are close to what the political scientist, Michael Lipsky, defined as street
level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1981). In general, such lower level employees also have
different priorities than their superiors, as well as interest in minimizing danger and
discomforts of the job while maximizing official and unofficial income.
My focus on this section of frontline staff is partly inspired by a wide body of
recent ethnographic literature from geographers and anthropologists on corruption and
governance that focuses on the treatment of the rural poor in India by lower level
bureaucrats. (Kumar and Corbridge, 2002; Corbridge et al, 2005; Shah, 2010; Gupta,
2012). In the context of Asian irrigation, Wade has himself pointed out the importance
of studying ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Wade, 1992, p. 306), although his paper on the
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subject focuses more on irrigation guards rather than Section and Assistant Engineers.
Moreover, even with his focus on the irrigation guards who police the canal network,
Wade`s paper is ethnographically ‘thin.’ Thus, while I remain in agreement with Wade
that incentive structures play a role in corruption, I modify his framework by focusing
on the lower level bureaucracy and the lack of bureaucratic turnover at that level to
provide a more thick and contextual description of corruption in the local Irrigation
Department.
In my work I attempt to describe how fissures within the Irrigation Department
may cause the bureaucratic-political corruption nexus to manifest differently in a tribal
context, albeit with still serious social and economic consequences for poor, tribal
farmers. This consideration of water politics is in the context of a dam project that not
only caters to a wide agricultural belt, but also delivers water to an important, rapidly
growing town in the northwestern Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Essentially, it is the
socio-spatial transformation of a major tribal-agricultural region directly under the
influence of a major metropolitan centre (Mumbai) that has caused a change in the
incentive structure for corruption at the main canal level. This, in my view, points
toward a new moral geography and political economy of the expansion of large Indian
cities. This 'intermeshing of scale' necessitates an analysis that combines both a
geographical and anthropological framework. This case study also critically analyses
the consequences of two parallel administrative systems (tribal and Irrigation
Departments) that function in this region. I argue that the absence of any tribal
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personnel in the local irrigation project has facilitated an administrative environment in
which corrupt practices flourish.

3.3

Social Relations, Politics of the Commons,
and the Role of the Lower Level Bureaucracy
This section is based on detailed interviews with two Executive Engineers, four

Section Engineers, one Technical Officer, one Administrative Clerk and two SubDivisional Officers over a period of nine months in 2008. I also had the opportunity to
visit various field sites during my time at the Surya project, which provided me with
unfettered opportunities to observe relations between engineers and their superiors, and
between engineers and farmers. That also afforded me insight into how everyday work
on the irrigation project was carried out. I also had substantial interaction with local
politicians (one of whom held official responsibility for the public irrigation corporation
that owned and maintained the Surya Project). It was not possible to select a
representative sample of engineers, as I spent my time mostly with staff from one
particular sub-divisional office that was engaged in construction and maintenance of the
main canal and distributor canal system. I also undertook two visits to the Irrigation
Circle Office in the district headquarters, and numerous visits to the Dam Office near
the reservoir. Given that I spent about nine months in the villages and project area in
2008, I developed an easy rapport with the engineers. My fluency in Marathi and Hindi
helped me further. I was also able to triangulate data from my interviews with articles
that appeared in local newspapers. Besides the engineers and local politicians, I also
spoke to representatives of local, social movement organizations, caste-association
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leaders, and large and small farmers who utilized irrigation water from the Surya project
and so had some kind of relationship to it.
Canal water is distributed to agricultural fields based on a cycle of rotations and
at different levels (Main Canal, Distributaries, and Direct Minors). These are meant to
cater to the needs and demands of agricultural plots that vary in size. At the main canal
and distributary levels, water is first conveyed to agricultural fields located in villages at
the tail end of the main canals; this rule is supposed to be followed even at the level of
the direct minors and the sub-minors (lower level branches in the canal system - see
Figure 3.3, below). Farmers are then expected to construct field channels so that they
can convey water into their plots from the direct minors and sub-minors that lie adjacent
to their fields. Outlets and Gates are used to control the flow of water at this level. An
even and fair distribution of water in this context depends both on co-operation between
the farmers, but also on the effective regulation of the canals by the engineers.

3.3.1 Attitudes of Lower Level Engineers towards Tribal Farmers
Engineers in general expressed views that were largely dismissive about the
abilities of tribal farmers in the irrigation project. This section highlights such attitudes
of lower level engineers in the project towards the tribal beneficiaries of the irrigation
project and presents data to support this argument.
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!
Figure 3.3: Schematic Layout of a Typical Canal System in India.
DM1= Direct Minor #1; DM2 =Direct Minor #2;
SM1= Sub Minor #1; SM2= Sub Minor # 2; OL= Outlet

This junior level cadre in the department had more interactions with the farmers
and also had day-to-day knowledge of the social profile of irrigation beneficiaries. This
placed them in a somewhat advantageous position as far as their knowledge of the
politics and society of the area was concerned too. Most engineers (irrespective of
rank), were unanimous in their view that Konkan tribal farmers did not deserve a large
dam and canal project because they had little experience with modern, canal-irrigated
agriculture. According to one Section Engineer, ‘the Ghat area (canal-irrigated western
Maharashtra) farmers are better at using canal water, the tribal farmers in the Konkan
are inept.’ Though there was cynicism and prejudice exhibited towards tribal farmers,
engineers also displayed ambivalence towards tribal users of the project by viewing
them as victims of the machinations of the political class who ultimately controlled
allocation of water in the command area of the dam. “All this water,” remarked a
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Section Engineer, “will end up in Mumbai because of the wastage in the canal system.
These tribals don’t deserve water because they waste it. They have no experience in
using canal water. They are fortunate to have access to water, but they excel in wasting
it.” Gaikwad, a Section Engineer further remarked:
We have had some successful farmers in the project area. They are all
horticulturists and have been engaged in this occupation because their
caste is a caste of gardeners and horticulturists. They are from the
coast and are using modern sprinkler and drip irrigation techniques
(that optimize the use of water) and they brought this technology to
the project area from periodic trips to Israel and Oakland, California.
The tribals, on the other hand, do not know how to utilize the water.
They waste the water and do not know its value. Moreover, they do
not know how to cultivate anything other than rice. Agreed that this is
a project that was designed to cultivate rice, but you just have to
compare the sheer ingenuity of the horticulturists with the lack of
initiative and risk taking of the tribals. (Interview: February, 2008)
The skill and enterprise of horticulturists was contrasted with the supposed lack
of ingenuity of tribal farmers. However, engineers seldom discussed the influence of
social relations or the state of the canal system. That was perplexing, since my
understanding from field research in a horticultural belt benefiting from the Surya
project was the opposite. Most tribal farmers on the middle reaches of the minor canal
system complained of the widespread theft of water by horticulturists who fenced off
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entire canal minors and sub-minors, and that Section Engineers did nothing to stop the
illegal practice (see Fig. 3.4, below and Paper Three, section 5.6.2 for how unfair water
allocation entailed large farmers taking siphoning water from canals). Tribal farmers
and their families were typically employed on the farms of horticulturists, and their
labour was crucial to the profitability of such operations. Paradoxically, the vegetables
and fruits grown on such farms did not require a lot of water and, for that reason,
sprinkler and drip irrigation served the purpose.

Figure 3.4: Photo of large horticultural farm. This photo was taken at a large agricultural farm near
Sakhare Village served by the canal. The outlet on the canal minor was choked by a gunny bag to restrict
flow to smaller, tribal farms downstream. Further, the canal itself was fenced off so tribal farmers could
not access it.

The large farmers simply wanted to make sure they got their adequate share of
water, and dumped the rest into the natural drainage system in the Command Area. At
first, I never confronted engineers about the unfairness of arrangements as I knew of a
nexus between large horticulturists and the bureaucracy. That changed later towards the
end of fieldwork when I developed a better understanding of the canal rotations and
schedule for releasing water. While my field observations of the canal system began in
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January, 2008, the irrigation season started in December, 2007. One village where I
conducted interviews and a sample survey was located near a small downstream
reservoir where the main canal system branched into two canals (see Figure 3.5, below).

Figure 3.5: Map of the Horticultural Belt in Dahanu that provides the larger geographical context for this
case study. Parts of the canal network (in red) intersect with natural drainage features (in blue) of the
area. It was at the intersection of the main canal system at Sakhare Village where I observed the sluice
gates to the rivulets being kept open illegally.

!108

Fig. 3.6: 'Waste' canal water being released into Khadkhada River in midsummer (May 2008).
Khadkhada River is a non-perennial stream that forms part of the natural drainage of the Surya Project
command area. The river meets the Arabian Sea less than half a km. from this spot. See Index Map 1.4 for
more detailed view of natural drainage system for this area.

That reservoir met the water needs of a small local town. Perplexed by the vast
quantity of canal water in the rivulets and natural drainage system leading to the
Arabian Sea during irrigation season, I investigated the operation of the main canal
system. From January to May, 2008 sluice gates leading to a natural rivulet (Dehene
Nalla) were kept open by engineers. Those gates were clearly meant for the contingency
of excess rainfall and floods in the main reservoir areas. That channel led to a small
river near the Mumbai-Ahmedabad railway line that joined the sea (see Khadkhada
River in Figures 3.5 and 3.6). On inquiring about this in the department with Gaikwad,
who flatly denied it, I was brusquely told that I was spending too much time in the tribal
villages and should check facts better. Yet on inquiring with tribal farmers I was told
that those gates were basically always kept open during irrigation season. That water
(categorized as ‘wastage’) was picked up by horticulturists via pumps, said the farmers.
Moreover, ‘waste’ water from Surya project was referenced to weave a local discourse
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asserting tribal backwardness (Lankford, 2013). As such, it also fuelled much
resentment in a rapidly growing, nearby town bordering the command area, given the
apparent paradox of a tribal region constantly contesting Mumbai’s right to that water,
which at the same time seemed to be wasting it. In this context, tribal farmers' lack of
knowledge and experience regarding operational rules of canals also stood out starkly.
With some engineers, prejudice also gave way to sympathy. On one occasion,
for instance, in an oblique reference to social relations in the area, the engineers
remarked, ‘the large horticultural farmers do not want the small tribal farmers to
succeed. We brought in modern pipeline technology to this area and set up water user
groups for the tribal farmers through the World Bank funded Command Area
Development Program.’ A Section Engineer vividly described what had happened:
The large farmers subverted the entire program by periodically
destroying the infrastructure with the help of their goons. This would
happen at night, but we wondered who the beneficiaries were, it was
indeed the large farmers who wanted agricultural labour on their farms
and much of it comes from tribal families in the area. Most of the
horticultural farmers are interested in enhancing their own wealth, even
if it comes at the expense of the poor tribal farmers. (Interview: June
2008)
The Command Area Development Programme was thus a failure in its efforts to
re-engineer the water conveyance system in Surya Command Area. Some engineers
pointed out to how social relations in the area worked against making the irrigation
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project work for small and marginal tribal farmers. Others pointed out to the lack of
cooperation amongst tribal farmers who would not contribute to the maintenance of the
new pipeline conveyance system. Employees in the Surya Irrigation Department who
were not engineers also pointed to graft in management of the Command Area
Development Programme as being a major factor behind its lack of success.

3.3.2 Making Large Projects Viable and the Cultivation of Informal
Norms in Water Management at the Main Canal Level
During my interactions with engineers I gained much insight regarding their
geographic origins in Maharashtra State, where they were trained, and how they
managed blackmail and threats of transfer by local politicians. I later discovered that
most engineers (at all levels) paid off the local Member of the Legislative Assembly
(from the tribal community) as well as the powerful, local leader of the Congress Party
in order to keep their positions on Surya Project. Once, while interviewing the
Executive Engineer (EE) of the Project in a first class commuter train car, I observed
him take a call from the MLA’s personal aide, who asked him to purchase an expensive
cell phone for the MLA. The EE called it ‘blackmail.’ Yet he said he had to comply, as
“the MLA calls the shots on the project and could stop work on maintenance tomorrow,
if he wanted.” This particular engineer was also ambivalent about his posting to a
remote tribal area. He had been posted to other parts of Konkan and believed that only
small reservoirs could work in the region. He considered it a bad idea to build large
projects there, but said the expansion of the city and industrial spillover created a need
for more water. “Everything here works on percentage,” he said. When asked about the
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revenue earnings of the project, he said “we survive because of the revenue we get from
the township in Mumbai. Without the revenue from non-irrigation use, we would be
shut down tomorrow. We earn very little from the tribal farmers, and the large
horticultural farmers don’t pay a paisa as they have political clout. On the other hand,
the city pays for the water.” (See coloured graphs below, in Figures 3.7a & 3.7b).
Better cost recovery rates from non-irrigation use means that more water
continues to be diverted for urban and industrial use. The deliberate wastage of water
from the canal system made more sense now. I realized that engineers in Surya project
had very little incentive to maintain the rural canal network since most of the revenue
(almost 98%) for the dam now came from the city. P.S. Purandare is a commentator and
former professor of irrigation at the Water and Land Management Institute; he writes
insightfully on this new dynamic of water management, especially with regard to the
attitude of engineers towards urban-industrial demands:
As compared to day to day irrigation management, management of nonirrigation is easy. Moreover, assessment & recovery of water tariff is also
comparatively better in case of non-irrigation. Hence, some canal
officers reportedly prefer an increase in water use for non-irrigation.
They even at times, it seems, discourage water use for irrigation. That
perhaps leads to ‘unutilized water.’ Showing unutilized water creates
grounds and justification for more diversion of water from irrigation to
non-irrigation.5 (Purandare, 2012, p. 19)

!112

The two graphs below (Figures 3.7a & 3.7b) illustrate the low cost recovery
rates of water for agricultural use in Thane District, and the increasing dependence of
such projects on non-irrigation revenue from Mumbai's hinterland. Note that dams in
two neighboring districts of that hinterland are owned by Mumbai Municipal
Corporation; the Tata Corporation; the Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation; the local Irrigation Department; and various corporations in smaller towns,
respectively. While the bulk of water storage in the three large multipurpose dams
owned by the local Irrigation Department is intended for agriculture, an increasing
portion of their revenues comes from non-irrigation use. This helps the dam projects
remain profitable year-to-year.

Revenue Targeted from Irrigation(Rs. In Millions)
Revenue Earned from Irrigation (Rs. In Millions)

Fig. 3.7a: Source: Computed from Water Cess Recovery Tables for Thane Irrigation Circle
Accessed June 1st, 2013 from http://www.seticthane.org/water-cess-recovery.
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Revenue Targeted from Non-irrigation(Rs. In Millions)
Revenue Earned from Non -Irrigation (Rs. In Millions)

!

Fig. 3.7b: Source: Computed from Water Cess Recovery Tables for Thane Irrigation Circle
Accessed June 1st, 2013 from http://www.seticthane.org/water-cess-recovery.

Closer interaction with Junior Engineers and Technical Officers also yielded
greater information about their backgrounds, caste identities, and when they had first
joined the project. I became intrigued by a number of Section Engineers and Junior
Canal Officers who had managed to stay in their positions for more than two decades,
since engineers normally stay in one location for no more than three years. The origins
of most of these engineers turned out to be the Maratha-Kunbi community in western
Maharashtra. Several Junior Section Engineers I spoke with preferred staying on the
Surya project because, first, it was close to the commuter railway line to Mumbai,
which afforded them the advantage of educating their teenage children in a suburban
Mumbai college. And secondly, because working on a dam project that serves tribal
areas where most farmers are illiterate and inexperienced with canal irrigation
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bureaucracy afforded them opportunities to exploit circumstances for their own
financial gain.
Alternately, the Executive Engineers always lived in the suburban and periurban areas of Mumbai and commuted to work at the Surya project. According to a
clerk in the Division Office, this meant ample opportunities for Section Engineers to
make money; indeed, the project was considered the most corrupt in the entire State of
Maharashtra. The spread of the canal network into the edges of forests and ravines in
the hinterland also meant that the Mumbai media never covered those dams or the
quality of maintenance work on the canals in the Command Areas.
This particular group of Section Engineers had the maximum level of interaction
with all classes of farmers as they were in charge of regulating the use and wastage of
canal water, and maintaining conditions of the outer bunds and water seepage in various
areas under irrigation. They were also in charge of counting the number of wells in the
Command Area, mostly built by the large farmers, who used these wells for irrigation
when the canal rotations were stopped. In any irrigation project in Maharashtra State,
Section Engineers, Assistant Engineers and Technical Officers play a vital role. They
are required to inspect field irrigation, and are responsible to superior officers for
carrying out orderly irrigation management and noting the misuse of water. They are
also expected to monitor the working conditions of the channels and courses. Such
responsibilities afford this level of Section Engineers a great deal of influence. Given
that they continued to live in the same area of the project, they also developed social
and cultural links with the large farmers (who were also from a Maratha sub-caste); in
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one case, the sister of a local Section Engineer married the wealthiest horticulturist in
the region.
Such close ties indicate a certain local, moral economy of water use, wherein the
Maratha engineers and horticulturist farmers see the latter’s access to water as a symbol
of their local power and material progress, as well as an indication that they have finally
“arrived on the scene” as rich, successful farmers. “We Vadavals are dominant here,”
announced Raul, a farmer whom I interviewed in the summer of 2008. Such access to
the irrigation project was also facilitated by a local leader and landlord from one of the
ruling parties in Maharashtra, who was also Vice President of the local irrigation
corporation. He used his control over the project to distribute contracts to cronies and to
control the functioning of the local Irrigation Department.
The presence of a very junior class of engineers who have never been
transferred does by no means completely contradict Wade's findings on the market for
transfers, as transfers remain prevalent in this context for Senior Engineers at the
executive levels. The fact that these Junior Engineers had to pay off the Executive
Engineers only indicates a different kind of market for transfers operating in this region.
The implication is that there was a relatively junior section of the bureaucracy who
preferred living in the tribal area, as there were prospects to make money there and to
take advantage of being fairly close to suburban Mumbai. Upon digging deeper I also
found that some of these junior engineers did not have the clout to arrange for transfers
out of the Konkan to western Maharashtra; pay rates in the Konkan for Junior Engineers
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were lower at 200,000 to 300,000 rupees (approximately US $3,500), thus more bribe
money would be required to obtain a higher paid posting in Maharashtra.
The local newspapers in the Surya Dam Command Area repeatedly pointed out
that the staying power of these recalcitrant engineers clearly indicated the presence of
an entrenched nexus of local contractors and politicians at that level of the bureaucracy,
and the persistence of patronage politics in the maintenance of the canal system. At the
end of May 2008, the local Marathi media began reporting on huge mismanagement and
corruption in the Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (see photo of newspaper article,
Fig. 3.8). The newspaper reports, most of them in the local town's Marathi press,
highlighted the brazenness of corrupt
practices and the failure of the state
government to address it - especially in the
context of a project originally intended to
benefit poor, tribal farmers. The articles
carried graphic pictures of collapsed canals
and distributaries from the interior,
coupled with reports of how a chronic and
malignant form of corruption had been
afflicting this dam project for over a decade.

Figure 3.8: One of many 2008 Marathi newspaper
articles reporting on the complicity of engineering
staff in massive corruption at the Surya Project.

The central theme of the news
articles was how the poor sections of the tribal community were being divested of their
rightful access to water from the irrigation project due to the shoddy maintenance of the
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canal network and the diversion of water to Mumbai. I later discovered that tensions
between the Junior and Senior Engineers had led to the selective leaking of information
(by Junior Section Engineers) about specific instances of corruption regarding
maintenance work. Invoking the plight of the poor is a common strategy employed by
lower level bureaucrats when they are in conflict with superiors although, in fact, the
interests of the poor are generally not important to those at that level of the bureaucracy
(Gupta, 2012).
This tactic of using the media to blackmail senior bureaucrats and politicians is
not new to rural politics. Most of the newspaper reports targeted Senior Engineers at the
project’s Irrigation Circle Headquarters in Thane. Later, the names of specific Senior
Engineers (based at the Irrigation Circle and the Sub-Divisional Office) also began
appearing in the news reports. The ethnographic extract below summarizes events over
two weeks in June, 2008. The narrative describes how lower level engineers tried to
navigate a situation that one of their own colleagues had been instrumental in creating.
It speaks to the dynamics of intra-bureaucratic politics, as well as how local, rural
politics and caste identities are inextricably linked with bureaucratic transfers and
administrative corruption.

3.3.3 Tensions within the Bureaucracy
During interviews with farmers in the villages I was called on my phone by one
of my informants (an administrative clerk) in the project. He conveyed news that the
project’s Sub-division and Division Offices would be shut down due to serious
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mismanagement and corruption reports in the media. Given the significance of this
news for my research, I rushed to the office and saw that the engineers were in a
despondent mood. I met my main informant and he mentioned that most engineers
would be transferred, and the project’s Sub-Division Office which took care of
operations and maintenance would also be shut down. As this news sank in, I was
actually surprised by how forthcoming with details the Section Engineers and other
officers were regarding the politics of the project. There was a clear feeling of
uncertainty, and all of the Junior Engineers voiced how worried they were about their
futures. As my chief informant came and sat next to me, I saw the engineers browsing
cynically through the local evening newspapers for clues about the future of the dam
project.
I was informed that the real turning point had come when the state Irrigation
Minister’s name had been mentioned in the reports of corruption. The newspapers then
reported that the Minister had subsequently decided, with the local leader (the Vice
President of the irrigation corporation) and the tribal MLA, to close down the project’s
office. It had been decided to move maintenance work and its supervision to the
location of another multipurpose project located in a more remote part of the district.
However, the minister had also summoned all class one officers to the city of Nasik,
where he was then touring. It was during that period that all Class One officers
(including Executive Engineers) were arbitrarily transferred out of the project. In the
view of the engineers I spoke with, that was done to cover up the shoddy maintenance
work, and also to shield local politicians and the Irrigation Minister himself from
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culpability, since they had benefited from payoffs on contracts awarded during
maintenance work.
My informant also noted that all of the engineers had made a beeline to the local
leader’s home to try and get their transfers revoked, as he was the Vice President of the
irrigation corporation. I had personally seen two engineers visit the local leader`s office,
lobbying to retain their current positions and location in the project. My chief informant
was himself transferred, but managed to get it revoked. Some of the Junior Engineers
commented on how they did not want to go to the other dam because the project was in
a very remote area, and they believed the educational facilities for their children were
not good there.
On the other hand, my informant attributed Junior Engineers' unwillingness to
relocate to their reluctance to surrender lucrative money-making opportunities they
enjoyed by being associated with the project. He also attributed the controversy that had
been generated over the project to the overzealousness of a newly appointed Executive
Engineer. That particular Executive Engineer had apparently put the Surya Project into a
deficit position of 40 crores (equivalent to US $6.5 million), and had been responsible
for overspending the allocated operations and maintenance budget. My informant and
the engineers voiced constant slurs of the Chief Executive Engineer. They claimed that
his approaching retirement had made him greedy, and that his lower caste background
underpinned his failure to successfully manage the project.
That afternoon, the normally reticent officials also opened up further to my
questions. Until then, this level of staff had co-operated only by sharing dam project
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reports and environmental assessment reports. Also, two engineers I had never spoken
to walked up and inquired whether I was affiliated in some way with a local nongovernmental organization and whether my research project also included investigating
the social dimensions of development. The junior engineers and technical supervisors
began narrating how most of the large, commercial horticultural farmers were behind in
paying dues and would never pay water charges to the Irrigation Department. When I
inquired about the amount of arrears, I was at first met with silence; then they remarked
that it ran into the millions of rupees (see figs. 3.7a & 3.7b for the low recovery rates
from irrigation). Indeed, the clout that large farmers enjoyed with the local politician
(who was also the Vice President of the Irrigation Development Corporation) meant that
all of the money they owed the project was siphoned off by the local political class,
which was proving to be the bane of the project.
I confirmed that the information obtained during those interviews was true, by
triangulating it with reports that had appeared in local newspapers, and by actually
visiting some of the sites at issue. Curiously, there was never any information reported
about the involvement of Junior Engineers in corruption at the project. That lent
credence to the dominant view that information was leaked about project contracts at
the behest of Mr. Gaikwad (pseudonym), a Section Engineer who was unhappy with the
work of a certain contractor.
Gaikwad had claimed that the shoddy maintenance work performed on a section
of the distributaries canal could potentially fail and cause flooding in the area. However,
the maintenance contractor had connections with the Executive Engineer as well as the
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Superintendent Engineer and had paid them off. Given the circumstances, Mr. Gaikwad
could not remedy the situation through official channels, but could raise awareness of
the risk by leaking details to the media about the corruption of Senior Engineers,
causing them to go on the defensive and, literally, do damage control. However, a major
consequence of the leaks was that the local MLA and the head of the Irrigation
Development Corporation sensed an increasingly negative public opinion about
management of the project. Fearing that the news and negative mood would take hold in
the Mumbai press too, they decided to shut down the project and transfer all operations
and maintenance work to another dam project in the same irrigation circle.
Similar tensions between executive level Senior Engineers and Junior Section
Engineers were also the subject of commentary during the irrigation scandal of 2012-13
in Maharashtra State. In a critical analysis of the state government`s handling of
expenditures on both new and existing projects, Pradeep Purandare noted:
The top heavy organizational set up of the Maharashtra irrigation
department has meant that powers have been concentrated in the hands
of Direct Class One officers and actual experience of work on site,
barring exceptions, is mainly with the officers below the rank of
Executive Engineers. Indifference towards grass root level functionaries
& subordinate engineers has taken its toll on junior engineers and
affected their morale. (Purandare, 2012)
By the end of June, 2008 the Sub-Divisional Office was forlorn looking, and
gone were the long lines of contractors and local journalists who frequently came to
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meet engineers for contacts and news of the project. Over subsequent months, the
Junior Section Engineers, Technical Officers and Supervisors stayed back in their
quarters at the Surya complex, as some successfully used their connections to retain
their positions. My chief informant told me that most of them would manage to keep
their current positions because most had some clout at upper levels, and could have
even paid to keep their jobs. However, in the next few months it was decided that that
level of staff from the Sub-Divisional Office would commute 100 kilometres to work at
another major dam site on the fringes of the MMR, which also provided water to
Greater Mumbai. This meant that the engineers and other staff would be away from
their families for four days per week. The implication was that, while these engineers
managed to keep their jobs, they were punished for leaking news of the collusion
between Senior Engineers, local politicians and contractors to the media. As my chief
informant told me: “there is a lot of money to make in tribal areas and they would do
their best to keep their positions in the department.”

3.4

Conclusion: Governance Reform and Tribal
Development in Rural India
The main contribution of this paper is to produce a different variation of the

theoretical framework that Wade articulated in the 1980s, which has informed research
on bureaucratic corruption in development over the past three decades. The layered and
nuanced dynamics revealed by this case study suggest that it is too simplistic to focus
on the turnover of bureaucratic transfers as a central cause of chronic corruption in
India. In contradiction to Wade's contention that transfers encourage corruption, this

!123

paper actually shows how a certain class of lower level bureaucrats has managed to
‘stay put’ in the same location for decades, playing an ambivalent but permissive role in
facilitating corrupt practices in the local Irrigation Department.
Transferring such lower level employees in tribal areas might contribute to a
solution. That needs to be complemented by rigorous auditing and supervision of how
development funds are spent, along with a more meaningful decentralization of the
water management. A reform of the pay structure could also provide more incentives to
lower level employees for ethical behaviour. And establishing adequate representation
from tribal communities in management decisions is also necessary to help ensure fair
play.
The case study also shows that the problem of corruption involves several layers
of ‘social transactions,’ and plays out differently in various parts of rural India, given
the nation’s complex, hierarchical social structures and highly variegated forms of
governance. We need more case studies and ethnographies that focus on corruption in
organizational contexts, which highlight local, political and cultural dynamics of this
phenomenon (Gupta, 2013). Not least, this paper highlights the need for a pointed
examination of the general lack of accountability within Indian public services towards
the lower caste poor. In other words, empirical research on India must ethically engage
the persisting problem of mistreatment of the poor by the public bureaucracy (Dreze
and Sen 2013, chapter 6, for a treatment of corruption and how it disproportionately
affects lower caste communities).
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In a landmark report by the Indian Planning Commission’s expert group on
extremism in tribal areas, the failure of governance in those areas has been explained as
follows:
Overwhelmingly, large sections of the bureaucracy/technocracy
constituting the delivery system in the tribal areas come from
landowning dominant castes or well to do middle classes, with their
attachment to ownership of property, cultural superiority, purity-pollution
governed behaviour and a state of mind which rationalizes and asserts
their existing position of dominance in relation to others. This influences
their attitudes, behaviour and performance segment, which constitutes
the power structure in rural and urban areas since colonial times. It is this
coalition of interests and social background that deeply affects
governance at all levels. (Government of India, 2008, p.19)
Any ethical engagement with governance in social science scholarship thus begs
researchers to ask tough questions about lack of accountability in the public sector that
manages water services in developing countries like India (Bakker, 2010). As such, two
issues stand out in the context of tribal India. The first is a broader level political issue
affecting the governance of water. Specifically, elites from dominant caste groups who
hold power in tribal areas are too entrenched in their privileged positions, and are often
in nexus with an equally entrenched, lower section of the water bureaucracy that is
complicit in corruption. The second issue relates to governance in general. Specifically,
there is insufficient awareness and understanding amongst tribal communities about the
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laws and policies in place to further their development. This dearth undermines their
political and economic enfranchisement, and too often makes it possible for non-tribal
bureaucrats and dominant caste groups to appropriate their voice and misappropriate
funds meant for tribal welfare and development (TR & TI, 2002).
This case study of the personnel structure in the Irrigation Department of tribal
Maharashtra describes an anachronism that is actually similar to conditions which
existed in the Tribal Development Department (and other jurisdictions outside
irrigation) throughout the state and the rest of India during the 1970s, and which was
first subject to critique by scholars such as B.D. Sharma (Sharma, 1978). Such critiques
were followed by administrative reform in those areas, where a new class of bureaucrats
from tribal communities subsequently came to be employed. The fact that one does not
see even one tribal employee in the ranks of the local Irrigation Department in the
Mumbai-Thane region represents a social and cultural vacuum that makes it much
easier for corruption to thrive in the dam project there.
While aiming to contribute value to the research literature on corruption, this
paper also aspires to help fill a specific ethnographic vacuum within recent urbanregional research in the Mumbai context, where there has been an interest amongst
geographers to identify causal factors that influence unequal access to water within the
Mumbai-Thane region (Gandy, 2008). The prevailing scholarship has not yet been able
to throw much light on the internal workings of the local water bureaucracy, or the
institutional architecture that plays a role in creating such a ‘quasi market’ in water.
Given this, the present case study strives to make evident that unequal access to water
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across the region is significantly facilitated by a bureaucratic apparatus engaged in the
deliberate mismanagement of adequate and surplus water, resulting in serious
consequences for the welfare of the poor sections of both rural and urban communities
in the region.
In doing so, this paper places a central focus on the social dynamics and political
legitimization that underlie the ad hoc nature of administrative, rural-urban transfers of
water in the Mumbai-Thane region. The main argument here is that water in this region
is actually abundant and available, but is mismanaged because of archaic rules around
the allocation of water from rural to urban use. And that, in order to politically and
socially legitimize the transfer of water to Mumbai from the Surya Dam Project, an
informal alliance of politicians and engineers have successfully projected the tribal
community as undeserving of the benefits of modern irrigation, while at the same time
becoming complicit in the deliberate mismanagement of water in the rural hinterland. In
that nexus there is little incentive for creating transparent and democratic water
governance institutions, or for transforming the rules and administrative structures
currently in place concerning rural-urban allocation of water in the Mumbai-Thane
region.
Finally, this paper argues that understanding the regional governance of water in
the (rapidly changing) Indian context also requires developing an analysis of the inner
workings of a highly complex and layered water bureaucracy with multiple interests,
including a wide range of formal and informal economic and social incentives. This
paper therefore makes the case for a more grounded analysis of corruption in India, and
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should be seen as a modest contribution to the ongoing public and intellectual debate on
graft and governance in that country.

Notes
1. On Google Scholar the World Development article has been cited more than 325
times while the Journal of Development Studies article (Wade, 1982) has been cited
more than 450 times. Both contributions helped develop a better understanding of
corruption in the water sector in policy and academic circles in the South Asian context.
However, except for Davis (2005), there has been no case study research on corruption
in the water sector in India and even the Asian context since Wade's articles. The term
“nexus” here means the conflation of politics and corruption around political spending
rather than its other meaning of energy/food/water.
2. In her study of water politics in the Kutch region of Western India, Lyla Mehta (2005)
argues for a distinction to be made between lived/experienced scarcity, which clearly
affects the livelihoods of people and manufactured scarcity, where water scarcity is
often manufactured to suit the interests of powerful actors (Mehta, 2005, p. 9).
3. Besides the influence of public choice approaches, Robert Wade’s work on corruption
and canal irrigation in India was equally influenced by the work of F. G Bailey, a
Sussex social anthropologist who had worked on tribal Orissa in the 1950s and 1960s.
Bailey is a political anthropologist with an interest in ‘prizes’ (hence resources of one
sort or another and to that degree interested in economics) and attempted at developing
an individualist account of politics in a classic work ‘Stratagems and Spoils: A Social
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Anthropology of Politics, 1968.’ In retrospect, one can see Bailey’s work as a kind of
‘individualist’ (but non-theoretical, hence non-rational choice model) account of
politics. In his book, Village Republics: Conditions for Collective Action South India,
which he published in 1990, Wade clearly credited Bailey's perspective for his study of
collective action by water user groups and blended the latter’s framework with the
sharper analytical tools of rational choice theory, borrowed from the work of E. Ostrom
(1990) and M. Olson (1965). The theoretical frameworks in Wade’s ethnographic
studies of corruption are a hybrid of these three theoretical approaches. The papers on
corruption try to analyze and marry the rules of the ‘political game’ by way through
Bailey’s with the public choice conceptualization of the ‘rent maximizing’ bureaucrat
and politician, which is later extrapolated to the study of the bureaucratic-political
nexus in the Irrigation Department in India.
4. Having stated the distinction between rational choice and interpretative approaches, it
should be pointed out that the logics of rational choice and interpretative approaches are
similar in that they are intentional accounts that start with observed data (behaviour
including documents and letters, practices and institutions and reconstruct actors and
their inner attributes—meanings, beliefs and values) in such a way that the data are as
fully explained or accounted for as possible (Griggs, 2007).
5. Water Auditing of Irrigation Projects in Maharashtra: Dams, Rivers and People.
September-October 2012. p. 10-16 accessed on 18th May, 2013 <http://sandrp.in/drp/
Sept_Oct_2012.pdf>.
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4.

Institutional Design and the Geography of RuralUrban Water Conflict in Mumbai
In the case study literature on the commons, there are few studies that examine

the institutional implications of water demand for a growing metropolitan region on its
rural hinterland.1 Urban expansion and growth often leads cities to take water from
distant rural watersheds that irrigate agriculture for urban use. Urban water
appropriation is rapidly becoming an important policy question in developing countries.
At the same time, the institutional mechanisms and regulatory frameworks that underlie
access to water from rural areas are poorly understood. Through a case study on the
city-region of Mumbai, India, this paper tries to develop a new understanding of an
unexplored institutional dimension of inter-sectoral water politics.
This paper hopes to make a contribution to the institutional and metropolitan
governance literature on water in large city-regions. The primary contribution is
empirical where the paper seeks to examine how a large city’s ability to access rural
water quotas and infrastructure has been mainly aided by a very particular evolution of
the legal-institutional architecture around water (and land). Its second contribution is to
highlight the common ground between the geographical and institutional economics
(including the CPR) literatures on this subject, and in doing so, it tries to identify some
of the key distinctions and commonalities between these fields.
I begin with a critical evaluation of the literature on rural-urban water transfers
in institutional economics and human geography and lay out the theoretical framework
of the paper in Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 and Section 4.3 present the paper’s theoretical
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framework. From Section 4.4 until Section 4.8, I deal with the case study of the
collective action2 problem in local water management that has important implications
for better understanding the mechanisms of rural-urban water transfers in the Mumbai
context. I end with an institutional analysis of findings in Sections 4.9 and 4.10.

4.1

The Problem: Water Abundance and Metropolitan
Water Governance
Large and growing mega-urban regions in the developing world often source

water from distant rural watersheds; however the basic water needs of human
habitations near the reservoirs get clubbed with the problem of water provision for periurban areas in the research literature. The abundant availability of water is a necessary,
but not a sufficient prerequisite to meet basic water needs of rural communities living
near source areas for large and growing cities. This paper focuses on two specific
questions to answer the failure of communities and governments to meet the demand for
basic water entitlements in such source areas outside Mumbai. The first question
focuses on investigating the role of institutional arrangements in meeting the basic
water needs of communities living near such source areas for large and growing mega
city-regions? Furthermore, it investigates how these institutional arrangements on water
sharing between urban and rural evolve at the level of geographical scale and how do
they influence local collective action in rural areas? In the Indian context, the water
problems of such source areas can often be a product of willful neglect by local and
state governments, or of a larger exclusion of rural indigenous communities who usually
live in proximity to dams located in forested watersheds. There has been a voluminous
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literature in the Indian context on problems of peri-urban areas and rural-urban conflict
in general (Joy et al., 2008a; Iyer, 2009), but very little research focused on institutional
factors that influence the interpretation of local water entitlements in rural watersheds
that serve as sources of water for large metropolitan cities.
The action situation described and analyzed in this case study is in the context of
a major water district called Tansa-Vaitarna water district (henceforth T-V) where five
major dams for the city of Greater Mumbai have been constructed in the last 100 years.
The five dams are located in a conservation area and water storage in the dams is preassigned and quotas reserved for various cities in the metropolitan region, viz. Mumbai,
Thane, Bhiwandi and some designated outlying villages. The T-V water district faces
socio-economic problems typical of forested areas in tribal areas of Western India
(Louw and Mondal, 2013, p. 50-51). Low levels of economic development combined
with high rates of seasonal migration are central in the experience of these communities.
Such problems of access to resources in forest areas and state monopoly rights are the
focus of a large literature in South Asian political ecology since the 1980s.
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai had, during the completion of
the Upper Vaitarna (1972) and Bhatsa projects (1983), promised water supply to
villages and towns (Mulekar, 1985). Water is conveyed from this region through large
aqueducts into the Bhandup complex of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. These
water mains, as they pass the villages near the source areas in the T-V water district, are
all above ground. The sight of water being conveyed to a large metropolitan city while
the inhabitants of the source area suffer from endemic water shortage became major
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ground for resentment for inhabitants of this area. This led the Government to
implement a rural water supply project that would source its water from the dams
owned by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation under a water sharing agreement. The
maintenance of the water supply scheme was handed over to the local government as
part of state policy to decentralize water provision in rural areas.
It is useful to see T-V as a “problemshed” within the Vaitarna sub-basin.
Conflicts over water in this area have ranged from demands for water quotas that were
originally promised for irrigating agriculture, to demands for water for domestic
consumption in the villages that lie in the proximity of the reservoirs. The Vaitarna
basin is the largest amongst the North Konkan river basin groups that constitute water
sources for metropolitan Mumbai and the region. The Second Irrigation Commission of
the State Government of Maharashtra went into this region and recommended that water
intensive agriculture be encouraged (Government of Maharashtra, 1999, p. 432). The
Committee report stated “that the requirements of the megacity and that of industrial
use are going to remain the principal determinant of planning and management of water
in this area instead of irrigation” (Government of Maharashtra, 1999, p. 432). However,
thirty nine percent of the area was found to be cultivable and the report concluded that
conditions in the basin were favourable for water intensive agricultural production that
was amenable to the needs of civic supply (Government of Maharashtra, 1999).
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Figure 4.1: Urban water demand and supply in Mumbai Hydrometric Area in million litres per day
(1991-2011). Source: Government of Maharashtra, 2003-2010 & 2005. Tables on Water Budget.

The report thus indicates a sufficient availability of water for meeting both
irrigation, and domestic and industrial water needs in this region. While there are urban
water supply dams constructed in this water district, there are also multipurpose dam
projects that supply water to irrigate agriculture through canal systems. This imparts a
variety of water rights to the rural population. However, the last two decades have
witnessed significant water quotas from this area’s largest dam, the Bhatsa multipurpose
project, allocated for urban-industrial use (Government of Maharashtra, 2005). For this
reason, Greater Mumbai and towns that access reservoirs with the city have not
witnessed any significant shortfalls in supply since the early 1990s (See Figure 4.1
above). The Bhatsa presently irrigates land in downstream Bhiwandi (in Figure 4.5, red
lines indicate canals that bypass predominantly tribal parts of the T-V water district).
An empirical focus on the main water district for Mumbai as a unique context
for metropolitan water governance presents some advantages. Mumbai is one of the
largest metropolitan cities in India. It is also an outlier in the Indian context on urban
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per capita water consumption and ranks amongst the world’s leading and more
prosperous global cities on this indicator. However, its water sources are located in an
underdeveloped tribal area of rural Maharashtra where there is a seasonal scarcity of
water. A recent National Sample Survey on the reliability and availability of drinking
water in rural Maharashtra shows that the state scores below the rural average for India
on both the sufficiency and availability of improved sources of drinking water (NSS
2012,: p.15). This is despite the fact that the state has the largest and highest number of
dams and per capita availability of water. This paper will thus explore disparities
between rural and urban areas in India and will also shed light on how institutional
arrangements crafted at the local level often influence regional water in one of the
fastest growing metropolitan cities of the world. Secondly, this paper will explore how a
city’s demand for water can crowd out the needs of outlying rural areas. In addition to
identifying the main legal principles that have played an important role in the evolution
of water governance system in the Mumbai metropolitan region, the paper will highlight
the role of local agro-ecology in shaping institutional arrangements on water.

4.2

Rural-Urban Water Transfers: Power or Institutions?
A review of theory from human geography (HG) and institutional economics

(IE) in a case study on a rural-urban water conflict might seem strange to readers of an
institutional economics journal. While there is an active program within economic and
environmental geography on institutions (Gertler, 2004; Adger and Jordan 2009), there
has not been a great deal of interest amongst critical geographers in applying
institutional theory to resource problems such as water. The main distinction between
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frameworks in both disciplines towards rural-urban water transfers lies primarily in the
different theoretical paradigms that are dominant in these disciplines. In critical
geography, the dominance of Marxism and post structuralism has focused on the role of
power and politics in water appropriation by cities from rural areas. In his landmark
study of the City of Guayaquil, the geographer, Erik Swyngedouw has argued that urban
water capture can be attributed to the power of capital located in urban areas and
considers water appropriation an inevitable outcome of capitalist urbanization
(Swyngedouw, 2004; Gandy, 2008). The political-ecological analysis in this Marxian
framework hinges on social and political processes and is chiefly informed by
dependency theory and ecological economics. Both of these fields explain contestation
over consumption of resources as a result of competition between urban and rural areas.
Another track within critical geography that uses power revolves around
analyzing the governance of urban water appropriation and inter-sectoral water conflict
by applying a Foucauldian lens. Here, the concept that has been utilized is
“governmentality” where the argument is that governments control populations by using
the knowledge acquired from their information gathering abilities. This poststructuralist framework takes the view that institutions, such as the government, its
regulatory frameworks and even organizations promoting people’s participation in the
management of public works, are part of a power gathering exercise, which in the
process of development, craft a complex (but amorphous) system of governance.
It is important to see this framework as complementary to the Marxian
approach. Both try to examine the role of power, but both often overlook the fact that
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state power in relation to water is exercised through specific legislative mandates or
executive decisions, especially in democracies. Empirical data on regulations and
instruments of governance are also conspicuous by their absence in these frameworks.
The complexities of geographical scale, boundaries and institutions that often manage
through overlapping jurisdictions around large metropolitan cities are also ignored. An
example of the application of a governmentality framework is Matthew Gandy’s 2008
paper on Mumbai. While the main focus of this paper is the uneven distribution of water
among rich, middle class and poor residents of the city over time, Gandy also grapples
with the regional power and influence of Mumbai’s claims to water over other towns
and villages in the region. However, his use of governmentality does not help us to
understand Mumbai’s total control over water in the region, beyond an argument about
the “performativity” of local right-wing populist politics and the influence of the Shiv
Sena over local water policy through its influence within the Mumbai Municipal
Corporation. This “performativity thesis” assumes that right-wing politics and neoliberal ideology act in tandem and completely explain the phenomena he describes. This
argument does not stand critical scrutiny as it ignores two important facts: a liberal/
mainstream party, the Indian National Congress, enacted water policy for the entire state
for the last fifteen years; and the state government’s Irrigation Department owns two of
the largest reservoirs that constitute the water sources for Greater Mumbai. Moreover,
neo-liberal policies have made little headway in the transformation of the regional and
urban water system -- which continues to be a state monopoly at both levels. Because
Gandy seems to ignore these facts on the ground, the paper is unable to analyze why the
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Municipal Corporation of Mumbai -- despite the construction of numerous dams and
high per capita water consumption -- is unable to meet the water needs of the poor in
the urban and rural areas. Formal state law on water and mechanisms of legitimation
and enforcement that shape water rights and entitlements are treated as epiphenomena
and ignored.
Research on rural–urban water transfers within IE has been primarily influenced
by common pool resource (CPR) theory. Water’s characteristics as a renewable
resource, its variable legal status within different contexts and the ability to store it in
reservoirs makes it amenable for empirical analysis using CPR theory. In the last two
decades, economists and even social scientists using institutional theory have also
outlined a variety of market and non-market mechanisms that exist in the context of
inter-sectoral transfers of water from aquifers and surface water storages (see Saleth and
Dinar, 2004; Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Crase and Gandhi 2009). There has been a large
range of theoretical approaches, from transaction cost analysis to empirical examination
of rules that undergird rural-urban water transfers. From the water markets of the
Western United States and Australia to administrative water transfers in Asia, one of the
main strengths of this literature is a close attention to the wide variation in institutional
arrangements on rural-urban water transfers that can exist in real world contexts.
While the gap between the HG and IE literatures on this subject of rural-urban
water transfers can be wide, some scholars have recently tried to bridge the distance by
producing case studies on water transfers that draw on insights from both disciplines.
An instance is a recent contribution, by Celio et al., (2010) who in their case study of
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Hyderabad, Southern India have pointed to the interesting complementarities that exist
between both the IE and HG perspectives. Applying institutional and geographical tools
to water transfers, their research finds that “appropriation of water” often has a spatial
and temporal dimension and involves the capture of rural water infrastructure by cities
(as Marxian geographers have argued). At the same time, the authors also present
counter examples of water transfer that focus on two reservoirs and are part of the same
context in the Hyderabad region. While transfers in the first example within this case
study points to outright appropriation of water, the two other examples in the same case
study also leads them to identify the importance of rules around such transfers that
ensure compensation for farmers.
While common features to IE and HG have been highlighted, there are also gaps
in both literatures on the subject of inter-sectoral water transfers. For example, the
power and influence of complex water bureaucracies and the path dependence of
institutional rules are not particularly well researched in either literature. On the other
hand, the general problem with the IE literature (given the influence of common pool
resource theory) is that resources are defined too essentially and “presuppose a cause
and effect of ecological analysis that may or may not be universal” (Forsyth and
Johnson, 2014, p. 9). Also, while institutional scholarship has been very useful in
furthering our understanding of these processes and the dynamics of collective action in
small scale communities, it is yet to develop a theory of local collective action could be
influenced by the sharing of the commons with larger geographical entities (Harvey,
2013: p.68-72). However, scholars working within CPR literature have now begun to
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point to the lack of attention to the interconnections between different institutions and
resources, which are primarily a legacy of the decades of engagement with the tragedy
of the commons argument within CPR theory (Cole et al., 2014). This is particularly
relevant to developing our knowledge of how water is shared between geographically
dispersed rural communities and large urban areas. Given the dependence of rural poor
in developing countries on common resources and land, an evolutionary understanding
of the relationship between various institutions that manage these resources is crucial.

4.3

Institutions and Action Situations:
The Context of the Socio-Ecological System
This paper utilizes some of Elinor Ostrom's key insights and methodologies that

she developed using institutionalism to research commons problems within the field of
development studies. Ostrom (1990) inspired a wide body of work within development
studies, economic history and other disciplines in the social sciences in India, in
particular, and also by overseas scholars studying environmental problems in India and
other parts of South Asia. This literature has consistently pointed out how the excessive
authority and power placed in a centralizing colonial and post-colonial state and the
consequent failures of governance and institutions had characterized the experiences of
the rural poor in their access to the commons (Wade, 1988; Gadgil and Ramachandran,
1995; Chakravarty-Kaul, 1996; Agrawal, 1999). In a recent review of Ostrom’s
contributions to development studies, Tim Forsyth and Craig Johnson have highlighted
the integration of theory from political science and economics that emerged from her
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work on resources as her chief theoretical contribution to this field (Forsyth and
Johnson, 2014).
For the purposes of this paper, institutions are systems of established and
embedded social rules that structure social interactions between individuals and
organizations (Hodgson, 2006). Though I explicitly identify and give a central role to
formal rules and organizations that manage water in this context, my description and
analysis of water politics in this paper does not strictly distinguish between formal and
informal institutions. The role and presence of caste groups and associations, the media,
political parties, and everyday enforcement of rules by various organizations viz. the
municipal corporation, irrigation and forest departments as actors in the water district
are examples of how the formal and informal interact. The treatment of institutions in
this paper is thus different from that in the new institutional economics, which
emphasizes the role of quasi-autonomous individuals (Hodgson, 2006; 2012; 2014).
Within common pool resource theory, a socio-ecological system is defined as an
ecological system intricately linked with and affected by one or more social systems
(Berkes and Folke, 2000). It can loosely be defined as an interdependent system of
organism or biological units. In her initial outline of the socio-ecological system,
Ostrom identified five design principles for the successful implementation of bottom up
solutions for socio-ecological systems. The first was that a resource system has clearly
defined boundaries. The importance of internal rules comes next, where it is critical that
there should be rules that prevent users from appropriating too much of the resource.
Third, rules work better when they are locally adapted as it helps prevent free riding.
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Next, strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms also play an important role and
so do dispute resolution mechanisms. If dispute resolution mechanisms are transparent
and clear and well-established procedures are in place, any decentralized resolution of
common pool resource problems can be successful. Finally, it is also important to focus
on the interaction between different systems of rules. Often governments try to
decentralize resource management but the overall legal frameworks in place means that
central authorities still assume responsibility for determining most of the rules that
govern the use of resources (Pennington 2012, p. 26-29). All these factors affect the
incentive structure that faces actors in the context of specific common pool resources
and these incentives constitute what Ostrom calls “action situations.” In this paper, the
term “commons” is used to describe water storage as well as water that is distributed
through conveyance systems as public and club goods.
The case study I present in this paper uses social ecological systems (SES) and
action situation methodologies, which are drawn from the CPR literature. The paper
uses this framework to relate the water question in the action situations to conflicts
around resources such as land within forests and tries to develop a more contextual
understanding of the institutional arrangements around resources (Ostrom, 2009).
An action situation following Ostrom (2005) refers to a situation whenever two
or more individuals are faced with a set of potential actions that jointly produce social
outcomes. Within every action situation an individual occupies a certain social position.
The same participant can interact in another action situation where they occupy
different positions. An action arena combines the action situation, which focuses on the
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rules and norms, with the participants who bring with them their individual preferences,
skills and mental models. Action situation methodology has been employed by scholars
investigating outcomes of collective action situations with respect to the
decentralization of resource management, but also in general studies of the commons
(Anderies and Janssen, 2013). Unlike other studies using the SES and action situation
methodology, this paper draws on cartographic and archival data, and synthesizes
ethnographic research with data collected from local newspapers, and dam reports.

Figure 4.2: Action Situations embedded in socio-ecological systems.

The action situation (see Figure 4.2) described in this paper is located within
what is called the Mumbai hydrometric area (see Note 2) in the T-V water district in
Thane. Following Ostrom (2011), I utilize the Social - Ecological Systems framework to
research a particular SES, namely the coastal plains and uplands in the region that are
located between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea coast. The city of Mumbai has
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identified a hydrometric area in this region on which it claims a priority of ownership of
water use since the early 1970s. The Regional Map (see Figure 4.3) is a cartographic
representation of the location of various dams for the entire Mumbai metropolitan
region. The Mumbai hydrometric area has several reservoirs (large, medium and small)
that impart a variety of local water rights to the various agricultural regions and smaller
towns and villages adjacent to Greater Mumbai within and outside the metropolitan
region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005; UNDP, 2009; SANDRP, 2013).
These local rights create grounds for contestation over the city’s claims that the
water belongs to it exclusively. The action situations analyzed below describe the state’s
attempts to resolve these disputes by the construction of a rural water supply system and
the attempts of the communities to inject transparency into local water governance.
Later, I examine how the attributes of a resource system (i.e., the coastal plains below
the Western Ghats), resource units generated by that system and its ownership (i.e., the
large dams), and a governance system affecting who is authorized to undertake what
policies under what conditions jointly affect and are affected by outcomes of the action
situation (See Table 4.1 and Table 4.3).
This paper uses a framework combining socio-ecological system and legal
institutionalist (L-I) approaches in order to understand the role of law in access to
resources (Rhodes, 2006; Deakin et al., 2015). The L-I approach helps to identify
important legal principles and to analyze the influence of water laws and their evolution
in particular local contexts. Thus, this paper departs from a spontaneous conception of
law and property rights that downplay the role of the state, as in the transactions cost
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literature. A weakness of that literature is an assumption of relatively small numbers of
agents and an underdeveloped conception of the nature of law. The L-I approach on the
other hand shares with other institutional approaches an emphasis on social rules. It
argues that the “more important and powerful social rules are legal in character and they
are backed by the power and authority of the state” (Deakin et al 2015: p 17).

Figure 4.3 - Regional Map of Mumbai Hydrometric Area.

The institutional complexity of the Indian context makes one ask; “how should
we frame and analyze institutions in all their contextual variety, so that our approach is
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relevant for the purposes of institutional design?” (Aligicia, 2013, p.73). The analysis of
contestation in contemporary India requires examining place specific laws and rights
and how they emerged from constitutional provisions in relation to the socio-ecological
context. For the purposes of this paper, legal rules and procedures are the independent
variable and water governance and institutions in this region are the dependent variable.
In summary, this paper applies common pool resource theory by using SES and
action situation methodologies to analyze how state actors attempt to resolve disputes
between urban and rural water supply in the Mumbai hydrometric area. This action
situation also analyzes attempts of communities to advocate for transparency in local
water governance. A legal institutionalist (L-I) approach is applied to analyze influence
of water laws and social rules in the institutional complexity of the Indian context.

4.4

Placing the Action Situation in a Historical-Evolutionary
Context
In a critical review of the CPR literature, Arun Agrawal has pointed out that

researchers within the common pool resource literature have paid more attention to the
characteristics and functioning of institutions than to the social and historical context in
which those institutions actually function and evolve (Agrawal, 2002). A large body of
empirical research in the common pool resource literature has also ignored the
evolutionary trajectory of institutions and the knowledge systems that influence
resource management systems. The CPR literature also fails to analyze how institutions
of resource governance interact with one another horizontally or across levels of social
organization (McCay, 2002; Young, 2003). This gap is widely prevalent in CPR
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research because it is considered impossible to combine the use of historical data with a
socio-ecological framework (for two exceptions to this trend, see Chakravarty-Kaul,
1996; Mwangi, 2007). In a context where institutions managing varied resources
intersect and overlap, a discrete approach to one resource may not be particularly
insightful. While privatization and extractive practices around resources could be one
vital aspect of social and ecological transformation, other factors such as choice of
technology, organization and legal frameworks are also important to develop a better
understanding of institutional evolution in the context of resources.
My focus on the evolutionary aspects of water resource management in the
Mumbai context is thus informed by combining the substantive and methodological
lessons from Ostrom’s corpus of theoretical work on the commons, with Geoffrey
Hodgson's recent collaborative research on legal institutionalism within institutional
economics (Deakin et al., 2015). The broad lessons from this literature include
embracing complexity and developing an understanding of how institutions have
evolved in concrete and real situations through interdisciplinary empirical case studies
(Frischmann, 2013, p. 393; Pennington, 2012). An understanding of rules that underlie
water governance entails developing an in depth understanding of what legal principles
have played an important role in the evolution of organizations that manage water
systems for large metropolitan urban regions. From an institutionalist perspective, a
closer scrutiny of debates on dam location in the Mumbai context yields important
information on the institutional evolution of the regional water system. Urban water
supply dams fall in a category of engineering projects where technological choices are

!153

considerably influenced by the institutional framework around land, water, and
geography. While planning these reservoirs, engineers have to be mindful of both the
costs and efficiency aspects of these projects, but they also seek to provide a reliable
water supply to large cities without creating conditions of legal insecurity around water
rights. Such debates on dam location were and continue to be covered in great detail in
engineering journals and Government reports and often reflect competing visions of
what can be accomplished by these dam projects.

4.5

The Action Situation - Hydropower versus Urban Water
Supply: Creating Mumbai’s Property Rights over Water
in the Mid–Twentieth Century3
In the mid-1940s, Mumbai was faced with severe water shortages. Financial

constraints to expand the city’s water supply network during the war had made the
situation precarious. The Mumbai Municipal Corporation turned to two of the best
experts in India, Sir M Viswesarraya and the English hydrologist Claude Inglis, for
advice. Claude Inglis, in a paper in the Journal of the Institute of Indian Engineers,
advocated the use of the tail race water of the Tata hydroelectric power project in the
Lonavala area (also in the Western Ghats) (see Figure 4.4) for meeting the future needs
of the city. Though located in the Western Ghats, the Tata project was an independent
private sector project and developed independently of the Bombay water supply system.
This understanding of institutions and legal-evolutionary aspects of water
governance help to contextualize the action situation in the Mumbai hydrometric area
and illuminate the legal principles significant to this case.
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Figure 4.4: Creation of Tansa-Vaitarna water district in Shahpur, Thane District. Note on Source:
This map was re-worked from a 1948 original by Modak. I thank the University of Chicago Crerar
Library for making available the microfiche with the original map.

The Tata power project (Bhivpuri, Andra, Walwan, Shirwata reservoirs) (see
Figure 4.4) was completed in 1919 to generate electricity for the city of Mumbai (Vora,
2009). Inglis advocated that Mumbai access the Lonavala reservoir system because he
saw it as the most ‘efficient’ and cost effective solution to the city’s needs. These
reservoirs were built in the 1920s and the water from the dams (after generating
hydropower) drained into the Arabian Sea through the Ulhas River. This water was seen
as being wasted. Inglis pointed out that thousands of acres of valuable agricultural and
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forest land would be inundated in any potential project in Thane district and exercising
the Lonavala option would therefore provide a good alternative.

4.6

Outcome of the Action Situation under the BMC Act
of 1888
In a dissenting response, first in an interim report in 1947, and later in a final

report in 1948, NV Modak, the special engineer of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation
advocated the construction of a new dam in Thane district on the grounds of meeting
future needs and the creation of an exclusive water district. He argued that the growth of
the city due to industrialization and an influx of population after the partition of India,
coupled with the existence of a massive forested watershed in tribal Thane, made the
Tansa-Vaitarna area more attractive for building a new dam and could also become a
future site of large scale dam building (Modak, 1948, p.47). He also argued that “an
adequate infrastructure existed in Thane since the nineteenth century to haul the pipes
and the various machinery to build a new reservoir.” This, according to him, would
provide economy to any dam project and future dam projects undertaken in the next 100
years. The Tata project, in his view, had limited yield and the tail race water from the
reservoirs was in fact accessed to some extent downstream by farming communities and
smaller towns that lay along the Ulhas River, thus imparting towns and villages riparian
rights (Modak, 1947). Along with the potential issues arising out of the riparian rights of
rural communities, Modak also pointed out the legal complexity and uncertainty that a
water sharing agreement with a private corporation producing hydro power would cause
in years with erratic rainfall. That would create potential pitfalls in securing Bombay’s
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future water needs from a legal perspective (Modak, 1948). In a 1948 report authored
again by Modak, the two other interlocutors in this debate, Claude Inglis and the Indian
engineer S. Visvesvaraya gave their written assent to Modak’s proposals, one to build a
new independent dam on the Vaitarna river and secondly, to link the new project with
the Tansa dam (built in the 1890s) through an aqueduct (Modak, 1948) (See Figure 4.5).
As the Bombay Municipal City Corporation decided to construct the next dam in
Vaitarna, the region to the north in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district was reserved for
meeting demand from Mumbai with all the attendant socio-ecological consequences for
the local population (Times of India, 1954). The eventual choice to build a dam at
Vaitarna highlights the importance of the local water rights situation in the 1940s.
Indian water law in the late Colonial period was (and largely still is) informed by
riparian principles (Singh, 1992; Cullet, 2010) and the Municipal Corporation used its
knowledge of the local water rights situation in its eventual choice of dam location.
Communities in T-V water district enjoyed weaker water rights since they lived in what
were mostly forested areas. A broad local scholarship has highlighted the historic
contestation over land rights (in tribal parts of Thane district) where T-V is located
(Ambasta, 1998; Munshi, 1998). Since most communities in T-V did not have clear
rights over land, Modak and the Municipal Corporation of Mumbai did not foresee any
major legal challenge to the claims and authority of Mumbai over water in the area. In
an American urban context, the late Vincent Ostrom pointed to similar strategies
employed by the City of Los Angeles to secure and control its own water supply.
Ostrom highlighted that “the phase of the cycle involving the movement of water across
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the land represents the most strategic opportunity for human control and
development” (Ostrom, 1953, p.232). He argued that while most governments are not
based on that notion, Los Angeles was deliberately organized to assure control over the
San Fernando Valley, a basic hydrological unit of the Los Angela river system. He
argued that having the hydrological unit as the area of government has been the basis of
annexation policies for the Metropolitan Water District (Ostrom, 1953).
Similarly, in the Mumbai context, while advocating for a second dam in T-V
water district, Modak foresaw how construction of a new dam project in the district
would potentially strengthen the city's rights in a forested watershed where there were
no other claimants to the water (Beaumont, 1943). Given that there was agricultural
activity in T-V watershed, (as pointed out in Inglis’ 1945 paper) the only way to secure
the city’s interests was to reserve the watershed and land around it for the future. In
1964, the technical report of the Bhatsa multipurpose dam further confirms this
perception of the importance of the watershed and the role of land rights in influencing
dam location. The Bhatsa report points to the “non-existence of riparian rights upstream
of the river” where the reservoirs were built (Government of Maharashtra 1964, p. 10).
The construction of more dams in the same water district in subsequent decades
indicates a preference of Mumbai Municipal Corporation to construct reservoirs in
forest areas and is further evidence of the important role of engineering perceptions of
the relationship of local land and water rights in the region. The absence of strong
riparian rights for local populations in T-V water district in the 1940s and the absence of
water claims made it attractive to engineers for exploiting rivers in the area. The

!158

subsequent reservation of the watershed in the 1950s weakened whatever future claim
local communities might have to water resources there. Reservation, by default,
recognized Mumbai as having prior appropriation rights to water in the area.
In the early 1970s, when metropolitan planning was introduced in Mumbai, the
T-V water district was not included within metropolitan region boundaries. The two
major institutional developments in this period were the creation of a local Water
Resources Board in the late 1960’s and the drawing of a hydrometric area that would
help with water planning in the region; the hydrometric boundaries of the Mumbai
region were extended far beyond those of the metropolitan region and included the T-V
water district and the major watersheds to the north, east and south of the metropolitan
region (see Figure 4.4). The Water Resources Board did not survive beyond a few years
and was disbanded (Binnie’s Consulting Engineers, 1971; World Bank, 1996), but the
hydrometric area continues to inform water planning and is a term often used to affirm
the city’s claims over water (MMRDA, 1996). This period from the early 1970s until
the late 1980s coincided with the planning of major new towns in the metropolitan
region and an attempt was made to balance agricultural and industrial water demand by
constructing large multipurpose dams in the T-V water district and in other parts of the
hydrometric area. Some of these projects were designed to both irrigate agricultural
land and supply water to Greater Mumbai and the metropolitan region, whereas some
others existed to simply irrigate agricultural land (such as the Surya, that lies outside the
T-V water district but within the Vaitarna basin, see Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Tansa-Vaitarna Water District (Pathak, 2005). This map is a reworking of originals from
Tansa Wild Life Sanctuary and GIS shape files from the Water Resources Information System of
India at http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in. Population of this 659.75 sq. km area was about 95,487
people in 1991 (Pathak, 2005, p. 449). Precise figures unavailable for current period.

How does this specific account of water policy and politics of dam location help
illustrate the role of water institutions and rules in an action situation today? Case
studies on Indian water governance completely ignore the historical evolution of rules
in local contexts. Moreover, it is often claimed that Indian water law comprises many
formal and informal laws, norms and principles (Cullet, 2010). Yet the influence of
common law tradition on Indian water law means local water rights and rules in any
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context carry their own weight. Any exercise of state power in a democracy must
depend on the prevailing legal system and local rules that evolve (or remain) over time.
The above account shows us that Greater Mumbai’s claims to water in the T-V
district were strengthened by the decision to reserve the watershed in the T-V water
district (after the construction of the Vaitarna dam in the 1950s). The city’s water rights
were further entrenched in law by the creation of a wider hydrometric boundary which
later became the basis for water planning and the assignment of quotas from the 1970s
(MMRDA, 1996; Binnie’s Consulting Engineers 1971: 37). Both these decisions to
create boundaries had direct implications for the rights of local communities to the
water of the T-V watershed. The paper now examines how these institutional choices
impacted policies and state and grassroots-led collective action attempts to resolve local
water conflicts in the T-V water district.

4.7

Action Situation in the T-V Water District: Outcomes
under the BMC Act 1888, the 1976 Maharashtra
Irrigation Act, the 1972 Wildlife Act and the 2005
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulation Act
In the early 1970s, a wide, forested and mainly tribal watershed in Tansa-

Vaitarna water district was incorporated into the Tansa Wildlife Sanctuary. Figure 4.6
shows the evolution of water governance in Mumbai-Thane region from 1892 to today.
The map of the Tansa-Vaitarna Water District (Figure 4.5) displays more than
four hundred habitations in the core and buffer zones of the Sanctuary (see Table 4.3 on
the laws that govern resource management in the area). This development brought part
of the Vaitarna watershed under the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 and its stringent
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provisions governing access of farmers to water, land and forest resources. Since the
nineteenth century, communities in T-V district have had a long history of conflict with
the state over access, ownership and use of land plots in the forest area for agriculture
(Tucker, 1979; Saldanha, 1992; Ambasta, 1998; Munshi, 1998; Bokil and Dalvi 2000;
Louw and Mondal, 2012). Over the last 25 years, frequent conflict between the forest

Figure 4.6: Chronological Timeline: Evolution of Water Governance in Mumbai-Thane region.

department and local inhabitants has intensified due to attempted evictions by the local
Forest Department of the local tribal populations engaged in agriculture on their forest
land plots within the sanctuary. The conflict has been amplified by a growing
curtailment of various rights of the rural population over the last three decades (Draft
Forest Plan, 1996; Pathak, 2005) that has seen the state declare more than forty human
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Table 4.1: Resource and Governance Systems. Sources: Pathak (2005); Census of India. (2001). District
Census Handbook, Thane District. Bombay: Government Central Press.; Louw and Mondal (2012);
Gazetteer of Thane District (1981).
Resource System

Attributes of the Resource System

Type of resource system

Coastal alluvial plains and forest ecology

Location

Konkan; North of Mumbai city

Productivity

Varied, but high in the coastal alluvial plains in Thane district

Clarity of watershed boundaries

Clearly demarcated in the 1980s

Constructed infrastructure
Not Well developed until the 1940s
Diversion dams

Weirs mostly set up on rivers to convey water to cities from larger
storages

Headworks

These are mostly located in forest areas

Channels and Canals

These have been constructed in very difficult terrain

Road and Rail network

Markets well developed because of an infrastructure

Resource Units
Spatial distribution of rainfall

Concentrated in the monsoon (June-September)

Temporal distribution of rainfall

Heavy in the mountains and hills near storages

Economic value of land

High

Economic value of water

High

Actors
Tribal farmers

Poor-below the official Indian poverty line

Non-Tribal farmers

Middle Farmers, owning more than 2 hectares

Landless

20% of farming population

Economic Status
Tribal Farmers

Poor access to modern crops or industrial jobs, and they don’t
migrate to the city

Non-Tribal Farmers

Less poor; 50% are marginal cultivators with access to urban and
industrial jobs

Central Government and State Government
Members of Legislative Assembly

Can request water for their constituency, deny water for certain
kinds of demand

National Water Development
Agency

Planning large water projects

State officials

Mostly involved in water planning

Local Officials

Not involved

City Officials

City Corporation officers and engineers
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Shared knowledge of resource system
Shared norms among actors

Very low due to caste status of rural communities

settlements in T-V water district as “illegal” (see Figure 4.5). In the last 140 years
populations living in settlements in this area have been periodically displaced to create a
category of “protected forests” that serve to protect the watershed (Tulloch, 1872; Times
of India, “Water Supply of Greater Bombay. A report Submitted to the Bench of
Justices.” 1954; Ambasta, 1998). At least four thousand tribal cultivators, therefore,
continue to live in the forests of Tansa (see “encroachment villages” in Fig 4.5),
precariously clinging to patches of land while battling state forest department
regulations that threaten their livelihoods. In order to understand the relationship of land
and forest tenure to water, it is important to understand the institutional diversity of
property rights around land and forests and the implications it has for collective action.
Forest regulations establish three categories of agricultural land. While a third of
land holdings are recognized by the state, at least two thirds of the land plots fall under
land tenure systems that are renewed every year. Some agriculture is also located within
forest areas where cultivation is carried out in contravention of the state regulations
around forest land. A majority of farmers in this region are small and marginal
cultivators and are dependent on their land holdings and access to the forests for their
livelihoods. In terms of pursuing an everyday existence and basic livelihoods, the
population living in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district thus face a very difficult situation.
A preliminary examination might fault the absence of clear land rights as a problem in
resource management in this area (see Table 4.1). However, such a perspective would
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be overlooking the problem of geographical scale in resource governance in the water
district.
The changing agro-political-ecology of the T-V water district has had a more
significant influence on the resource rights of the local communities. For reasons that
are elaborated below, it can also be discerned that the institutional design and
biophysical boundaries of both the forests and watersheds in the Sanctuary and the T-V
water district show considerable overlap. This spatial fit and the legal architecture that
has been created in the 1970s to draw a boundary around the forests in the watershed
also completely leaves out the local communities (who are one of the main
stakeholders) from the decision making and planning process around water and land.
The Mumbai Municipal Corporation’s stated policy for discouraging human habitations
is not to allow pollutants from rural settlements to enter the water within the reservoirs.
This has led to very tight regulation of human habitation and land use in the forested
belts between the Upper Vaitarna and Modak Sagar Dams (Mulekar, 1985, Gokhale,
1995). However, the exclusion of local communities from the governance of the T-V
water district by the various agencies also leaves out any potential co-operation between
local communities and the state agencies.
Two local researchers have highlighted the following about the predicament of
the local communities when it comes to livelihoods in the T-V water district:
Faced with the choice of either surrendering completely to the dictates
of a market economy they are ill equipped to deal with or seeking to
eke out a miserable living on small patches of land, most tribals have
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chosen the latter option i.e. occupation of the conservation area in the
T-V. The close symbolic attachment that tribals have to traditional
forest land underpins this choice and determines, clearly, a rational
choice that underpins their livelihood strategies. Not surprisingly, this
reinforces a destructive circle, bringing tribals and conservation
authorities into increasing conflict over the two critical resources
discussed earlier, namely, access to land and water. (Louw and
Mondal, 2012, p. 54)
The current institutional-geographical profile of the T-V water district has thus
been influenced by past enclosures around land and forest resources. These struggles
around forests and land have also helped shape place based collective identities in the
action situation around water. Figure 4.5 vividly illustrates the spatial geography of
land, forests and water resources which the rural communities have to deal with in the
T-V water district. It also shows the spatiality of the commons problem and the spatial
domains of resource users and the commons. These agro-ecological features and the
resource governance system in the area are further delineated in Table 4.1. The poor
economic status of farmers in the water district and high value of water (due to urban
water demand) in what is a forested area makes water provision for local communities
who are socio-economically poor a challenge.
The denial of basic amenities such as water to the local population in the T-V
water district as part of a conscious policy by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation
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(which owns most of the infrastructure in the area) led to the local self-government to
plan and construct a rural water supply system in the T-V water district.

4.8

Rural Water Supply Project: Decentralization in Action
In the T-V water district, the provision of rural water services takes two forms.

Rural water supply is a subject of local self-government in the state of Maharashtra.
However, communities in rural Maharashtra are also reliant on their own village based
wells. The presence of a large Municipal Corporation’s reservoirs and water main
infrastructure in the water district meant that the water problem could only be alleviated
if the Municipal Corporation shared water from its reservoirs in the T-V Water district
with villages. Traditionally, in the Indian context and in the state of Maharashtra, water
storage and supply are within the domain of state owned enterprises and the state
Irrigation Department. Partly, this is a historical inheritance from the Colonial period,
more importantly “the characteristics of water with a high degree of natural monopoly,
high capital intensity, the presence of sunk costs, the multipurpose and hydrologically
interconnected nature of water itself ensures that the state continues to monopolize the
provision of water in rural areas in India” (Sangameshwaran, 2010, p. 54). However,
two dominant trends in the area of water distribution took over in rural areas of Western
India from the mid-1990s onwards. One was sectoral decentralization which was
particularly influential and the second was privatization. Noting wide disparities in
water access between cities and rural areas, a White Paper on the Drinking Water
Problem (Government of Maharashtra, 1995) had acknowledged and emphasized the
needs of water in source areas that were located next to dams on a priority basis. In the
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T-V water district, overhead water tanks were constructed as part of a project to
alleviate the problem for eighteen villages with a total population of 15,000 people by
decentralizing water provision. The Maharashtra State Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Corporation (MSRWSSC) now called the Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran
set up a Water Supply Division in the T-V water district to provide water to eighteen
villages. The construction of water tanks to provide water to the villages in this region
started in 1992. Upon completion in 1995, the scheme was to be handed over to the
village councils for operation and maintenance. Water for this scheme came from the
Mumbai Municipal Corporation reservoirs in the T-V water district. This water supply
project in the T-V water district claimed to have involved participation of rural
communities, but in fact this was a scheme mostly implemented by a parastatal
corporation that supplied water to peri-urban areas in Mumbai (IRHDP, 1997).
The completion of the project and the transfer of water supply systems to local
self-government, which did not have the technical capacity to maintain the project,
caused recurrent failure in water provision within various villages (IRHDP, 1997).
Water provision in rural areas in India is considered the domain of local selfgovernment and village councils (also called Panchayats). However, local village
councils that were put in charge of the project complained of shoddy work and poor
maintenance, but the main complaint of the local villages was unavailability of water
from the Municipal reservoirs and the exorbitant water tariffs. What made the water
problem difficult to solve for the inhabitants was the scattered nature of the human
habitations with the main villages cut off from several tribal settlements by forests and
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rivers (see map in Figure 4.5). Given the forest department’s control over land in the
area, maintenance work on the water pipes that conveyed water to the tanks through
forest land was often not allowed. The location of some of the eighteen villages within
the buffer zone of the wildlife sanctuary also added to the challenge. Land use in the
buffer zones of wildlife sanctuaries is always marked by a priority to the ecology of the
area over human habitations. In the case of the T- V water district, the fact that the water
district is located in the middle of a conservation area (where the interests of the local
inhabitants on the one hand and the Forest Department and Municipality on the other
have been in conflict) led to frequent impasse over the maintenance of the pipeline
infrastructure. However, no such obstacles are encountered by the Municipal
Corporation in maintaining its own water mains infrastructure for the city of Mumbai as
it enjoys more rights of access in the T-V area. Section 263 of the Mumbai Municipal
Act that applies to the T-V water district empowers the Municipality to access “any
water work within or without the city, adjacent to or in the vicinity of such water-work,
in whomsoever such land may vest” (BMC Act, 1888, p. 352). The hierarchy of local
rules on land that privilege the BMC over the local self-government institutions in the
maintenance of their respective water infrastructures was also perceived as a major
cause of failure of the rural water supply project. Moreover, most of the village councils
in this area did not have the revenue to purchase water from the Mumbai Municipality,
as they are located in a conservation area where land use is severely regulated by the
local Forest department and economic activity is severely curtailed. As a result, their
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revenue base could not meet the expenditure required to maintain an independent rural
water supply scheme in the T-V water district (People’s Daily, 2007).
The policy to decentralize water through the rural water supply project for
eighteen villages thus did not take into account the complex ecology of the area and the
evolution of the socio-economic context through the 1980s and 1990s. In this period,
the structure of local rules around water and land had further entrenched the interests of
the city. The construction of a new dam and the reduced forest in the T-V water district
in the 2000s (Singh and Mishra, 2012) as a result of dam building only further widened
the lack of trust between various state departments that manage water, forests land and
the local communities. The centralized policy making around water planning in the T-V
water district where most of the decisions around dam building and water allocation
were taken by bureaucracies in New Delhi and Mumbai further worsened the prospect
of a good outcome. The role of geography, types of water storage, and water rights in
creating a complex water governance system is highlighted in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.3
below. The over concentration of urban water supply dams in a forested watershed has
only helped worsen the uneven geography of water entitlement between the city of
Greater Mumbai and the T-V water district (see Table 4.2). Since the water district is
outside the boundaries of the metropolitan region, per capita water consumption can be
even lower than what is in the table.
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Figure 4.7: The Varieties of Water Conflict – Politics of Water in the Mumbai Region.
Table 4.2: Water consumption disparities between villages and towns in the Mumbai
metro region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005).
Per Capita Domestic Water Use Per day in Liters (Mumbai region)

4.9

Area

Water Usage in Liters

Greater Mumbai

240

Navi Mumbai

150

Other Areas

150

Villages to be incorporated in
municipalities

70

Other Villages in Rural Areas

70

Nested Nature of Rules:
An Obstacle or an Opportunity in Collective Action?
Problems with lack of access to domestic water such as the ones facing the T-V

water district are not unique to this context. Where multiple and often competing policy
and legal frameworks around water exist, the problem of rural water supply and
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provision is difficult to solve. These issues are exacerbated by chronic corruption
fostered by the lack of participation of local communities in water supply projects and
drinking water laws that do not recognize the right of rural communities to a minimum
per capita quantum of water. Given that the basic water entitlements of the local
communities were not addressed by state agencies in the T-V water district through the
water supply project, the only alternative to the population in the T-V water district and
their representatives was to mobilize rural communities and seeking the intervention of
higher levels of government.
The early 2000s witnessed the emergence of a local movement that managed to
bring the local tribal and non-tribal communities on a common platform and widened
the list of demands from domestic use to water for irrigation use. It also questioned the
wisdom of the government constructing multiple urban water supply projects in an area
where people displaced by past projects were yet to be rehabilitated within the same
forested belt. Given that the local context was characterized by divisions of caste
amongst the poor inhabitants of this water district, this rare moment of rural collective
action was a significant development. Mobilizations, work stoppages on maintaining the
Municipal Corporation’s infrastructure (local communities are employed in maintaining
the city corporation's infrastructure) and information campaigns on the water issue
followed (Centre for Science and Environment, (CSE) 2013). In the summer of 2006,
communities living in 104 villages next to the reservoirs threatened to break the valves
of the water mains supplying water to Mumbai. The immediate cause for such direct
action was an acute water problem and a localized crisis with non-availability of water
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for irrigation. The State Government’s persistence in going ahead with a new project led
to a major change in the strategies of local actors in their advocacy on water issues in
the T-V water district (CSE, 2012 see ‘Mumbai’s Water Fuels Rural Ire’).
In 2007, another local political party in the T-V water district revealed that the
Mumbai Municipal Corporation which accessed the T-V water district owed millions of
rupees in water revenue to local village councils and district level governments
(People’s Democracy, 2006). This symbolized a major change of strategy from action at
the local level to a higher level of governance. The tax revenue according to the party
was to be paid as part of an inter-governmental transfer of revenue from the Municipal
Corporation to the local village governments as the Corporation had sourced water for
decades from a rural area. This change in strategy by local political actors was an
acknowledgement of the nested-ness of the water rules that governed the management
of reservoirs in the water district. This change in strategy also revealed a major dilemma
for the local movements with the governance arrangements in the water district. The
ownership and management of various reservoirs in the T-V water district was found to
be divided between the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the State Irrigation
Department. Three of the five major reservoirs in the T-V water district are owned by
the Mumbai Municipality and two are owned by the Irrigation Department. Dams south
east of the T-V water district are owned by parastatal agencies like the Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation, smaller municipal councils while some others are
owned by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation (see Table 4.3 for ownership and water
rights to reservoirs in the T-V water district and the hydrometric area)
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Given that there is no formal monitoring authority (other than a committee
headed by the State Irrigation Minister of the state of Maharashtra) to manage the
apportionment of water between various users and adjudicate water disputes, the higher
status accorded to Mumbai’s water demand in the T-V water district is identified in this
paper as one of the major factors that led to frequent conflicts between the state
Irrigation Department and the Municipal Corporation. These problems often reach their
peak in the summer when the State Irrigation Minister has the sole authority to manage
water conflicts between various large users in the T-V water district. Given Mumbai’s
senior water appropriation rights, the beneficial aspects of urban drinking water use, and
the political clout of the city, water quotas are always allocated to Greater Mumbai,
even if such a decision clashed with the water needs of other Municipal Corporations in
the region that use the T-V water district as a source (Indian Express, 2010; Asian Age,
2012).
The unwillingness of the state government to reform the local institutional
architecture around water in the T-V water district echoes a similar problem with water
governance throughout the state of Maharashtra where the absence of water councils at
the district level is noticed in the above analysis. Decisions around water allocation in
the context of disputes are made by the state Irrigation Minister (or the Chief Minister)
on an interpretation of existing state policy and local water laws and rights. This has led
to a situation where there are conflicts between governmental authorities at various
levels in the metropolitan region (Pethe et al, 2011) and growing discontent within rural
communities that are faced with very poor per capita access. Thus, in some respects, the
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action situation in the T-V water district is also characterized by ‘institutional opacity.’
The lack of co-ordination between the territory planned and governed by the
metropolitan/municipal authorities and the so called hydrometric area has further
contributed to a fragmentation of metropolitan water governance. The resulting
fragmentation in water governance is further exacerbated by the ownership of reservoirs
by different state and parastatal entities which in turn is sought to be coordinated
centrally by the state ministry in Mumbai when a local district council in the MumbaiThane region could better adjudicate water disputes between different actors (see table
4.3 for data on institutional ownership of dams).
Identity politics in the water district with antagonistic relations between caste
Hindus (locally called the Kunbi Marathas) and the tribal community also had their own
negative impact on the outcome of the action situation. Culturally, tribals are placed
outside the fourfold hierarchy of the Hindu caste system and past struggles around land
have often pitted caste Hindus against the tribal community in the water district.
Moreover, every village and the local self-government is structured in a manner where
caste Hindus inhabit the main villages and tribal communities that are part of the same
village are dispersed in settlements in the forest surrounding the villages. This
geography of human settlements had its own impact on collective action. Political
leadership in the villages is usually drawn from the tribal community, but caste Hindus
tend to be dominant which tends to influence rural collective action (Varshney, 1995). In
the water district, however, both Kunbis and tribals are equally impacted by the
monopoly of the Municipal Corporation over the water in the T-V water district
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However, the tribal community is poorer and faces high seasonal distress migration
rates.

4.10 Prior Appropriation and Local Water Institutions:
Implications for Water Governance and Mumbai’s
Senior Water Rights
The eventual outcome of the action situation was influenced by the social and
economic constraints faced by participants that result from the structure of water
governance in the T-V water district. The rural water supply project was also located in
a forest area where at least a third of the farmers in the T-V water district did not have
legal titles to their land plots, were mostly poor and also as a result faced high seasonal
migration rates as a result of a lack of viable livelihood options within agriculture (see
tables 4.1 and 4.3 on the governance system around land and water).
Access to information on the management of water and the vertical hierarchy
between various organizations (the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the State Irrigation
Department and the Forest department) are also a major constraint to successful state
led or bottom-up collective action.
The civic officials in the Municipal Corporation are not equipped to be sensitive
or deal with the problem of rural water supply in the T-V water district.
Most importantly, the action situation highlights how the local institutional
arrangements enable the regulator (in this case, the state Government of Maharashtra) to
favour one user of water over another. This interpretation and use by the state
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government of local water law to privilege Mumbai over other water users in the region
is a significant finding from the above analysis.
Another example of appropriation in the T-V water district is the case of water
diversion from the Bhatsa multipurpose dam project (Mumbai Mirror, 2010). When the
World Bank funded this project in the 1970s, no known allocation rules from rural to
urban use were tied into the dam’s project design, though the Bank had advised state
officials to manage water resources in a comprehensive multi sectoral way (World
Bank, 1996:p.29; Binnie`s Consultancy 1971: p.35-38). The city of Greater Mumbai has
benefitted from a diversion of water from the Bhatsa project since the mid-1990s
(Chitale, 1994). This is unlike the Hyderabad context, where the World Bank (perhaps
due to its knowledge of the local rights of farmers in the Andhra Pradesh context)
ensured that it funded a dam project that had allocation rules written into its objectives.
This ensured that the state government could follow these rules when it regulated the reallocation of water from rural to urban use (Celio et al, 2009). Not much is known
whether such rules exist in the context of Mumbai.
How do Ostrom’s design rules help us understand the working of institutions in
this particular context? While the T-V water district has clearly defined watershed
boundaries and Mumbai’s water resource boundaries are defined by the hydrometric
area that coincide with these boundaries, the internal rules of allocation do not prevent
the main user, in this case, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, from overextracting water from the T-V water district (See Table 3 on dam ownership and Section
5.3.3 in Paper three below on how ownership and water rights affect rules of allocation
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Table 4.3: Large and Medium Dam Project Ownership and Water Rights
Sources: Irrigation Department, Thane Irrigation Circle: http://www.seticthane.org/storage-position. Data
on dam completion dates from National Register of Large Dams, 2014:
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/NRLD%202014.pdf 2
Dam Name
and year of
completion

District

Institutional
Ownership of
reservoirs

Urban Water
Supply (to
Mumbai and
other cities in
metro region)

Irrigation

Industrial
Water
Supply

Dhamani
(Surya
project)
1987

Thane

Irrigation
Department of
Maharashtra

☑

☑

Kawadas
(Surya
project)
1979

Thane

Irrigation
Department of
Maharashtra

☑

Bhatsa
1983

Thane

Irrigation
Department of
Maharashtra

☑

U.Vaitarna
1972

Nashik

Irrigation
Department of
Maharashtra

☑

Wandri
1987

Thane

Irrigation
Department of
Maharashtra

Mulshi
1927

Pune

Tata (Pvt.
Corporation)

Andhra
1916

Pune

Walvan
1916

Hydro
Power

Legal frame
work that
influences
rights to
stored water

Designed
Live
Storage in
Mm3

☑

R

276.52

☑

☑

R

9.96

☑

☑

R, PA

942.10

PA

331.31

R

35.94

☑

R

522.76

Tata(Pvt.
Corporation)

☑

R

339.14

Pune

Tata (Pvt.
Corporation)

☑

R

66.12

Shirawata
1916

Pune

Tata (Pvt.
Corporation)

☑

R

191.28

Lonavala
1916

Pune

Tata(Pvt.
Corporation)

☑

R

11.72

☑

Modaksaga Thane
r
1954

Mumbai
Municipal
Corporation

☑

PA

128.93

Tansa
1892

Thane

Mumbai
Municipal
Corporation

☑

PA

145.08

Vihar
1860

Mumba
i

Mumbai
Municipal
Corporation

☑

PA

27.07

Tulshi
1860

Mumba
i

Mumbai
Municipal
Corporation

☑

PA

8.05

Middle
Vaitarna
2012

Thane

Mumbai
Municipal
Corporation

☑

PA

194.72

Barvi
1978

Thane

Maharashtra
Industrial
Development
Corporation

☑

PA

180.03

☑
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in the Mumbai-Thane region). The following excerpt from a water bylaw of the
Brihanmumbai Municipal Act (1888) provides some insight into the power of the
Corporation in the water district,
The Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai may supply water from a
municipal water-work to any local Authority or person without
[Greater Mumbai] on such terms as to payment and as to the period
and conditions of supply as shall be, either generally or specially
approved by the corporation. (BMC Act, 1988, Provision 288, p.188)
The excerpt above tells us that the Municipality of Greater Mumbai has the sole
authority to decide if other towns in the metropolitan region and villages in the T-V
district can share water from the dams owned and accessed by the Mumbai Municipal
Corporation. Given the mandate provided to the state government by the Irrigation Act
of 1976 as a regulator, the decisions on disputes over water allocation and the
construction of more dams in the T-V water district by the Central and State government
has only affirmed these senior rights of Greater Mumbai. This means that not only do
the local rules of allocation in place favour the Municipal Corporation’s rights to draw
more water from the water district and build more reservoirs, but the higher level rules
that are meant to balance that right of the Municipal Corporation with those of the rural
communities have not been utilized optimally by the state government.
The status of the T-V water district being located in a designated tribal area
actually empowers its elected representatives to advocate for the interests of the villages
and their basic water needs under constitutional provisions that protect tribal areas.
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However, the interpretation of the local water rights structure and the priority accorded
to Mumbai’s water demand coupled with the political clout of the city ensures that this
mandate is never exercised. The situation is worsened by the absence of an impartial
monitoring and enforcement mechanism at the regional or the state level. The
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority, a regulatory body, that was set up
in 2002 to adjudicate disputes and allocate water entitlements, has a provision that
subordinates its power to make decisions to state water policy, thus making the act
ineffective in dealing with water disputes in a fair and transparent manner (Wagle et al.,
2012).
A legal-institutional analysis of local water governance in the T-V water district
reveals that the water laws of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the State
government of Maharashtra rely on a combination of prior appropriation and riparian
principles (Beaumont, 1943; BMC Manual, 1976); also see Table 4.3). The implication
is that since the Mumbai Municipality was the first to harness water resources in the TV water district and reserve the watershed for its purposes, Indian water laws confer
upon it a status for senior rights over local users and even other cities that share water
from T-V reservoirs. However, the riparian influences in state and central water laws
only confer usufruct rights to local water users in the T-V water district thus rendering
their claims weaker in comparison to those of the city of Mumbai and other towns in the
Mumbai metropolitan region (see Table 4.3). Table 4.4 summarizes the attributes of the
governance system at play in the T-V water district. The reservation of the T-V water
district in the 1950s for Greater Mumbai had a direct impact on both the water and land
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rights of the local communities. While the implementation of the Bhatsa Multipurpose
irrigation project sought to balance the water needs of the city and irrigation demand in
this water district, the governance arrangements around the intersectoral sharing of
water ended up turning out to be inadequate. The conferral of senior water rights to
Mumbai from the Bhatsa project only reinforced this disparity since national water laws
such as the Indian Easements Act only grant customary rights to local communities and
no contestation of prior appropriation through the existing legal framework is possible
In 1992, the Indian legal scholar, Chatrapati Singh critiqued the influence of prior
appropriation principles in national water laws (like the Indian Easement Act) and local
water laws. Singh pointed out that prior appropriation fails to recognize the rights or
needs of new users for distribution and does not meet the demands of natural justice.
The influence of prior appropriation principles that inform the senior water rights of the
city of Mumbai in the T-V water district is primarily a vestige of the colonial period in
India. It merely records and recognizes “political fact of acquisition or appropriation.”
Table 4.4: Governance System and Outcome of Action Situations under Central, State and
local water laws in northern and coastal Thane District. Sources: Following Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act (1988), People’s Democracy (2006) and Pathak (2005).
Governance System

Attributes

National Legislation

•

Indian Easements Act, Statute of Limitations

State Legislation

•

Bombay Irrigation Act 1976

City Legislation

•

Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1988

•
•

Land Ceilings in place
Tenancy rights under Bombay Tenancy Act
1953
Wildlife Protection Act governs Forest land
Eksali laws (one year leases to cultivate land
in forest area)

Rules regarding Landholding
and Forests

Average size of landholding

•
•
•
•

0.2-0.5 hectares
Contestation around land in forest areas
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•
•
Formal rights to land

•
•
•

Property rights to water

•
•
•
•

Ownership of irrigation and
water supply dams
•
Financing of rural water supply
for domestic use

Not always assigned formally.
Land in forest areas under control of farmers
(see Figure 4.5)
One Year leases for cultivation.
Formal Land Titles needed to access water
from canals
Riparian Principles in areas serviced by canal
irrigation
Prior Appropriation principles in TansaVaitarna water district
Rights to water under the Indian Easement
Act
Bombay Irrigation Act
Water in storages owned by different
parastatal entities such as state Irrigation
Department, public water agencies, state
industrial corporations & Municipal
Corporations.
Other River use regulated by state

•

State support; grants provided by the state
government

•

Water charges paid by village councils

Monitoring of relevant
transactions

•

Public sector irrigation corporation/Bombay
Municipal Corporation

Conflict = resolution arenas

•

Local Courts, High Court, District Council
(Zilla Parishad)

Action situations around water

Maintenance of rural water
supply systems. Water for
domestic use in rural areas

Maintenance of irrigation in
major and minor projects
Social Action and search for
institutional alternatives

Attributes
•
•
•
•

Poorly serviced infrastructure
Revenue often not shared by city with rural
areas
Multiple agencies with conflicting agendas
Low revenue base of Village Councils due to
their location in forest areas

•

Poorly maintained conveyance systems; lack
of co-operation amongst farmers; absence of
participation by farmers
Arbitrary diversions of water to urban areas

•
•

Demands for rural water quotas
Struggles against displacement

•

Furthermore, “it also provides no legal grounds for why the new settlers or users cannot
appropriate water for their own beneficial use.” Moreover, “instead of providing a legal
arena for conflict resolution, prior appropriation leaves the entire matter to political or
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coercive methods” (Singh, 1992, p. 69-70). Many countries that share the common law
framework with India have reformed their water laws to reduce the influence of
riparianism and prior appropriation, South Africa being a case in point.

4.11 Conclusion
From a theoretical perspective, this case study on the Mumbai region has
identified some of the potential common ground between the IE and the HG literature(s)
on the theme of water sharing between large cities and their source areas. First, the
findings could remind environmental geographers that bad rules are as much to blame
as political power and the social and cultural hierarchy of different places in the uneven
distribution of water. The paper identifies the influence of prior appropriation in the
water bylaws as a major constraint in the ability of villages in the T-V water district to
meet their basic water needs and their demand for irrigation quotas. Ostrom’s SES
framework is a useful tool to identify the influence of rules that are implicit in the
application of local water laws and policy. On the other hand, institutional economists
could better appreciate the significance of geographical variables in the outcome of
action situations. The demands of a large and growing urban centre, the forest ecology
and the evolution of land, forest and water institutions are some of the enabling spatial
factors that influenced the outcome of the action situation. An understanding of the
politics of scale can thus be a helpful addition to the toolkit of institutional economists;
they can be useful in telling us how geographical scales are socially produced in the
course of action situations (Swyngedouw, 2004). In addition to the rules and the

!183

geographical context of the water district, a third factor that overlaps geography and
institutions is the fragmentation of water governance in the so called Mumbai
hydrometric area. This is identified as another major impediment to ensuring a fair
distribution of water between various regions. Recent research in the Mumbai context
has argued that the presence of multiple Government agencies with overlapping
functions has actually obstructed the effective implementation of decentralization and
governance reform in several development schemes (UNCHS, 1993; Pethe et al., 2011).
Reform of water governance in Mumbai could begin by confronting the archaic
legal institutions on water in this growing mega-urban region. Reform also needs to
address the fragmentation of metropolitan governance, and establish a more democratic
arrangement that is representative of sectoral interests on water. Empirical evidence
from Southern India that cites court judgements indicates that the state has an absolute
right to regulate prior appropriation and use by legislation, and to change the
entitlements and rules of allocation at its discretion (Vaidyanathan and Jairaj, 2009: p.
7). However, such reform in local and regional water governance is possible only if it is
realized that the power of the city over the water resources in the T-V water district and
the rest of the hydrometric area is written in rules that were crafted for another time.

Notes
1. My reference here is primarily to developing countries. This lack of attention could
be attributed to the focus on small-scale communities in the common pool resource
literature. However, a classic in the institutional literature on this subject of the creation
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of water districts that predates the common pool resource literature is Vincent Ostrom’s
book Water and Politics, a study of Los Angeles (Ostrom, 1953). There are also several
multidisciplinary studies on inter-sectoral water management and water conflict in
development studies, political science, geography, but few of these have focused on the
institutional and geographical implications of an exclusive water district for a fast
growing city at the level of contextual detail as V. Ostrom’s 1953 case study of L.A.
2. This debate from the 1940s is presented to further my argument that the Mumbai
Municipality and the Metropolitan Planning Authority's present refusal to countenance
any claims by rural communities towards water has been shaped considerably by
engineers to take for granted that the water within the “hydrometric area” has been
allocated to for urban and industrial use. The Mumbai Municipality has refused to take
any lessons from its experience because as an organization, its behavioural habit and
institutional disposition to serve urban interests are mutually entwined and reinforcing.
Its stated commitment to serve urban demand completely ignores rural aspirations. This
is despite legitimate rural claims for minimum water entitlements that even the state
government has acknowledged. There is no official acknowledgement by the Mumbai
Corporation or the State Government of Maharashtra of a water district, though water
resources in the hinterland have been reserved for future urban utilization since the
early 1960`s. Instead, the vague technical term ‘hydrometric area’ has been constantly
referred to in the water plans and the metropolitan planning documents since the 1970s.
The first reference to a hydrometric area was first made in Binnie’s consultancy report
of 1971 for the Government of India on planning water resources in the Mumbai region.
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A hydrometric area is generally referred to a grouping of catchments for monitoring and
reporting purposes. My interviews with planning officials in Mumbai revealed that
water in this entire hydrometric area is reserved for the city, though the reality is that the
water rights situation in rural communities is far more complex and variegated with
small, medium and large irrigation projects that continue to supply water and meet
irrigation demand in some pockets (see Figure 4.3).
3. Data on ownership accessed from Chitale Committee Report (1994); Maharashtra
Irrigation Commission Report (1999); and Thane Irrigation Circle website. PA stands
for prior appropriation, and R for riparian rights. This classification is based on
analyzing water diversion data from various reports, and responses of State Government
to legal affidavits challenging such diversions. Dams in T-V water district are reserved
for Mumbai, which has senior rights to water. In the case of Bhatsa Dam prior
appropriation and riparian rights overlap. The primary objective of Bhatsa Project is to
meet demands of Greater Mumbai and other MMR towns, but water is allocated by
Ministry of Irrigation based on local water rights, needs and scarcity. While this dam
was built in a watershed reserved for Mumbai, farmers in Shahpur and Bhiwandi have
rights to water from the reservoirs, and other cities in the metro region downstream of
Bhatsa but upstream of Greater Mumbai also have developed rights to Bhatsa water.
Tata stands for Tata Power Corporation.
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5

The Paradox of Dispossession Amidst Plenty:
Social differentiation and Institutions in
Intra-Rural Water Conflict in the MumbaiDahanu Region
In his fictional 2011 novel, Dahanu Road, the Indo-Canadian author Anosh Irani

shares with his readers the story of Dahanu, a fertile and scenic agricultural belt outside
Mumbai, famous for its vegetables, fruits and orchard farms. Irani narrates the saga of
the intertwined fates of feudal landlords and the agricultural labourers of the indigenous
Warli tribe in a gripping account that combines drama with accounts of exploitation of
the tribal community over the last century (Irani, 2010). Missing in Irani's dramatic
account of violence and dispossession in Dahanu are three social and cultural
contradictions that now characterize the landscape of this region outside Mumbai and
the wider metropolitan region.
The first and primary contradiction is the one between the city of Mumbai and
its agricultural countryside to the north that finds growing expression in the increasing
number of anti-dam and anti-urban water diversion movements. The second is between
tribal and non-tribal commercial farmers around access to resources, where the former
are at the receiving end of water and land grabbing practices of the latter. The third
contradiction is the conflict between modern and traditional agriculture within Dahanu.
This is a place where large commercial farmers are bringing in new technology for
growing horticultural crops, whereas tribal farmers continue to cultivate domestic and
traditional paddy varieties. These three contradictions increasingly characterize the
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Mumbai- Dahanu region with the contestation around water at the very centre of this
cultural landscape.
This paper is an ethnographic account of how all these contradictions play out in
the horticultural belt of Dahanu, Thane district in western India. Dahanu is located in
northern Thane district in Maharashtra and borders the western Indian state of Gujarat
to the north and Palghar to the south. It lies outside the boundaries of the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region, but it has witnessed some industrial spill over from both Gujarat
and Mumbai over the last three decades. Dahanu is one of the most fertile parts of
coastal Maharashtra state and is also home to a diverse population of the local Marathi
and Gujarati speaking communities. It is also the site of a new struggle over the
construction of a new dam to meet water demand of towns in the Mumbai Metropolitan
Region. Using an account of social relations around land and water in an agrarian
context that enjoys the benefits from canal irrigation, this paper focuses on experiences
of water scarcity in the context of intra-rural conflict on a canal system. It narrates the
story of the uneven development of Dahanu's horticultural belt, where the promised
benefits to the tribal Warli community from the Surya irrigation project have not been
realised. The two central empirical themes of this paper are a study of social
differentiation in the geographical context of an agricultural belt irrigated by canals and
an examination of the role water technology and local land and water institutions have
played in shaping intra-rural conflict over water. As a contribution to the literature on
nature-society relations in the Mumbai region, this study of intra-rural conflict on the
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canal system in Dahanu will build understanding of the claims of the fast expanding
Mumbai Metropolitan Region on water from this particular irrigation project.
Using a hybrid of two institutional approaches from political ecology, the sociotechnical and hydro-social, this paper explores the institutional and technological
architecture of canal irrigation and the everyday working of irrigation systems in rural
India with a focus on the experiences of farmers with water access and scarcity. This
paper takes six main steps in investigating social differentiation and local water
practices with a focus on the role of water and land institutions. The paper begins by
examining the broad interface of local geography and institutions around water, canal
systems, urbanization and agricultural land in the Mumbai-Dahanu and Konkan regions.
Secondly, it presents an argument from the interdisciplinary environmental politics
literature on how ethnography can be an important tool for researching the scalar
dimensions of local water management. The paper then presents qualitative evidence on
social relations in irrigated agriculture and shows that the practices around water use
and grabbing by large commercial farmers during the irrigation season is an act of
power meant to serve accumulation objectives. It later situates this evidence in the
context of the institutional architecture around water rotations and the functioning and
state of the canal system in the Surya command area. It also presents cartographic data
on the transformation of the ecological and agricultural landscape, and the functioning
and governance of the main canal system in the everyday context of the two villages.
Finally, it presents the broader socio-ecological consequences of formal and informal
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water practices in Surya project, the varied social response to irrigation and its
implications for growing claims on Surya water from outside the project.

5.1

A Hybrid Institutional Framework
From within the discipline of human geography, this paper is closely informed

by two theoretical approaches that have been influential in the critical literature on
water and irrigation research. These are the socio-technical and the hydro-social
frameworks. Both these frameworks have been useful in analyzing the interactions
between social relations, technological systems around water and the everyday micro
politics of water governance. The main argument of the hydro-social approach is that
the “models of the hydrological cycle that dominate water science need to be combined
or integrated with conceptualizations of social dynamics” (Mollinga, 2013, p.1-2).
Theorizing the hydrological cycle as a hydro-social cycle is also an effort on the part of
geographers to avoid the pitfalls of reductionist and depoliticized water resources
management analysis (Mollinga, 2014, p. 1). Here, the theoretical contributions of
critical geographers such as Jamie Linton, Erik Swyngedouw and Jessica Budds have
been important. Working in diverse contexts and exploring the history of water science
as in Linton’s case, this geographical scholarship has made compelling arguments about
the importance of a critical analysis of state-led hydraulic paradigms and water
governance practices that have become hegemonic in the twentieth century. The hydrosocial cycle’s key objective is “to capture the ontological complexity of water resource
management as being structured, stratified and heterogeneous and in critical
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perspectives, contested systems and processes animated by configurations of actors
networked in a variety of social relations of power that shape their individual and
collective agency” (Mollinga, 2013, p. 2). All three scholars have thus advocated for a
process and human centred understanding of the water cycle. The socio-technical
approach to water systems research has its origins in an influential argument from
science and technology studies about the social construction of technology. Here, “the
inter-relationship of technical/physical, organizational/managerial and socio-economic/
political control of water” are the central issue (Mollinga, 2013, p. 2). In the Indian
context, the canal system can thus be seen as a socio-technical configuration of
relationships of communities of irrigators with the outlet structures on canals which in
turn are the important sites of contact and contestation between the system’s engineers
and irrigators (Mollinga, 2010: p.424). The re-working of these canal systems in the
local context and the experiences of farmers with this system and its managers
constitute the main focus of this theoretical framework.
Both the hydro-social and the socio-technical frameworks have been used by
interdisciplinary scholars studying water conveyance systems such as canals in the rural
context. Thus, within this body of critical water literature, the recent research of
scholars like Peter Mollinga and Vishal Narain on canal irrigation systems in southern
and western India is important (Mollinga, 2003; Narain, 2003). Influenced by this latter
scholarship, this paper pays close attention to the institutional and technological
architecture of canal irrigation and analyzes their functioning from both the sociotechnical and hydro-social perspectives. At the same time, it also tries to develop an
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understanding of the working of irrigation systems in the everyday context of rural
India keeping in view the cultural specificity of the local context with a focus on the
experiences of farmers with water access and scarcity. The main theoretical argument of
this paper is that these critical approaches drawn from human geography, when
combined with an ethnographic study of the actual movement of water in a conveyance
system, can be usefully deployed to distil the materiality of water and the manner in
which it shapes and is in turn shaped by social relations. Thus, while I have much in
common with recent researchers who have used these critical frameworks to analyze
canal irrigation systems in the Indian context, I supplement the hydro-social and sociotechnical approaches to utilize a new emerging body of theoretical literature, namely the
paracommons approach.

5.2

The Paracommons Approach
Conventional intellectual and policy understanding of the impact of irrigation on

rural societies has been deeply influenced by the principle of seeing water in volumetric
terms and the language of the hydrological cycle. As a result, most empirical work on
water has not focused on the possibilities of water savings (Lankford, 2014). The sociotechnical and the hydro-social approaches to water are not devoid of this focus on
seeing water in volumetric terms and in terms of water quotas. A potential problem with
an exclusive application of these frameworks in the context of this particular case study
is that they would be unable to analyze and account for the social and ecological
possibilities that are created by water efficiencies at the farm level and the waste
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resulting from the underutilization of water. This is because in their application to the
Indian context, the socio-technical and hydro-social approaches have been mainly
applied to water scarce contexts (Mollinga, 2003; 2013). At the same time, the sociotechnical approach retains some of its utility to irrigation in Dahanu. The
implementation of canal technology based on the principles of productive irrigation was
developed from certain knowledge and experience that came to this region from the
interior of Maharashtra (WAPCOS, 1996). However, while useful in analyzing canal
technology and its reception by farmers in this area, the socio-technical approach is
unable on its own to grapple with the material properties of water and its abundant
availability in Dahanu context. A scalar approach that incorporates the possibilities of
the creation of surplus and unutilized water is more useful here. The hydro-social and
socio-technical approaches are also somewhat constrained by their Marxian lens in
analyzing consequences of such efficiencies. Similarly, even the Common Pool
Resource (CPR) literature is seriously constrained by lack of attention to efficiency.
In an important revisionist contribution to our understanding of the commons
and water in particular, Bruce Lankford has drawn attention to the lack of attention in
the Common Pool Resource (CPR) and the political ecology (PE) literatures to the
consequences of micro level efficiencies in the use of water resources and the potential
future pathways of such efficiencies (see Table 5.8). Where do the savings made in our
use of resources end up? The silence of both literatures on this subject has made
Lankford coin the concept of the “paracommons.” The paracommons views “social
ecological systems as being shaped by efficiencies and the material salvaged losses
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from efficiency improvements, giving rise to a wider system of systems than is usually
recognized” (Lankford, 2013, p. 17). Thus, according to Lankford “the idea of the
‘paracommons’ is to view water in a different way. As yet-to-be conserved gains within
a system, water movement and use can waste or ‘save’ previously wasted water. But
where does that ‘saved’ water go? Who has claims to freed up water resources from
improved technological or social practices?” (Lankford, 2013, p. 29).
In this paper, I have merged the paracommons framework with its close
attention to the assembling, use and diversion of saved (and wasted) water with the
socio-technical and hydro-social’s emphasis on the complex, stratified, heterogeneous
and political nature of water governance (Mollinga, 2013; Linton & Budds, 2014). The
fact that two thirds of the land in the horticultural belt under study is comprised of
vegetables irrigated by drip and sprinkler irrigation points to the substantial savings on a
canal system where engineers continue to release water at rates intended for more water
–consumptive paddy cultivation.

5.3

Water Surplus and Abundance: Socio-Ecological
Transformation and the Commons in the MumbaiDahanu Region

5.3.1 The Surya Project: Geography and Political Economy of the
Project and Villages
The Surya project is a large multipurpose dam that lies in the western parts of
Thane district in Dahanu and Palghar sub-districts (see Figure 5.1). It is one of the few
irrigation projects in the country designed to benefit more than 25,000 hectares of small
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holder agricultural land in 64 villages, most of which belong to tribal agriculturists in
the area of Dahanu and Palghar. Work on building the reservoirs started in the 1970s
and work on the storages and the first phase of the canal work was completed in the
early 1980s.
The project witnessed several obstacles in its completion: while most of the
irrigation potential was created and the dam and appurtenant gates were completed, the
spillway gates could not be lowered to impound water due to a non-transfer of
designated forest land to the project. Similarly, certain lengths of the canal system
remained incomplete due to the non-transfer of forest land (see Figure 5.1 for
incomplete parts of the canal system in Palghar). Canal building in this region presented
another challenge. Given the narrow terrain between the Western Ghats and the Arabian
Sea coast, canals often run close to rivers in the Konkan and they require better
foundations. For this reason, canal building is often more expensive for the government
to execute. In Figure 5.1, the area in brown indicates a belt in the command area where
canal construction has been left incomplete. Given the incomplete canals and the
underutilization of water from other parts of the project, surplus water from the
reservoir is conveyed to Vasai-Virar and Mira Bhayandar in the MMR.
For years, work on the reservoirs was stopped due to a lack of environmental
clearances; then work on the canal system was done in phases. The most difficult phase
was in parts of Dahanu, where the system had to be constructed through forests and
ravines during the 1980s and early 1990s. This had implications for agricultural
development in the entire Dahanu beneficiary area.
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Figure 5.1: Map of the Surya Project’s Command Area in Dahanu and Palghar with Sakhare and
Vanai villages in focus (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of
Maharashtra).

As this was a productive irrigation project aimed at double cropping, farmers in
the horticultural belt benefited from the canal system only from the mid-1990s which
led to farmers on the head of the main canal branch starting with an advantage of prior
access. The late execution of the canal system did not stop enterprising horticultural
farmers from Vadaval and other communities from buying or leasing inland from
Brahmin landlords in the area. The land ceiling laws in India had still left Brahmins in
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this part of Thane with surplus land. Parts of that surplus were distributed among tribal
beneficiaries in 1976; however, a substantial part of the land was distributed by these
landlords among their families to escape provisions of land ceiling laws (Ambasta,
1998; Lobo, 2012). Given that laws prevented Vadavals from purchasing tribal land in
the newly irrigated belt, a strategy was employed in Dahanu to lease land from Brahmin
landlords. Land was purchased and leased strategically on the canal minor systems. The
problem, however, lay in the complex system of land tenure that characterized
agriculture in Thane. The presence of customary tenures adjoining the land of Surya
River and the command area of the canal project was a major obstacle for Vadaval and
other farmers who wanted to cultivate a second commercial crop in this area. An
excerpt from a 1983 thesis by the University of Mumbai sociologist, Indra MunshiSaldanha, anticipates this transition from the dominant landholding class (Gujarati
Vanias, Brahmins and North Indians) to the Vadaval caste:
The Surya project will most definitely lower the land ceiling in this
area around Vangaon and that has consequences for our landholdings.
Also, once the water comes, the Vadaval caste has able horticulturists
and they will be able to take advantage of the irrigation facilities to
expand and will surely grow powerful. (Munshi-Saldanha, 1983, Ch
2)
This passage from Munshi’s thesis is also a useful pointer to the rise of new
classes and castes that occurs frequently within Indian agriculture and the importance of
place oriented studies in understanding the local political economy of agrarian change.
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It also affirms the recent findings of human geographers who have argued about the
centrality of caste in initiating new waves of capitalist accumulation in farming and
agro-industrial enterprises in rural and small town India (Chari, 2004; Gidwani, 2008).
In my first fieldwork report after a month of interviews with farmer in February
2008 on the Palghar Branch canal of the main Surya canal, I wrote, “I have seen
dispossession of small and marginal farmers from water and common land, but I have
also seen precious water resources squandered from the main canal systems into the
natural drainage.” This particular canal branch irrigated a wide belt of fifteen villages in
the low lying fertile black soil tract of western Dahanu (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). It was
here and in the railway agricultural town of Vangaon that I saw beautiful homes
belonging to upper caste orchard owners, SUVs and the Dahanu creek where it meets
the Arabian Sea, full of canal water (described as runoff and wastage by local politicians
and canal engineers) from the irrigation project.

5.3.2 Water Institutions and the Historical Background of
Multipurpose Dam Projects in the Mumbai-Thane Region
To understand the performance of Surya project at the local level in the villages,
it is necessary to place it in a broader geographical framework of water policy and
practice. The interactions of institutions and the physical geography of watersheds and
river basins have received cursory attention in theoretical and empirical literature on
irrigation in human geography. However, Indian and South Asian social science
literature on irrigation emphasize geography and local institutional evolution in the
history of water technology (Bolding, Mollinga, & Van Straaten, 1995; Mosse, 2003).
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Contributions from South Asian economic history have also dealt centrally with the coevolution of institutions and geography in the irrigation context. For instance, a
contentious debate between Ian Stone and Elizabeth Whitcombe revolved around the
role of institutional variables, colonial water governance and related geographical
factors in the performance of canal irrigation systems in the colonial period in North
India (Whitcombe, 1972; Ali, 1982; Stone, 1984). The uneasy co-existence of local and
modern land institutions, evolution of class structures, and economic objectives of
colonial government came into special focus in the historical literature.
I will focus on a definition of institutions for the purposes of this case study and
later examine the interface of water policy and laws with the local physical geography
of Konkan region, where the Dahanu region and Surya project are located. Rules, laws,
customs and every-day practices play an important role in water governance in the
developing world within which decisions and policy choices in the water sector are
made. As demonstrated by a solid body of empirical work on Indian irrigation, both in
economic history and development studies, institutions have been central tools in our
understanding of the scenario around water in the country. The significance of an
institutional framework for this paper is further enhanced by the fact that India is a
formal democracy with a well-defined constitutional division of powers between
different levels of government concerning water. Indian rural society also has a
somewhat rigid social structure based on caste and kinship, but has witnessed rapid
social change in the last six decades. At the same time India also enjoys a vibrant civil
society sector, which includes a strong presence at the grassroots and a focus on
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environmental governance. From a constitutional angle, water policy is primarily a state
subject in India, but the Central Government has a role to play as it often allocates funds
to build large water storages and also intercedes in river disputes between different
states. The influence of institutions on water policy and politics finds overwhelming
expression in the presence of laws and statutes created in the colonial period which
continue to influence the country’s water laws (Iyer 2009; Cullet, 2013).
In the north Konkan region, the institutional framework on water co-evolved
with historical experience of what modern dam systems in the Western Ghats could
achieve for agricultural and industrial development purposes. The main physiographic
features of Konkan region, shared with Surya command area, include its location in a
very high rainfall tract and the availability of untapped small perennial rivers. Amongst
other factors, the water policy framework has been primarily influenced by the physical
geography of the river basins which constitute the units around which long term water
planning was done. The main physiographic features of the Konkan region, which it
shares with the Surya command area, includes its location in a very high rainfall tract
and the availability of untapped small perennial rivers. Amongst other factors, the water
policy framework has been primarily influenced by the physical geography of the river
basins which constitute the units around which long term water planning was done.
In the context of canal irrigation, such assumptions of water abundance in
resource planning made planners ignore the geographical variation within Konkan
region. They also ignored important geographical and institutional differences in land
tenure and water rights between this region and the interior of Maharashtra. Other
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factors ignored were the potential scarcity of suitable locations for reservoir and canal
construction, and the implications of prior rights established by Mumbai’s claims on
water for power and water supply, thus intensifying competing sectoral demands on
watersheds in the region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005).

Figure 5.2 - Existing and proposed new dam projects in the Mumbai-Thane region and the
Mumbai hydrometric area over the next two decades (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation
Department, Government of Maharashtra).

Emphasis on tapping “open” river basins in this region for both irrigation and
urban development continues to be the single most important variable that influences
present day water policy and the planning of new dam projects in this region
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(Government of Maharashtra, 2005) (see Figure 5.2 on new proposed projects). All the
proposed projects in Figure 5.2 (identified by black circles with “P”), including the
transfer of water from Damanganga basin to new reservoirs, are being planned to meet
urban water demand from the Mumbai Metropolitan region. Given these factors that
emerge from the local physical geography, rules around water management and sharing
between different sectors have had a complex evolution. They have also been deeply
influenced by the local rights around land and water, the physical geography, the agroecological setting and the water policy frameworks of Maharashtra state government.

5.3.3 Inter-Sectoral Rules and the Local Context: A GeographicalInstitutional Profile
As far as the structure of rules are concerned, while the institutional evolution of
water laws in the North Konkan context continues to be largely informed by state water
policy and broader national and state laws, the priority given to local water rights within
Indian water law has also had its influence on rules around water allocation. The North
Konkan has a governance system that is largely characterized by administrative
decisions on water allocation and transfers with the absence of any kind of voluntary or
market mechanism. Some factors that have become more important over others in the
last six decades are the local water rights regimes that were created with the expansion
of the city of Mumbai’s access to watersheds in north eastern Thane from the 1950s,
and the reservation of entire river basins for metropolitan use in the 1970s (Government
of Maharashtra, 1981). Other rights were created largely as a result of local water
development for farmers on small irrigation projects in several parts of Thane and
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Raigad districts. In addition, the construction of canal projects from the 1970s and the
rights conferred to farmers by priority of use in irrigated agriculture, a result of the
riparian influence in Indian water law, have also created local rights for these rural
populations (Chitale Committee Report, 1993; Government of Maharashtra, 2005;
MMRDA, 1996; Mumbai High Court, 2006).
Additional rights were also created by new dam projects and water sharing
agreements between towns, cities and villages in and around the Mumbai metropolitan
region (Paper Two of this thesis, Sivaramakrishnan, 2014, p. 68; Rao, 2015, p. 166).
The continued access of urban areas to rural water storages exists as long as their use
complies with the priority accorded in Indian water law to continued beneficial use of
water, such as an urban jurisdiction’s entitlement to quotas related to domestic water
use. Such institutional arrangements are regulated by the state government; however
water re-allocation decisions are also closely informed by the state of local rights, water
demand and utilization, and the local state’s attempts at balancing rural and urban
political pressures.
However, there can be some variation within the rules that inform rural-urban
transfer of water (an increasingly contentious subject in this region since the early
1990s). Here, the initial project objective of different multipurpose dams adds an
important layer to the institutional water governance framework in this region. Large
dams, such as the Bhatsa dam in Shahpur in north eastern Thane district, were
constructed for both agriculture and urban use, though priority of access in the case of
the Bhatsa was accorded to Greater Mumbai, with no known rules of allocation between
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that city and other urban and rural settlements during times of scarcity (Government of
Maharashtra, 1964). There are other dam projects which were planned purely for urban
use, such as the various projects on the Vaitarna river for Greater Mumbai, and some
others like the Surya project, which is the focus of this case study, that were planned for
growing a second post monsoon crop, but are now a major source of water to the
metropolitan region. Smaller reservoirs are mostly devoted to agriculture, the condition
being that they continue to be utilized by farmers. Yet, there are a few examples of
small reservoirs (Usgaon dam in Bhiwandi) being constructed for the purpose of
irrigation and then having their water diverted to urban and industrial use on grounds of
underutilization. The water rights structure for the farming population utilizing water
from canal systems is largely riparian. While this ensures that the rights of farmers (with
clear land titles) who access water from reservoirs for canal irrigation are guaranteed, it
does not mean that water quotas for irrigation in the overall system cannot be diverted
for urban use. Water re-allocation (or diversion) can occur if the construction of canal
systems for projects has not been completed, as Indian water law gives the state
government the right to divert surplus water from reservoirs for beneficial urban use
(Mumbai High Court 1996).
Another factor that influences the institutional architecture around water in this
region is the ownership of reservoirs. This adds another complex layer to water
governance. Some dams and storages in this region are owned by the Mumbai
Municipal Corporation, giving it priority of access. Others, such as the Bhatsa and
Surya, are owned by the Irrigation Department, giving the State Government more
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influence in water allocation between different water users. The presence of a city like
Mumbai and a fast expanding metropolitan region with senior water appropriation
rights further complicates this picture and places urban and industrial water demand in
direct competition, sometimes even overt conflict with farming communities in the
region (see Paper Two of this dissertation). In such cases, the latter have little recourse
for contesting rural-urban water transfers except to challenge such (often arbitrary)
diversions in local courts or through social protest. The combined effects of institutional
variation and the geography of water storage and use have also meant that in the
absence of effective functioning of autonomous regulatory mechanisms, such as the
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulation Act (MWRRA), to provide any countervailing
influence the State Government plays an important role in adjudicating water disputes
between jurisdictions (Wagle, Warghade, & Sathe, 2012; Paper Two).
Canal technology has also played a major role in institutional evolution and
directly affects the experiences of rural and urban communities with water for
agricultural use. Some empirical work on the Konkan done locally has examined the
role canal technology plays in the utilization of water and the shaping of water
institutions. This paper will review the arguments from this literature next. In the
empirical section following this section, I examine the implications of this technology
for water politics and policy in this region.
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5.3.4 Institutions, Technological Constraints and Canal Water
Management in the Konkan
In the case of the operation and functioning of the rural canal systems in the
North Konkan, this paper argues that the availability of water “on demand” on canal
systems in irrigation projects in the region makes it imperative to examine the actual
experiences of farming communities with water access from a perspective that is
qualitatively different from the one that has been used in the canal irrigation literature in
India. The projected availability of water to grow a second paddy crop in irrigation
systems in the Konkan itself means that there is sufficient water available on demand
(WAPCOS, 1996). The design and construction of the canal system has also factored in
the abundant availability of water (WAPCOS, 1996). The resulting canal technology
which includes the design of irrigation outlets and the local rules of water management
on the canal system are closely influenced by the planned cropping pattern during the
execution of the project, viz. paddy. Experiences with irrigating paddy have produced
mixed results. In this regard, research done by local geographers and economists on
water technology and practices in the north Konkan provides some useful insight. A
survey by geographers on the canal system of the Vandri medium reservoir, a project
next to the Surya in Thane district, points to the conveyance systems and outlet
structures. Here, canals designed to irrigate paddy influence rules around water
rotations on the main canal level and through the canal minors to agricultural fields.
These rules which involve providing water for a second paddy crop with a weekly
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rotation and flow type of irrigation are hard to change once the canal systems have been
constructed (Gore & Phadke, 1996).
The heavy flow of water through the canals that were originally designed to
irrigate paddy became a disincentive in growing less water intensive crops in the Vandri
project. So, while farmers continue to have notional rights over the water of the project,
lower water utilization as a result of the design of the conveyance system and the nonimplementation of crop zoning rules resulted in massive wastage and underutilization of
water. This technological-institutional constraint will be explored in the empirical
section of the paper.
Thus, in addition to the ownership and other organizational dimensions of water
management, the technical design of irrigation systems and the tailoring of water
rotation rules based on canal designs have created a challenging institutional obstacle
for reform in water governance in this region. The findings affirm the claims of local
irrigation engineers in the Konkan that the geography of the region, the difficult
adaptation of canal projects to the local environment and the social relations within
rural communities also make co-operation around water on village canal systems a
formidable challenge (Sinchan, 2000). This does not mean that such claims by the
bureaucracy should not be critically analyzed, as relations between social classes in
agriculture are being constantly re-produced in the context of an unequal agrarian
structure in villages that are still dominated by large rentier land holding classes and
farming entrepreneurs (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2014).
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5.4

Method and Scale: Justifying an Ethnography of the
Commons
The best methods for understanding the social, cultural and collective
implications of the commons might also be elastic and diverse. First, as
landscapes change through state intervention, urbanization and
globalization, the units of analysis to study the commons also change. We
cannot decide on how to study the commons without understanding what
led to the definition of commons in our analysis. (Rao & Appadurai,
2008:p.165-166)

When I started my field research on the access of farmers to water on the canal
system in Sakhare village in Surya project area, the field research quickly turned
towards a parallel investigation of dispossession from land being primarily experienced
by small and marginal tribal farmers. The scale of analysis also shifted given that water
from this project was claimed by a new group of farmers outside the official beneficiary
area of the project in coastal Dahanu. Another claimant to the irrigation water in Surya
project that emerged during the course of my field research was the fast urbanizing
Vasai-Virar sub-region outside Greater Mumbai. Both new agricultural and urban
claimants to the water of Surya project cited water wastage by tribal farmers. Thus, the
flows of water became salient in a context that had already come to be increasingly
characterized by the conversion of resources from sustaining agriculture to increasingly
enabling the spatial expansion of suburban and peri-urban areas of Mumbai.
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In focusing ethnographically on relationships between water, society, land tenure
and geographical scale on resource access, this paper takes on a methodological
challenge posed by social anthropologists who argue that the commons should be
treated as an analytical and political construct rather than as a mere physical category
(Rao & Appadurai, 2008, pp. 165-166; Linton & Budds, 2014).
First, in terms of the physical space of the canal systems in villages in the
horticultural belt, I argue that a study of the commons in rural areas should be part of a
larger relational analysis examining impacts of regional processes on a local unit (Rao
& Appadurai, 2008, p. 166).
A second justification for a study of the commons that incorporates a scalar
perspective is the multidimensional relationship between state territorialities and local
resource rights in rural India (Agrawal & Sivaramkrishnan, 2000). The variety of
institutions and the specific nature of local ecologies and land tenures in Dahanu and
Thane make study of the impact of canal irrigation on a local unit such as a village an
interesting methodological challenge for social scientists. Ethnography helps us
appreciate the nature of relationships and histories around resources between state and
communities in such contexts. It also helps emphasize the penetration of markets and
the geographical interactions of industrial-urban forces with agriculture in rural areas in
the context of rapid social and environmental change in Asia (McGee, 1995; Li, 2007).
Therefore, the choice of ethnography is not simply another attempt to make
claims about the importance of researching complexity in resource management, but is
more of an attempt at a real engagement with the scalar dimension of a resource like
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water. The allocation of water across crops to different sectors of the local economy, and
the contrary experiences of abundance and scarcity of water in this region, make the
observations that follow from an ethnographic route even more valuable. From the point
of view of producing an ethnography of the commons in contemporary rural India, the
importance of a holistic investigation is also reinforced by a scenario where agricultural
livelihoods remain tethered to access to local commons in rural India (Gidwani, 2008).
Moreover, unequal land distribution and uneven access of tribals and lower caste poor
to agricultural land continue to be central policy issues for agrarian researchers in the
country (Menon & Vadivelu, 2006; Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2014). So, rather
than dismissing the village as a unit of study, I have attended to social and ecological
flows between villages and the external world while also furthering an analysis of micro
water politics by undertaking agrarian research in two villages (Gupta, 2005).

5.5

The Politics of Unequal Water Distribution and
Accumulation in Horticulture: Anarchy, Location, Water
Grabbing and Dispossession
The water literature in political ecology does not take into account the centrality

of land in the actual working of the socio-technicality in water systems (Mollinga,
2003). A polarized discourse between Marxist scholars who work on agrarian change
and critical political ecologists who research the politics and political economy of canal
management is responsible for this disjuncture (Mollinga, 2010). The focus on flows of
water and the multi scalar implications of water management in a local context in this
study of canal irrigation make it imperative that this paper focuses on the consequences
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of uneven agricultural development in the Surya project. Thus, the theoretical frames of
socio-technicality and the hydro-social cycle (outlined above) become useful here. At
the same time, a power centred view of technology and social relations that characterize
both these approaches do not produce sufficiently insightful analysis on how the
instruments of power in water systems actually work in practice in the Indian context.
Besides being selective in their conceptualization of power, socio-technicality and
hydro-socaility paradigms can produce an over-socialized explanation of ecological
problems on water systems and do not incorporate the technological dynamism of
farmers and water users. Here, my disagreement with the literature on water in
geography stems from an overemphasis in that literature on a Marxian and Foucauldian
definition of power to the exclusion of studying institutions at the level of organizations.
Practices, habits and attitudes (Hodgson, 2006) that often remain deeply entrenched at
the level of very centralized Irrigation Departments reinforce and exacerbate social
differentiation and social inequities in a hierarchical context like India. Both
frameworks also do not throw sufficient light on the movement of water across scale.
Hence, in this paper, the socio-technical and hydro-social frameworks are in
effect combined with the paracommons approach so as to “follow the water” (Lankford,
2013). The central findings discussed in this section are the inability of the Irrigation
Department to adapt to local needs for water, the obstacles posed by social relations and
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Figure 5.3 - Map of the Horticultural belt that includes Sakhare, Vanai and other villages. The area in
green indicates water logging as a result of water runoff and is taken from the Indian Government’s WRIS
data source (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra).

local geography to efficient utilization and the scalar dimensions of water wastage and
underutilization. Thus, the local politics of water becomes central, but in keeping with
the ethnographic thrust of this paper, the political and social frame of the study extends
far beyond the unit of analysis in Dahanu as it tries to follow the ‘wasted’ water.
My findings that follow here are from the two villages of Sakhare and Vanai of
Surya project located on Palghar branch canal (see Figure 5.3). The data is highly
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Table 5.1 - Gross Command, Culturable and Irrigable Area in Dahanu’s Horticultural Belt (in hectares)

No.

Village

Gross
Command

Culturable
Command

Irrigable Area

1

Sakhare

260

130

130

2

Govane

408

204

204

3

Kapashi

200

100

100

4

Dehane

300

150

150

5

Vanai

800

400

400

6

Dabhale

478

239

239

7

Khambala

120

60

60

2566

1283

1283

Total

Source: Draft Project Report, Surya Project (2005)

Table 5.2: Total Area (in hectares) under command in various administrative sub-divisions of
Surya project

Name of subdivision

Gross Command
area

Culturable
Command area

Irrigable Area

Jawhar

60

30

30

Dahanu

12730

6111

6111

Palghar

17757

8555

8555

Total

30547

14696

14696

Source: Draft Project Report, Surya Project (2005)

specific to the agro-ecological context of this part of the command area of the Surya
project (see Table 5.1 on the extent of cultivable irrigable area in the horticultural belt).
I state this at the very outset because there were other parts of the command area where
I witnessed lesser social differentiation and inequality in access to water. Parts of
Palghar in the Surya Command area (see Figure 5.1), for instance, had water user
associations comprised largely of tribal farmers using water from the project. While my
findings are highly specific to the horticultural belt of Dahanu, research findings on
social differentiation, the functioning of water institutions, and the problem of
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underutilization of canal water (first pointed out to me by the engineers interviewed in
2006 and 2008) resonate throughout the command area. However, the causes of such
underutilization of water vary between different areas of the project.

5.5.1 Planned Anarchy
There is enough water wasted into the Arabian Sea from the release in
the Surya irrigation project in Dahanu during the canal rotations that
could last suburban Mumbai's demand for six months. This is a project
as large as the Bhatsa. The local Irrigation Department is as
incompetent as it is corrupt, no one knows what is going on with this
project and the maintenance of canals is very poor. It irrigates far less
agricultural land and its performance is a symbol of waste and
bureaucratic sloth - Large Commercial Farmer. (Interview with Mr.
Mistry, June 2008)
It is not unusual to see chaos in Indian canal irrigation systems, as the presence
of democracy and populism in rural India often leads to the Irrigation Department
adapting to the wishes of local elected politicians. The release of water into the canals in
Dahanu followed a prescribed pattern of paddy cultivation that catered to its
predominantly tribal population. However, the paradox was that a significant portion of
the land under this specific canal was also under vegetables, which required less water.
The horticultural farmers from the Vadaval caste had adapted to these cultivation
conditions by using wells, but the Irrigation Department continued to release water for
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paddy. When Mistry, a large commercial farmer in Dahanu shared his frustration about
the volume of wasted water in April 2008, I was into my fourth month of research in the
command area of the Surya irrigation project. I had also been a firsthand witness of the
waste of water and corruption around the irrigation project (see Paper One). However,
the kind of graft around this important irrigation project outside Mumbai was one in
which the upper caste Hindu-Vadaval and Parsi commercial farmers (both of whom
represent the dominant faction of agrarian capital in this region) were complicit. Some
of these early interviews and close interactions with the richer sections of the farming
communities and engineers in the spring and summer of 2008 set the stage for my
survey research in both the first and second villages. This was also a time when the
canal rotations on the Surya Right Bank Canal system were close to an end in May 2008
and farmers in the region had started preparing their fields for the monsoon (My field
research had started in December 2007 and continued until September 2008). Some of
the preliminary observations of the movement of water in the canal system in the
villages yielded findings of a paradoxical nature. I had witnessed tribal farmers
accessing water from wide streams at the tail end of the canal minors complaining of
water scarcity and water grabbing by the large farmers on the middle reaches of the
canal minor system. However, what was consistent about the picture was the quantity of
water drained into rivulets and streams in the region and the haphazard organization of
water rotations and constant violations of rules on the main canal system. Canal
rotations were typically organized according to a weekly schedule between November
2007 and May 2008. Water rotations would start on Sunday and would stop on Friday,
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to begin a week later. On the main canal level, water would first be released to the tail
of the main canal system in Palghar and a day later the gates in Dahanu would be
opened (tail-head rotation). This was done to ensure fairness on the main canal system.
A prescribed schedule of water rotation was advertised in local newspapers prior
to the beginning of the rotations in November. Yet this schedule was violated in April
and May of 2008 when the canal system broke down due to poor maintenance, and
political pressure came from local large farmers wanting to harvest their produce in
May and water to stop flowing through the canals. While, on paper, farmers had to
submit applications to the local Irrigation Department for water, in practice no
applications were made. Moreover, while tail-head rotations were implemented at the
main canals level, no such rotation was practiced at the canal minors level. When I
asked engineers in Vangaon why there was no policy of rotation on canal minors they
said “this was an Adivasi area and there was no need for rotations on the canal minors.”
The reasons for non-implementation of rules below the outlet were attributed to
the dysfunction of local society and termination of the command area development
programme funded projects that were focused on re-engineering the canal minors.
However, closer observation of the canal system yielded interesting sociological clues.
While it was true that water drained very quickly due to the design of the system and
the Konkan topography, it was also true that both the rules and conditions on the canals
below the outlet and on the main canal level were dictated by the large Vadaval
horticultural farmers. Thus, while the quantity of water released into the main canal
system was clearly meant to cultivate paddy, keeping in mind local tribal interest in that
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crop, there was no effort by engineers to regulate water usage or even mediate water
disputes between farmers. When I started my interviews in Sakhare, the rotations and
water discharge had clearly not taken account of new cropping patterns that had evolved
in the horticultural belt since 2000. This was in keeping with early productive irrigation
objectives of the Surya irrigation project where the entire project design was developed
and implemented to cultivate a second paddy crop and boost agricultural production.
A report of the Surya Irrigation project published by the project two years before
my fieldwork states:
As actual water utilization is comparatively less and storage available
in the reservoir is more, the rules of canal operations are not strictly
followed and water for irrigation is released mainly as per demand of
farmers. (Draft Project Report. Restructured Command Area
Development Programme, 2007)
A twenty year old report prepared by Water and Power Consultancy Services
(WAPCOS) involving a technical survey and socioeconomic study of Surya Command
area warned about possible loss of control over water use soon after the canal system
was in place in Dahanu, and two years after rotations began on the main canal system:
The water resources stored and available in the reservoirs are much
more than needed in the field. The water is supplied as desired by the
cultivator. Though the system is being operated on a demand basis
and the numbers of rotations are fixed in advance and water is being
supplied to the sanctioned area, there is no rotation or control at the
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outlet level. The irrigation is mostly “field to field.” (WAPCOS, 1996,
pp. 6-11)
The design and construction of a canal system that was designed to irrigate a
second crop of paddy, the absence of any institutional intervention below the level of
the main canal, the poor management of water at the main level, the failure to account
for the dynamism of farming entrepreneurs in the horticultural belt and their success at
changing cropping patterns, all remained unincorporated into local water policy and
practices in the project. The unanswered question here is: What were the reasons for
such mismanagement of water? And was water the only object of politics here?
The concept of ‘water control’ in the canal irrigation literature has now posited
that technical/physical, organizational/managerial and socio-economic/political control
of water are internally related (Mollinga, 2013). In the Surya project, engineers I spoke
to told me about political pressure applied on them by the tribal MLA of Dahanu to
make the main canals appear full of water. While they were aware that the consequence
of releasing water into the main canal system for paddy was clearly not working, they
wanted to ensure the MLA was kept satisfied. “The real problem here is not the
availability of water, but that of social relations between the Vadavals and non-tribal
farmers in the villages,” explained a junior engineer in a candid moment. “We cannot
manage that turf because it is not our responsibility.” This deliberate separation of
technical and social realms of irrigation by engineers speaks to the very heart of the
socio-technical critiques of centralized modern canal systems (Mollinga, 2010: p. 424).
By consigning the social and technical into separate realms of water management, the
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engineers failed to acknowledge the political embeddedness of large irrigation systems
and their management.

5.5.2 Phase 2000-2008: Settler Farmers Increase their Grip on Land
and Water on the Canal Minors
A broad literature on canal irrigation has focused on the main canal level and
less on the experiences of farmers who enjoy the benefits of surface irrigation within
villages on canal minor systems (for notable exceptions, see Mollinga, 2003; and
Narain, 2003). Most analyses of canal irrigation have also neglected to analyze and
understand the interface of water conveyance technology, the behaviour of users, and
the institutional organization of irrigation. More recently, a critical lens has been
extended to canal technology and the degree of social and technical organization needed
for the successful working of such water conveyance systems at local levels (Mollinga,
2003). However, even this literature is not without blind spots. The relationship of land
and water institutions is not well understood; moreover, the geographical and scalar
dimensions of local water management are also poorly researched. The findings in this
section point to the centrality of the land-water nexus in villages under study. From both
theoretical and empirical standpoints, that nexus is emphasized in this study because it
reminds water researchers studying other contexts that land titles/ownership and actual
access and control over land also play a key role in ensuring fair and equitable
entitlement to water in rural contexts. Also, in the micro context of conflict on a rural
water conveyance system, water may not be the only resource of interest; other
resources may also be up for grabs. For example, appropriating water may serve a
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particular class interest in re-ordering of agricultural accumulation strategies.
Appropriation of water could also help richer sections of the farming community rework land ownership and access to their own advantage and the disadvantage of the
rural poor on a canal system (Mehta, 2012, p. 203). By focusing mainly on access to
water within political ecology and neglecting the interactions of land and water
institutions in the agricultural landscape, one might be missing a vital part of the puzzle
in the local politics of water in rural areas of developing countries.
Sakhare village’s location at the junction of two large main canals and the
presence of two distributary canals and three minors with a weekly rotation system of
water makes it seem like a village that should be well endowed with water and in
principle should enjoy benefits of surface irrigation evenly (see Figures 5.3 & 5.4).
However, the presence of three distinct caste groups in one village, the leasing of land
by settler farmers, and presumptions lying at the heart of engineering large dam projects
and conveyance systems qualify the anticipation of an even distribution of benefits from
irrigation. The population of Sakhare is 2,700 people and more than ninety percent of its
inhabitants are from the tribal Warli community, while the rest are from Macchi caste.
There are about 600 households in the village. Vanai village is of equal geographical
size, with 2,600 people, mostly tribals, and also has about 600 households (see Table 5.3
below for data on land use for both villages before surface irrigation).
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Figure 5.4 - Land use in Sakhare and Vanai Villages 1971-2001.
Source: Census of India, 1971; 1981; 1991; and 2001
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In Figure 5.5, the canal layout of the village command for Sakhare is further
divided into sub-commands named “chaks” (see Chambers, 1990, pp. 54-59 for the
origins of irrigation planning under chaks in India). The chaks are organized on the
basis of the location of outlets and gates that are used to apportion the water equally
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amongst users. Most of these sub-commands and the organization of irrigation within
villages in the Surya Command area were developed during the period of the Command
Area Development Authority (CADA, 1995-2001) where the objective was to
implement a rule based rotation of water below the outlets. Under this principle, the

Figure 5.5 - Map of the Distributary, Canal Minor and Sub-Minor Network and the chaks (village subcommands) in Sakhare Village (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of
Maharashtra).
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tails of the sub commands in the village get water first and it is later released at the
head. This rules based rotation of water was also intended to closely co-ordinate with
water requirements of the farmers and the cropping patterns within every village.
The lack of community experience with irrigation in this part of Maharashtra
with canal irrigation made it imperative for the Government to implement the CADA
programme here. However, when I started fieldwork in 2007, CADA had been
withdrawn from the Surya Irrigation project amidst allegations of serious impropriety
and misuse of development funds. During my fieldwork, I noticed that of the outlets and
the gates regulating the flow between fields had fallen into a state of disrepair and water
measurement devices on the system were missing. With the dissolution of CADA, a
state of anarchy had gripped water management in Sakhare village.

5.5.3 Canal Location and Land Grabbing:
The Centrality of Social Relations
Conventional analysis of irrigation systems have focused on access to water
along the various reaches of the canal system. However, in contrast to protective
irrigation systems in Southern India (Mollinga 2003), the experiences of water scarcity
in the canal system of the Surya project were marked at the middle and tail reaches of
the system. At the same time, water access followed the acquisition and subsequent
fencing of land by Vadaval farmers at all reaches of the canal minor system.
Consequently, water grabbing followed the grabbing of land in some instances. In a few
cases Vadaval farmers had also acquired agricultural land at the head reaches of canals
(see Figures 5.4 and 5.8). However, given the heavy flow of water, tribal farms
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adjoining Vadaval farms at the head of the canal minor system (unlike those on the
middle and tail sections) did not face any serious disadvantage regarding water access.
At the head of the canal minors, changes in land use that were a result of a
second irrigated paddy crop produced expectations amongst some tribal farmers about
the possibilities of cultivating other crops. “There was great joy in the village when the
canal water came” said Gehla, my first contact in the village. On other sections of the
head of the canal system, during my interviews, most tribal farmers shared with me
their interest in growing mostly traditional varieties of paddy. “It is our staple,” said one
farmer. “I don’t care what others want from irrigation, I want to continue to grow paddy.
A second crop of paddy helps us in providing subsistence for our households. We have
to survive and cannot invest in horticulture like the Vadavals, it is risky. Besides, they
have more experience in growing vegetables and fruits, we don’t.” A second tribal
farmer on the head of the canal system pointed to the heavy water discharge from the
minor branches of the gravity canals and said “We cannot grow anything but paddy
here, because of the flow of water. Moreover, our land plots are small.” The average
size of a tribal family plot is 0.5 ha in this area.
Both tribals and Macchis (a local caste in Sakhare village) who were
numerically dominant at the head of the canal system consistently pointed out the heavy
flow of the water that compelled them to grow paddy. “I did not take a canal irrigated
crop this year, as we have to leave the land fallow this year,” said another farmer.
Another tribal farmer pointed out to the fact that most members of his household were
not interested in farming and he was himself employed on industrial estates in Palghar.
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Farming families at the head of the canal system, being close to the road to the railway
station in Vangaon, were more likely to have diversified outside agriculture.
Tribal and Macchi farmers in Sakhare at the head of the canal minors pointed
out how they had tried to get the Irrigation Department to do something about the heavy
flow of water to their fields. “This is how it will stay, we cannot re-design the canals for
you was the answer we got from the engineers,” pointed out another farmer. Several
tribal farmers in Sakhare at the head of the canal minor also narrated to me how they
had signed a joint written petition to the Irrigation Department to stop the canal
rotations for a year in 2005 so that they could do some maintenance work on the field
channels and also nurture the soil so that it could regain its nutrients. However, the
Irrigation Department did not relent. “It is the demands of the Vadaval horticultural
farmers in this belt that always prevail, we don’t matter, though it was the tribal
community that made a sacrifice for the Surya project and lost land in the process.”
Due to the undulating terrain, small land holdings, high intensity of rainfall, and
terraced fields, the traditional pattern of canal irrigation below the outlet in the Konkan
is “field to field” irrigation (WAPCOS, 1996). The conventional open channel
distribution network that is present in the interior parts of Maharashtra does not work
well in the Konkan and maintaining field channels has proved to be a costly and
repetitive operation for local farmers. This mode of irrigation is a cause for the area
irrigated per unit of water to be far lesser in the Konkan region. It was one of the
reasons why farmers could not grow crops other than rice which was also a cause for
underutilization of water (as rice had a limited market and not all farmers were
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interested in growing a second paddy crop). Moreover, this also means that co-operation
between farmers growing different kinds of crops becomes a challenge.
Shiva and Ganpat, two tribal farmers at the head of the canal minor system who
also had land plots on middle reaches of the canal system, noted an absence of cooperation between farmers around water throughout the canal system in the villages. “I
tried bringing farmers together, but it did not work. Some farmers have lost land to the
Vadaval farmers; some others don’t trust each other because there is a lot of contestation
and conflict around land. Some don’t even know where their land is located,” pointed
out Shiva.
Ganpat who also had agricultural land on the middle reaches of Direct Minor 2
spoke of how the field to field irrigation (a system where water courses have to be
developed between fields and channeled by farmers) needed more cooperation between
farmers. “Given that water courses had to be developed by farmers due to the nature of
the soil and the quick run-off of water, the importance of building relationships cannot
be underestimated,” said Ganpat. “However, while we developed such mechanisms of
co-operation by starting groups to manage water, things would fall apart during night
time when some individual farmers would destroy the channels and grab water at the
expense of others. Things fell apart further after the Vadavals started irrigating their
fields,” added Ganpat. Gehla, a farmer who has a forest plot on the outskirts of the
village and cannot irrigate that particular plot, though it is close to the distributary at the
northern end of the village, narrated an account of how he had tried to initiate a cooperative arrangement around sharing irrigation water with Ganpat and two other
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farmers in another plot he had clear title to near Direct Minor 1 (on the middle reaches)
that went through the middle of the village (see Figure 5.6, the large farm is in yellow).
Ganpat, Gehla and a third tribal farmer had constructed a field channel from the
outlet in 2002 and were overjoyed at the prospect of cultivating an irrigated crop. Yet
that very irrigation season, Raut, a Vadaval horticultural farmer, enclosed his farm (and
by default the canal outlet and field channels) on a pretext that stray cattle were entering
his farm and destroying the bell pepper crop. In a short time, Gehla and Ganpat started
facing problems on their small plots of land as water started running short. When they
approached Raut he claimed that he owned the land around the outlet and had no choice
but to fence the farm because of the threat of stray cattle to his crop. Ganpat added:
That was the end of the story for us, we never could take a second
crop again as we did not know how to coordinate with Raut. When we
complained to the irrigation engineers, they said that they had no
jurisdiction over disputes over water that broke out between farmers
and asked us to manage such differences on our own. The engineers
also remained evasive when we questioned them about the canal
being enclosed by the Vadaval farmers.
The regulation of canal minors and dispute resolutions between farmers on field
channels falls under the purview of the Maharashtra Irrigation Act (Government of
Maharashtra, 1976, pp. 9637-9638). While co-operation between farmers on field
channels is voluntary, enclosure of entire canal minors and manipulation of field
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channels and water courses by Vadaval farmers constituted clear and flagrant violations
of the Irrigation Act.

Figure 5.6 - Map of land holdings on a Canal Minor in Sakhare Village. Plots of land
under this outlet were cultivated by tribal farmers, but access to water was lost as Lot 3
under the control of a large horticultural farmer sealed off the canal with a fence (Base
Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra).

There were also agricultural plots at the head that were left unsown; farmers
blamed the cattle problem for their choice not to plant. Thus, another reason for
underutilization at the head of the canal minor system was the cattle problem. Forest
hamlets in the village witnessed seasonal migration. Inhabitants in these hamlets and
others with non-agricultural employment would let their cattle loose in the village and

!236

they would destroy the standing crop. The enclosure of large Vadaval farms, common
land, and entire paths exacerbated this problem after irrigation: “We don’t have fences
like the Vadavals,” said Ghoda a farmer at the head of the canal. On one occasion when
Ghoda’s farm was being rampaged by cattle, I personally ran and brought his attention
to it, but a lot of damage was done by the time we reached his plot (see Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7 - Cattle straying into tribal farms in Sakhare

There were few instances of tribal farmers or Macchis grabbing each other’s
land (detailed below), but many cases of Vadaval farmers having grabbed land of tribal
and Macchi farmers on the head, middle and tail reaches of the canal minor system. My
initial Sakhare interviews revealed cases of land grabbing in at least 25% of the 50
marginal tribal farmers I interviewed in my first round; the grabbing of land was
rampant throughout the head, middle and the tail ends of the canal, but more severe at
the middle and the tail (for survey data from Sakhare, see table 5.4).
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Table 5.3 - Reasons for non-irrigation or factors influencing lack of access to water on canal sub- minor
one in Vanai village. N=23
Reasons for non-irrigation

Head

Middle

Tail

Unlined sub-minors/Poor Canal Maintenance
Too much water

1

Absence of field channels/Water courses washed away

1

Lack of co-operation between Farmers
Canal minors and field channels enclosed and blocked within large farms

2

Agriculture is un-remunerative

4

Cattle Problem

1

1

Picks up drainage water (no need for Canal)

3

Accesses well

1

Unleveled Land

2

2

5

Source: Survey in Vanai Village (2008)
Table 5.4 - Reasons for non-irrigation on two canal sub- minors systems. Sample survey of all classes of
farmers: Sakhare Village (N= 31). Sub Minor 1= 15 Sub Minor 2 =16. Survey conducted in April-May
2008
Reasons for non-irrigation

Head

Unlined sub-minors/Poor Canal Maintenance

1

Too much water

9

Absence of field channels/Water courses washed away

1

Lack of cooperation between Farmers

1

Middle

3

Canal minors and field channels enclosed and blocked within large
farms

10

Agriculture is un-remunerative

2

Cattle problem

1

Picks up drainage water (no feed for Canal)

Tail

2
1

On public canal systems in rural India, the land-water nexus has become even
more crucial as contestation over resources intensifies. Given the state of social
relations in Dahanu before the 1980s and difficulties involved in gaining access to tribal
land, Vadaval farmers went towards a strategy of leasing in land from another dominant
community who had lost interest in agriculture. Land was leased strategically on the
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canal minor system and then enclosed. “Theirs is a strategy of consolidation,” said
Shiva, adding “they leased inland from the Brahmins in Vangaon, but many land
holdings were scattered throughout the village. Given that the canal runs through the
villages, they had to bring everything together. This strategy has come at our expense.
After they grabbed land, they fenced off their farms” (see Figure 5.8). “Then we lost
access to water because the canals were enclosed too! Unless you work as agricultural
labourer inside, no one knows what happens inside the farms of the Vadavals!” A third
of farmers surveyed in Sakhare village revealed that they had lost land in various ways
to the Vadavals in the aftermath of canal irrigation in the village (see Figure 5.8). A
common complaint was of the loss of Varkas land. Varkas was a form of customary
tenure that was mostly not entered in the official land records. It was used to make
“rab,” a natural input that goes into local agriculture (Munshi, 1989). Tribal farmers
reported losing varkas land to the Vadaval horticultural farmers throughout the canal
minor system. Data from Vanai village on loss of land is unavailable but the numbers
are fewer than in Sakhare given the resistance put up by the local social movement, the
Kashtakari Sanghatana. The Sanghatana shared ten cases of Vadaval farmers grabbing
land belonging to tribal farmers, some involving varkas land, others being unrecorded
tenants while yet others involving open theft of tribal agricultural land and even village
paths. For instance, there was a case of a large orchard owner grabbing land belonging
to the tribal community’s village deity in Vanai. The Sanghtana fought back in court
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Figure 5.8 - Fencing of a large Vadaval farm at the tail end of Direct Minor 2 in Sakhare v i l l a g e . T h e
canal is not visible in the picture and the large fence prevents access to the farm.

and won the case on behalf of the tribal inhabitants of Vanai and the owner was forced
to return the land. The strategy in Vanai was to grab land belonging to tribals that had
turned valuable and potentially remunerative after the onset of canal irrigation.
This account of the canal minors being enclosed by Vadavals is represented well
by the map in Fig. 5.6 and the picture in Fig.5.8. Throughout the upper, middle and
lower reaches of this map, one can see that the outlets are enclosed within the large
farms (in yellow) belonging to the Vadavals. Vadaval farms are surrounded by patches
of tribal land (in brown), especially at the middle and tail reaches of the canal system.
Vadaval farms were then fenced off by Vadavals who used domesticated dogs to keep
out trespassers from the tribal village. The strategy of land consolidation is thus
affirmed by the map, but whether Vadaval farmers needed the water remained a
question. After all, they cultivated vegetables, flowers and fruits which require less
water than paddy. The largest Vadaval farm in Sakhare was about 30 hectares while
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there were at least nineteen other large farmers who owned farms ranging from 30 to 60
hectares in other parts of the horticultural belt. These farmers dominated other villages
in the belt where Sakhare was located, but came mostly from coastal Dahanu, having
anticipated the opportunities of irrigated agriculture as a result of the Surya project.

Figure 5.9 - Map of Sakhare Village’s command area highlighting social and economic
differentiation between small irrigated tribal and non-tribal large farms on the canal minor
system. The area in yellow was under grass cultivated and sold in Mumbai and Gujarat. In the
1990s these particular land tracts came to be irrigated and brought under horticultural crops. The
area in brown shows land plots belonging to tribal farmers and were unirrigated in the
agricultural season year 2008. Green indicates tribal farms that were irrigated (Base Map
courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra).
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“There is no money in agriculture” lamented Churi, the first large Vadaval
farmer I spoke to. “Have you seen my farm? I grow bell peppers, flowers and fruits,
where is the money in there?” Churi was reckoned in Dahanu as the most successful
horticultural farmer who came from a family of small agriculturists and worked hard
after leasing land from a Brahmin landlord from Vangaon. Churi explained, “we use
tubewells, drip and sprinkler irrigation so our benefit from the Surya project is indirect.
The Government still wants us to pay water charges and we won’t.” (see Table 5.6 for
well ownership). While the onset of canal irrigation in this area had imparted a change
in the hydrological cycle in the area, the rhythms of water rotations on the canal system
had been further altered in Sakhare and other villages where horticultural farmers had
managed to regulate water use on their farms through the use of tubewells while
accessing canals at the same time. The distribution of wells between Vadaval and tribal
farmers also points to a disparity. While most Vadaval farmers had tube wells, none of
the tribal farmers in Sakhare had access to such wells because it required a heavy
financial investment. The wells were used by Vadavals to regulate and optimize water
use on the farms where the water discharge through the canals often exceeded 4-6 times
than what the vegetable crops needed (Government of Maharashtra, Water Audit, 2011).
Churi’s claim of not using the canal system wasn’t true because a sub minor of
the canal system ran through Churi’s farm and, as the tribal farmers had told me, he was
one of the biggest farmers in the area and employed a large number of agricultural
labourers from tribal families in Sakhare and other villages in the interior of Dahanu. A
very significant section of this farm labour came from the small farms that surrounded
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Churi’s huge landholding that encompassed an entire section of Sub-minor 1. “We have
to compete for this labour with industry. None of the new generation wants to work in
agriculture; it is a challenge to find labour. We, Vadavals, have worked hard to survive
the vagaries of the farming business here as entrepreneurs.”
Table 5.5 - Well Ownership in villages in the Horticultural Belt under Palghar Canal Branch 2.
Village Name

Number of
Tribal
Farmers

Number of
non-Tribal
Horticultural
Farmers

Total Hectares Area
under
cultivated by
Vegetables
tribal farmers

Area
cultivated by
Horticultural
Farmers

Sakhare

18

85.80

85.80

Govane

16

64.70

64.70

Kapashi

34

130.65

130.65

Dehne

26

89.30

89.30

20

87.08

Dabhale

29

148.61

148.61

Khambale

18

80.91

80.91

2

32.05

Vanai

1

Chandranagar

7

0.41

1.99

86.67

30.06

Sources: Calculated from Revenue Tables 2007-08, Surya Irrigation Project & Fieldwork Notes.

A month after I left Churi’s farm, my research assistant showed me how Churi
had enclosed an entire sub-minor and flattened it and had diverted water to his tube
well. While there was direct evidence of such siphoning away of water, other tribal
farmers told me that competition for water in the past really became intense in March
when the weather started turning hot and everyone (whether it was tribal or non-tribal)
wanted water for their crops. While there were no fights on this issue, the Vadavals
decided to fence their farms along with the sub-minors. The Vadavals move to grab
water from the canal minors was also part of a strategy to deny water to neighbouring
farms, so that agricultural labour from the adjoining smaller farms would continue to be
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employed on Vadaval farms. It was also a strategy to ensure that they would not have
interruptions in their access to water. “Who will work on their farms, but the tribals”
said an Irrigation Department employee on the condition of anonymity.” It is all an
encompassing strategy, involving land, labour and water,” he chuckled and said.
Table 5.6 - Reasons for dispossession from land in Sakhare Village. N=31. Almost a
third of the surveyed farmers reported losing land to commercial farmers in the village
since the late 1990s after irrigation (June 2008).
Reasons for Dispossession from Land

Head

Middle

Tail

Loss of Land to Canal Building

3

Land Grabbing

1

2

3

Loss of Varkas Land/Unknown where land is lost
No loss of land

2
5

1
6

2
6

Source: Survey of Sakhare Village (2008)

In terms of the distribution of farmers who reported no access or issues with
water from the canal minors, almost 80% of the tribal and Macchi farmers at the head of
the canal in Sakhare were able to access water from the canals. However, this number
declined as one entered the middle and the tail ends of the canal in Sakhare village (see
Table 5.4 and Fig 5.9). In Vanai village, the picture was not different. In 2002, the
Kashtakari Sanghtana lodged a court case against Tarporewala, a Parsi farmer who had
grabbed land from a tribal agriculturist and was siphoning water away from the canal
minor in Vanai. The Sanghatana records revealed that the Taraporewala lost the case as
the canal was ruled by the judge to be a common resource to be shared by everyone.
Still, the sharp inequity in land holdings and social power between tribal and large nontribal farmers makes this a tough struggle for the former in other villages where the
Sanghatana is not powerful.
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The problems of farmers in Vanai village were of a different sort (see Table 5.4).
While siphoning away of water was prevalent there too, the problems of tribal farmers
with water access could be categorized into four types:
1) Agricultural land plots were often above the canals and the farmers could not
access the water for their fields.
2) An intensive round of land disputes between large farmers, mostly Vadavals
from the coast and the tribals, had also led to underutilization since the early
2000s.
3) A large part of the tribal community that was settled in Vanai after the
construction of the Surya reservoirs were unable to cultivate land in the village
as the formal process of transfers of land certificates was not done properly.
4) Several Parsi farmers (former landlords) sealed off canals inside their farms and
this led to disputes between the tribal community and these farmers.
In both villages, tribal farmers were often surrounded by large farms that fenced
the canals inside (see Figure 5.7). Water drawn from canals was stored under-ground
and ensured successful crops for the large farmers, while tribal farmers surrounding
large farms either withdrew from agriculture into other occupations or were forced to
look for wage work on the large farms. It was clear that Vadaval horticultural farmers
flourished on the labour from families that came from the same village. The large farms
in this belt have also relied on labour from the hilly interior of Dahanu, but it was easier
for the large farmers to access labour from the same village (Mehta, 1999).
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A visit to the farm of another Vadaval farmer, Raut, in Sakhare yielded more
insight, as he was transparent about reasons behind the success of the Vadaval
community:
It is the canal system, we were like the tribals, my own father was an
agricultural labourer on a farm on the Dahanu coast, but the surface
irrigation in this area changed the entire picture. We wouldn’t be here
if it was not for the canals. However, we don’t need the water from
the canals as we grow vegetables with drip and sprinkler, so though
we use the canal water, most of the benefits are indirect as we use the
recharged ground water. The flow of water through the canal system
is unsuitable for our vegetable and fruit crops, we don’t need it. We
understood the importance of the use of optimizing the use water from
Israel where we undertook trips to learn the use of drip and sprinkler
irrigation. When it comes to vegetables, fruits and flowers, they need
the right amount of water at the right time; sprinkler irrigation ensures
that we are able to water the plants adequately at the right time.
A Gujarati landlord in neighbouring Vangaon who had diversified outside
agriculture then told me how Syngenta, the agro seeds corporation, had sent these
farmers to Oakland, California and Israel to learn the new agricultural technology,
which included drip and sprinkler irrigation. Still, a question that continued to bother
me was what happened to the water that went into Vadaval farms? The canal water
discharge in Sakhare was meant for paddy, while vegetables consumed less than a third
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of the water needed for paddy (Command Area Development and Water Management
Programme, undated). “This isn’t just about water, it is about control of all three
elements that are central to horticulture in the village,” I wrote in my fieldwork diary.
Water was an important object of politics in this micro context, but not the only
resource up for grabs. Moreover, water that was not needed was expelled by Vadaval
farmers into neighbouring farms using pumps. After disputes over land, this was also a
contentious issue between tribal and Vadaval farmers and caused more disputes on how
village water should be managed. However, the power of local Vadaval horticultural
farmers was quite overwhelming for tribal farmers in places like Sakhare. Closer
observation of canal minors was supplemented by similar observation of the canal
system at the main level. There, the water was often conveyed into the natural drainage
system and rivulets by canal engineers (see Paper One). Perplexed, I checked with
several tribal farmers whether they had always seen the main canal gates at Sakhare
(Palghar branch) open to the drainage and they nodded their heads affirming my worst
doubts about deliberate mismanagement at the main canal level. “Some of this is
because they want the Vadavals to be able to pick up water from the drainage too at the
tail end of the village; the canal system here is rigged to benefit them,” the tribal
farmers added. This last comment exposed both the lack of knowledge of tribal farmers
about local machinations around water, but also exposed their ignorance about the rules
around rotations on the main canal. According to the Irrigation Act, 1976 for the state of
Maharashtra, sluice gates leading to the natural drainage system have to be always kept
closed unless there is an overflow in the reservoir or a flood (Government of
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Maharashtra, 1976, Section 16, p. 9634). At the level of the canal minors, water that
was not required was periodically expelled using pumps into surrounding tribal farms
and waste land (see Figure 5.10). A lot of this water ended up in rivulets that led into the
Khadkhada River and later into the Dahanu creek.
Water waste was thus an important social-ecological consequence of introducing
canal irrigation to the area. However, complicity of the local irrigation bureaucracy and
Vadaval farmers in creating wastage was beyond any doubt from my nine month field
research in Dahanu. Social relations in the area after the onset of canal irrigation had
also completely transformed the agrarian landscape, while also facilitating urban claims
on Surya water.

Figure 5.10 - Water expelled out of the large farms in Sakhare
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5.5.4 The Significance of the Paracommons: The Social and Political
Discourse of Water Underutilization and Diversions
The Surya project has not been able to meet most of its objectives
around irrigation, but what has saved it is water demand from the city
and industrial areas which keeps this project financially viable. The
only projects that work for irrigation in the land constrained Konkan
region are small irrigation projects. Large irrigation projects veer off
their objectives and end up supplying their water to cities and
industrial areas. (Executive Engineer Interview, Feb 2008)
The unique ecological context of the Surya project, which irrigates an
agricultural belt between the Western Ghats and the northern Konkan coastal belt with a
canal system (with all its institutional underpinning and cultural assumptions of farmer
response) imported from interior Maharashtra, clearly narrates a story about the
unsuitability of canal technology for the tribal agriculturalists of this water rich, but land
constrained region. Given these constraints, state attempts to shape the agrarian context
with the help of various programmes to remodel the canal system for tribal farmers have
also failed and social relations played a major role here (Sinchan, 2000).
Given the overwhelming challenges posed by terrain as well as social relations
and unfeasibility of canal technology, the socio-technical and hydrosocial frameworks
help us understand the adaptation by Vadaval farmers to the canal system to grow a
commercially viable but less water intensive crop. The sociotechnicality of Vadavals’
response is best embodied in the (illegal and subversive) re-working of the canal system
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through drip and sprinkler irrigation which reflect Vadaval ingenuity and enterprise in
horticulture. Thus, at the same time the cycle of water rotations through the canal
system (in itself constituting a new hydro-social cycle) is also further re-engineered on
Vadaval farms through the construction of tube wells and class relations transformed
simultaneously to the detriment of small and marginal tribal farmers who don’t have
similar access to capital and knowledge to utilize drip and sprinkler irrigation.
However, since water was still released into canals for paddy, what happens to
the wasted water? On their own, the socio-technical and hydro-social approaches only
partially help to understand social consequences and material properties of “wasted”
and underutilized water in this context. The concept of the paracommons focuses in a
novel way on competition over water resources freed up as a result of efficiency in
utilization or wastage. It is used to bring together the narrative above and explain how
water claims are made on wasted water of the Surya (Lankford, 2013, p. 9). Thus, while
the hydro-social cycle and socio-technical perspectives remain crucial to our
understanding of the social context of canal irrigation in Dahanu, they are supplemented
by the paracommons approach in order to understand dynamics of water use in a
productive irrigation project (see Paper One) where canal water is distributed on
principles other than strict crop zoning and based on meeting water demand from
farmers.
The canal engineers in Dahanu termed water runoff from the Surya canal system
as wastage. Run-off from canal systems is not an uncommon phenomenon in rural
India. Yet the scale of run-off from the Dahanu canal system created an interesting local
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cultural discourse about tribal utilization of water in the area. In 2008, a separate,
powerful lobby of Vadaval farmers in coastal parts of Dahanu outside the command area
(where fellow farmers from that caste had benefitted) blamed the Government for
poorly implementing the Surya project and wanted the Irrigation Department to
construct a canal for Vadaval farmers in western coastal Dahanu to access “wastage.”
The flow of wasted water into the natural drainage of the area created expectations for
other users, especially farmers outside the dam’s official command area. Thus, within
the paracommons perspective is a spatial dimension that explains this politics of water
claims, “the loss portion of a unit withdrawn by one user is available for other users
including the original, proprietor/withdrawer through different pathways” (Lankford,
2013, p. 179). Therefore, the paracommons features modified subtractibility
(subtractibility and non-rivalry in the consumption of common pool resource is assumed
in the CPR literature, see Table 5.7), whereas, in Lankford’s new conceptualization, a
loss of water in a system like the Surya could become available for other users outside
the official beneficiary area. Raul, a Vadaval farmer specializing in organic agriculture
and local leader on water issues for the west coast of Dahanu noted:
If you take a look at the Khadkhada, you can see the volume of water
being wasted during the irrigation season. We, Vadavals have proven
ourselves and can put this water into better use and have formally
approached the state government on many occasions for building a
canal that takes this “surplus water” and wastage into irrigating our
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Table 5.7 - How do the two theoretical frameworks explain underutilization of canal water in their
separate domains? The political ecology/production relations, common pool resource and
paracommons approaches. Sources: After K. Bharadwaj (1990) and Lankford (2013: p 172)

Dimension

Production Relations/
Political Ecology
approach

The (principal)
Commons approach

The Liminal
Paracommons
approach

Behavioural
approaches

Access to water depends
on class or caste status of
farmers

Rational actor
approach

Not worked out

Factors behind
water losses
and wastage

Socio economic
environment and including
conditions of production
that users face that affect
utilization. Geography of
canal system and role of
state acknowledged.

Brief incomplete and
summary treatment

Defining feature of
the paracommons.
Complex nested and
scalar.

Property rights
question

Not important, but this
could change in a complex
agro ecological context
that involves customary
tenure land, but property
rights in water not central

Who owns the
commons? How
could rights be
transferred?

Who owns the
wasted and
underutilized water?

Subtractibility

No attention

Water consumed in
one place cannot be
consumed elsewhere

Modified
subtractibility

Regulatory
Questions

State seen as representing
dominant class interests

How to manage
common pool
resources and
regulate demand?
What common pool
resource modes?

How to govern the
commons with a
significant
proportion of
salvageable wastage?

Design and
Technology

It is more important in
political ecology, but
socio-economic context
more central

Canal technology
related to harvest and
water storage

Technology related
to raising efficiencythough often
unpredictably so and
requiring ‘systems
thinking’

Spatiality
Conferred
Ownership
claims and
Competition

Not central. If geographical
scale considered, class
relations and sectoral
priorities of the capitalist
state become important.
Within rural areas, some
attention to spatial aspects

In parallel (all users
acting
simultaneously); or in
geographical
sequence with users
in longitudinal,
vertical or lateral
sequence

Extrinsicappropriation
sequence; likely to
be a complex
intricate and unique
set of resource and
wastage flows in
different contexts.

NonExcludability
or Rivalry

Not considered.

Defining feature of
the principal
commons. Difficult to
exclude others
accounting for
geographical and
spatial factors.

Excluding others
from waste fraction
is one option; or not
if recycling/reuse by
others deemed
normal
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fields, west of the railway line. But we are told that the tribal
community has prior rights to the water.
Seconding Raul’s argument was an engineer from the Surya project, whom I
met separately. The engineer stated:
There is indeed underutilization in the project, but what can we
engineers do? The tribal community is utterly incompetent and
underserving of the benefits of modern canal irrigation, this is a social
problem. All this water I can tell you will end up in the city, it pays
for the water. This could and might happen to more of the Surya
water; it will end up in the city.

The underutilization and wastage of water became grounds for the proposal of a
new canal project to irrigate western parts of Dahanu where the Vadaval community
originates. However, this project never fructified because the diversion was proposed
from the existing horticultural belt where communities had now developed clear rights
to waters of the Surya project. At the same time, the state government citing essential
use and overall underutilization in the irrigation project has successively diverted water
to the northern suburbs of Mumbai and to Vasai Virar, one of the fastest growing
townships in the MMR. The diversion to Vasai Virar began in 1998 and has been
renewed by the state government three times in the last 15 years citing underutilization
in canal irrigation (see Figure 5.11 and Table 5.8). Another diversion of Surya water was
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made to Mira-Bhayandar, a suburb in Greater Mumbai in 2009. Almost 25% of the
project’s water has now been transferred to urban-industrial use (see Table 5.8).
Table 5.8 - Water utilized for non-irrigation purposes, including diversions to Vasai
Virar. Source: Various Reports, Surya Command Area Development Authority (2002-2010)
Water Supply to Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation,
Tarapur (MIDC), Tarapur

19.20 mm3 (6.17% of total
water utilization

Water Supply to various towns (10 No.) and villages (27 No.)

24.56 MM3 (8.58%)

Water Supply to Industries like Bombay State Electricity Supply
company, mills, industries etc.

21.93 mm3 (7.76%)

Water Supply to following important Central Government Schemes
Tarapur Atomic Power Station (Stages I, II, III, IV, V & VI) and Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Tarapur

6.70 mm3 (2.34%)

Total

72.39 mm3 (25.28% of
total water utilization)

Irrigation Potential Utilisation
in Surya Project
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Figure 5.11 - Irrigation potential utilisation in Surya Project. Sources: Directorate of Economics and
Statistics, Thane District, 2000-2012; Report on Benchmarking of Irrigation Projects in Maharashtra,
(Various Years). This data has been calculated after using all these sources.

“The water of the Surya is coveted by property developers in Vasai Virar
because without water, there cannot be any urban expansion at the fringes of Mumbai,”
said Navneetbhai Shah, a former MLA and litigant on the Surya dam water diversion to
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Vasai Virar in the Bombay High Court. On the one hand, the Government says it wants
to give a fair deal to economically depressed tribal areas; on the other, they take water
away from poor tribal agriculturists to help with the contentious expansion of Mumbai
into Vasai Virar. Now, the government has decided to construct a new dam called Susari
in Dahanu to supply water to Vasai Virar (see Figure 5.2). Shah added,
Where is the underutilization? On the one hand, the Government has
not constructed the canals and maintains the existing system poorly.
On the other hand, it wants to divert water from the tribal areas and
now build a new dam displacing 10,000 people in an area that has
already sacrificed land for this massive Surya project with negative
results for tribal agriculture. There is no logic in the Government’s
policy.

The politics of surplus and wasted water created by such “underutilization” in
the neighbourhood of the horticultural belt points to the weaknesses of both the Marxian
and political ecology approaches to irrigation in analyzing this phenomenon of water
wastage. A classic Marxian political economy response would be to blame the condition
of class relations for the underutilization of irrigation potential (see Bharadwaj, 1990 for
an excellent Marxian analysis of underutilization in irrigation and Table 5.7 on political
economy analysis of underutilization) While the Marxian political economy argument is
validated by the above account, it neglects the assumptions that go into the technical
design of large irrigation projects, the material properties of water, and the role of the
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bureaucracy in water management (also see Table 4 above on the differences in
approaches to underutilization of irrigation water).

5.6

Conclusion
The empirical findings of the paper that focus on the underutilization of

irrigation water in the Surya project help us justify the theoretical framework that has
been brought together in this paper. The introduction of a new irrigation project
fundamentally altered the hydrological cycle in this region and transformed social
relations and the ecology of the area. However, on their own, the hydro-social and the
socio-technical approaches cannot explain the claims made on the unutilized water of
the Surya project as a result of underutilization. The scalar politics which the urban
claims to that water create justifies a synthesis of the paracommons approach with the
hydro-social and socio- technical approaches.
From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, this paper forwards a new
lens of understanding and analyzing the intra-rural water dimension in rural-urban water
transfers in India, especially in areas that enjoy an abundant availability of water, but
are characterized by significant social-geographical constraints. While this paper has
dealt mainly with the experiences of farmers on the canal system in a rural area, it has
shown that we need a combined grasp of the interface of local canal technology and
water institutions at broader geographical scales to understand how intra-rural dynamics
over water could facilitate rural-urban water transfers. This needs to be considered in a
context where the utilization of water by agriculture is influenced by the social

!256

geography as well as water institutions, such as rules of water management and the role
of the Irrigation Department.
In this paper, the various theoretical frameworks that exist in political ecology
and the general literature on water were utilized to examine the interface of social
relations, technology and institutions. An empirical attention to the micro politics of
water utilization at the canal level constitutes part of that focus and highlights both the
underutilization of water and the implications of underutilization for water management
at a broader geographical scale. It is quite clear from the evidence that the dispossession
of the tribal community from both land and water lies at the centre of the politics of
resources in the horticultural belt in Dahanu. Any explanation of water diversion to
Mumbai is thus incomplete without examining the contestation of resources between
the tribal and the non-tribal communities on the canal system in this part of the Surya
project. The analysis of water wastage due to the non-implementation of rotation rules
at the level of the canal minors, the lack of incentives to farmers to optimize their water
use, the excess conveyance of water in the canal system, and the state of social relations
are some of the highlights of the empirical findings. They highlight the broader regional
implications of the uneven nature of agricultural development in the Dahanu area for
subsequent water transfers to Mumbai.
While each of the theoretical frameworks from within political ecology (the
hydro-social and socio-technical) remains useful in analyzing the empirical data
presented in this paper, these theories present strengths, but also some key limitations.
Therefore, approaches from outside political ecology are assembled together with the
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hydro-social and socio-technical frameworks. In terms of strengths, while the sociotechnical parses the working and the adaptation of canal technology in the socialgeographical context (Section 5.6) by the large Vadaval horticultural farmers, the hydrosocial approach helps us to keep the political construction of geographical scale
(Sections 5.6.4) and social consequences of the hydrological re-formatting of the entire
landscape in focus. The paper uses some key features from both these frameworks to
analyze the evidence from the experiences of farmers on the canal system.
It also becomes clearer that a treatment and analysis of empirical data on water
utilization in this context by developing a hybrid framework is necessitated by some of
the unique contextual factors at play. A significant one is the presence of underutilized
and “wasted” water. In this context, the paracommons approach is critical for dealing
with the material properties of water. The social and institutional mechanisms behind
the creation of water wastage and underutilization at the canal level and local politics
around wasted water necessitate theoretical hybridization in analysis. Key features and
characteristics of the geography of the canal systems are thus also identified as playing
a major role. Thus, the social and geographical context in which canal technology
works, the political construction of geographical scale, and the politics of underutilized
water all inform this hybrid framework. The scalar focus of the paracommons approach
has some characteristics in common with the hydro-social framework
While this paper does not claim to contribute to theory, it does emphasize the
value of studying the movement and politics of water at different scales by using
theoretical tools from both political ecology and water policy. By attempting to provide
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an explanation that is both sensitive to social and geographical context, this paper has
tried to understand how the politics of water and utilization at one geographical scale
influences claims and water transfers to other scalar levels. Through a scalar approach,
this paper also highlights the importance of more contextual studies on the social,
institutional and geographical implications of rural water use, regional water
institutions, and geography for rural-urban water transfers in India.
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6.

Conclusion

6.1

Intent and Questions
This dissertation set out to address the politics of water transfers and

appropriation in the context of the Mumbai-Thane region, India. In the process, it has
posed questions on the institutional, social, geographical and political context of the
management and governance of watersheds and water districts (including irrigation
Command Areas) that are shared between large urban centres and agricultural/rural
water users. Given the growing contestation over water between cities and agricultural
areas in India and other parts of Asia (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005), this
dissertation should be seen as an empirical and conceptual contribution to the subject of
inter-sectoral water transfers. It should also be seen as a contribution to the literature on
water politics in human geography, political ecology and environmental politics. In this
concluding chapter, I present and reflect on the dissertation's theoretical, empirical and
policy contributions, and make recommendations for future study. This chapter also
summarizes the core findings of each of the component manuscripts of my dissertation,
drawing them together to answer questions that guided my overall research project. To
repeat them here:

1) What aspects of farmers' social and economic locations (within overarching
relations of production) influence their access to water? (For instance, is access
to water influenced by size of landholdings? By proximity to canals? By a
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farmer's class- or caste-position? And how is water scarcity experienced by
farmers in Surya Command Area?).

2) What are the rules, institutions and governance structures underpinning water
transfers from rural to urban areas (and water management more broadly) in
Mumbai-Thane region? (For instance, what factors might lead to water being
[paradoxically] underutilized for agriculture in locations such as Surya
Command Area? And, how do broader structures and practices of water
governance interact with social/class divisions in such rural areas?).

6.2

Empirical Findings
This dissertation also sets out to research questions around water governance,

institutions and social relations in the Mumbai-Thane region of western India, at two
primary geographical scales: rural, and urban-regional. This section of the conclusion
summarizes the answers to those questions which I identified as a result of my field and
archival research. The latter was carried out in four locations: India; United Kingdom;
Canada; and the United States. Such archival research in various locales helped me to
situate my field and empirical data within proper historical and policy perspectives.
All three of the manuscript components of this dissertation have pointed to the
excessive centralization of decision making powers in both the Maharashtra Ministry of
Irrigation, and the District Irrigation Department, in one of the most important
economic regions of Maharashtra State. This is true not only in the context of how
water is managed at the regional level in the Mumbai-Thane region, where
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fragmentation of water governance has led the Ministry of Irrigation to make decisions
about administrative re-allocations of water. It is also true in the context of the broader
failure of governance and collective action at local levels. By focusing on three case
studies - two from dam projects, and one from a water district catering exclusively to
Greater Mumbai and adjoining towns - this dissertation also brings into sharp focus the
institutional variation that exists within Mumbai-Thane region surrounding water
appropriation and transfers.
For example, Paper One explains how excessive centralization of power and
decision making at the Irrigation Department is characterized by a lack of participation
and transparency - which has in turn created opportunities for graft among engineers.
That centralization has also created an environment in which the needs of small-scale
farmers (who depend on the rural canal network for subsistence) have been completely
neglected by Irrigation Department staff. In Paper Two, I closely analyze the political
and institutional dimensions of relations between an ever-expanding Greater Mumbai,
and the water district located outside its official boundaries (yet reserved for exclusive
use of Mumbai and other nearby towns). There the dissertation also situates the
interface of geography and institutions - as well as long term consequences of past
policy decisions to reserve the entire Tansa-Vaitarna watershed for the eventual use of
Greater Mumbai - within their proper institutional, geographical and historical
perspectives. And in Paper Three, farming communities’ experiences with the canal
technology prevalent in the Surya irrigation system are critically analyzed, along with
political claims about how water is wasted and underutilized there. Studying how intra-
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rural water conflict results from (or is exacerbated by) the pressures of geographically
distant urbanization also raises important contextual questions about the major actors
facilitating changes to the 'waterscape' of Mumbai-Thane region.
PAPER ONE focused on the governance of the canal system in Surya Project.
That chapter was brought together using qualitative data gathered from interviews with
engineers after the 2008 canal irrigation season was over. Conventional understandings
of the political-bureaucratic corruption nexus surrounding irrigation projects in India
has already been firmly represented in Indian social science scholarship by Robert
Wade’s classic papers (Wade, 1982 & 1985). While acknowledging the strengths of
Wade`s arguments, this chapter points to weaknesses in his use of the rational choice
framework to explain the behaviour of junior bureaucrats who are unwilling or
uninterested in job transfers to other locations. The chapter identifies possible reasons
for them to avoid seeking promotions or transfers, such as the potential for them to skim
off developmental subsidies in economically backward areas.
Paper One also presents findings that challenge official narratives behind the
underutilization of irrigation water - which are used to justify the transfer of water from
Surya project to the Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR). The paper presents evidence that
underutilization of irrigation water is explicitly the result of informal norms that project
engineers have cultivated and followed, in which they deliberately under-maintain the
rural canal network. The system of kickbacks that results from such poor maintenance
work responds to a logic of self-interest among engineers (first identified by Wade in
the context of Andhra Pradesh). It also reflects an institutional incentive for the

!267

Irrigation Department to earn official water revenues from urban areas (amid political
pressure not to collect water charges from the prosperous new class of commercial
Vadaval farmers who have benefitted from the irrigation system). Thus, in the context of
a poorly maintained rural canal system that does not respond to the needs of the smallscale, marginal, tribal farmers, the extent of agricultural land that is actually irrigated
(versus potentially irrigated) remained small and stagnant.
Paper One thus brings together an analysis of how social relations, institutions
and incentive structures can influence water policy at the local and regional level. It
demonstrates how the uneven development of Dahanu`s agricultural landscape
facilitates underutilization and water transfers to the Vasai-Virar sub-region and parts of
Greater Mumbai. By taking a broad view of institutions and seeking to inform a more
grounded understanding of the politics of water transfer, this paper also departs from a
more narrow economic-legalistic view of the institutional underpinnings of intersectoral transfers that some important policy studies in the Indian water literature have
taken on this subject (World Bank, 1999). My focus on the informal dimension of the
politics of water transfers and the role of the bureaucracy in that presents new
information about the social and cultural dynamics of water transfers from Thane
district`s reservoirs to Mumbai.
PAPER TWO is situated within the theoretical framework of the environmental
politics and common pool resource (CPR) literatures. It takes a slightly different route
because of its reliance on multiple sources of information: archival material; dam
project reports from the 1960s; newspaper reports; government reports on water
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utilization; interviews with planners and municipal bureaucrats; and maps from
conservation departments. This chapter uses the CPR literature and applies it to analyze
geographical, social and economic data with a focus on an action situation around water
entitlements in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district. It uses that case study to examine
associated problems of water appropriation, as well as the long term environmental and
human consequences of reserving entire watersheds for a metropolitan city based on the
prior appropriation principle. It later juxtaposes the institutional analysis with an
argument about the fragmentation of metropolitan water governance, while advocating
for the establishment of a metropolitan regional water council to manage water conflict
and specific contestations on a broader, regional scale.
Information was not forthcoming from the Maharashtra Government about rules
of allocation from T-V reservoirs, among towns, cities, irrigation Command Areas and
other villages. Thus, data for writing this section had to be compiled from primary and
secondary sources, including newspaper reports on water diversions and interviews with
local leaders, which were crucial. At the same time, archival material and a closer
reading of dam Project Reports from the 1960s proved useful in piecing together a
picture of the institutional architecture of water governance, and the historical legacy of
water planning in Tansa-Vaitarna water district since the 1940s. Interview data with
government officials was also valuable. Some individual planners in the Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) spoke clearly about the legal
rights of Greater Mumbai and the MMRDA to exploit the untapped water potential of
the Hydrometric Area. But officially, Mumbai Municipal Corporation authorities were
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reticent to speak about the status of rural communities' claims concerning water rights
and access in the T-V water district. They were equally reticent about the rights of other
towns in the MMR that lie on the water pipeline route to Mumbai. Given the resistance
to share such information, greater transparency on the part of Mumbai municipal
authorities would have helped immensely.
The fragmentation of water management policies and procedures between the
District Irrigation Department and the Mumbai Municipality also did not help matters
while investigating these issues. After my persistent petitioning of both planning
authorities and municipal officials, a brief, cryptic description of the City`s senior water
rights was finally released to me; it simply stated: 'the water in this area has been
allotted to us.’ Clearly, further research is needed on this question of water rights in
Tansa-Vaitarna water district; for geographers, an empirical route to investigating this
problem might be through the use of more archival sources, surveys, and Freedom of
Information requests.
PAPER THREE brings out the ecological salience of the urban–rural resource
relationship between large Indian metropolitan centres and areas where water sources
for smallholder farmers are located (such as Dahanu in Thane District). The experiences
of small-scale, marginal farmers - as well as interviews with commercial, Vadaval
farmers - revealed that smallholder agriculture in Thane District faces not only the brunt
of intensive water demands from large cities, but also the challenge of the emerging
class-interest of commercial farmers. This chapter shows how both land and water have
acquired a new economic and cultural significance for the poor in the context of this
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dual threat of dispossession. An enclosure-like situation in which smallholder farmers
have lost access to land and water is another finding that sums up the experience of
tribal small and marginal farmers. Institutional inertia on the part of the bureaucracy,
partly a result of technological choices that accompanied the construction of large dams
and canal systems in this region, hasn’t helped. Manifestations of this institutional
inertia include the declaration of "underutilized irrigation potential" without adequate
scrutiny of the functioning of the canal system at various levels; brazen neglect of the
needs of smallholder farming; and a callous waste of water by the bureaucracy and large
farmers. The paper presents new findings on the transformation of social relations in
agriculture in Dahanu and how these get mapped onto institutional practices and
ultimately water policies in the Surya Command Area and at the regional level.
Given my focus on how water institutions impact rural livelihoods in Dahanu,
this chapter was not able to investigate the influence of either seasonal migration or
economic diversification upon small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers in the MumbaiThane belt who are now slowly moving away from irrigated agriculture, as they do not
find it sufficiently remunerative. The dominance of the non-farm sector has been
demonstrated in other empirical work on Thane District (Ambasta, 1998; Mehta, 1999),
as has been the finding that small and marginal farmers also remain tied to the land.
Some of these issues around diversification remained uninvestigated as they were
beyond the scope and organization of my planned field research on water, institutions
and social relations, but they warrant further academic and policy attention.
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Papers one and two bring out the central importance of developing a more
transparent and autonomous water governance apparatus that monitors water use by
different sectors. The findings from both these papers emerged only after careful
conceptual analysis of the water problem in two locations drawing primarily on the
rational choice and institutional frameworks. Paper three uses the political ecological
framework explicitly, but also relies on institutional theory to analyze the problem of
water underutilization in the Surya Project. All three frameworks are detailed in the
following section, which outlines this dissertation’s theoretical underpinnings and
conceptual contributions.

6.3

Theoretical Framework: Merging Political Ecology and
Institutionalism
This dissertation furthers understanding of the social and political processes that

underlie water transfers and contestation between rural and urban areas. While there is a
significant policy literature on this subject in the Indian and international context
(World Bank, 1999; Molle and Berkoff, 2006), case studies that integrate the
institutional dimensions of water transfers with the social, cultural and geographical
context of irrigated agriculture are made are quite rare. Thus, in the three papers
presented, I have sought to focus on the multi-scalar politics and geographies of water
transfers, and how those interface with the formal and informal institutional rules and
practices at the village level in the SMIP, the water districts and the hydrometric
boundary of the Mumbai-Thane region.
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Drawing on a wide literature about water and irrigation in political ecology, this
dissertation asserts that claimed scarcity of water is a limiting perspective for analyzing
water problems. Physical availability is only one dimension of water insecurity, as
issues around access to water also hinge around local socio-geographical contexts and
land and water institutions. Therefore, besides focusing on the dynamics of water
allocation between cities and rural areas, this dissertation also investigates how water is
managed and distributed for agricultural irrigation between different social groups, by
actors such as the local water bureaucracy and the state Irrigation Department. It has
further examined the implications of intra-rural management for water policy and
politics in the entire Mumbai-Thane region (Paper three). The politics and political
economy of local water management and regional water institutions also find a presence
in all three case studies.
To understand the experiences of farmers and rural communities in water
districts, the policies of the local water bureaucracy and the evolution of policy
frameworks of the State of Maharashtra, this dissertation brings together theories from
political ecology and the common pool resource literatures. By utilizing the CPR
literature to examine the rules that inform distribution and allocation of water, the
dissertation tries to compensate for the policy gap in the political ecology literature
(Walker, 2005). It does so by focusing on the evolutionary and institutional aspects of
regional water governance. However, at the same time, it does not rely on merely
analyzing the working of rules and rights in water transfers, but places these in the
context of social relations, the agro-ecology of the water districts and the fast
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transforming geography of water use in the Mumbai-Thane region. A disconnect
between the political ecology and common pool resource literatures on water prevails
primarily due to the exclusive reliance on rules and governance in the latter and a
dependence on examining social relations and power in the former. By focusing on how
social relations, geography and governance interact and are transformed after the
execution of dams and modern canal systems, this dissertation draws attention to links
between all three themes. The Indian context - with the presence of a populist
democracy; a large water management bureaucracy; poor rural populations; social
ferment; rapid urbanization; and a fast changing ecological landscape - necessitates
such a pragmatic blending of theoretical frameworks. The politics of the regional water
commons is thus situated in the overall context of the constant re-scaling of water
governance, and the production of space and nature in the Mumbai-Thane region
(Smith, 1984; Swyngedouw, 2004).
The presence of a large and growing metropolitan city like Mumbai places an
extraordinary ecological footprint on its rural hinterland. At the same time, the mapping
of water resource availability and the rules that govern re-allocation of water from rural
to urban use necessitate a closer analysis of local water practices and how scarcity of
water on the canal systems in this context are experienced by rural communities. A mere
focus on urban versus rural to explain water diversions would have been insufficient as
agriculture is the dominant user of water in the Surya sub-basin. This political
ecological dimension of the analysis is also informed by literature on the political
economy of development and agrarian change in India. The findings presented in Paper
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three emphasize the social and economic impact of the wasteful water practices of the
rich horticultural Vadaval caste farmers on the small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers,
whose villages are located on the middle and tail reaches of the canal system. The
transformation of social relations in the aftermath of canal irrigation is thus identified as
one of the major factors in the underutilization of irrigation water in the Surya Project.
Land grabbing, and the concomitant transformation of caste and class relations
in the rural areas (and its effects) in the aftermath of canal irrigation become equally
important in explaining practices and access to water. In this context, the paradoxes of
water wastage and underutilization are confronted and analyzed in the context of a
productive irrigation system by developing a merger of the socio-technical, hydro-social
and the paracommons frameworks. The choice of the paracommons framework builds
on and adds to the present theoretical tools that have been deployed to research canal
networks in India within the political ecology literature (Mollinga, 2013; Lankford,
2013). Furthermore, by using the paracommons framework to analyze the consequences
of waste and efficiency on the canal system in the villages, the limits of the political
economy and institutionalist frameworks for explaining underutilization of water in this
context are highlighted and explained.
While Papers one and two have relied on methods and theory from the rational
choice and CPR literatures respectively, both papers develop a more hybrid theoretical
framework that draws from rational choice and human geography. Thus, a pure
dependence on rational choice is eschewed in Paper one, while retaining some of its
features to explain corrupt practices in the Irrigation Department (such as a lack of
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bureaucratic turnover amongst some sections of the staff, as well as the rent seeking
activities of engineers). In this same paper, keeping with a critical geographical focus,
attention is also paid to the local context, the state of social relations and other features
of the bureaucratic system that manage water, thus merging attention to the politics of
place and space with an equal emphasis on why corrupt practices flourish on the canal
system. In Paper two, the rational choice framework typically applied in CPR theory to
development problems (Forsyth and Johnson, 2014) gives way to a more evolutionary
framework. A historical evolution of rules in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district provide a
useful context and background to the failure of local collective action in solving the
water problem. Given cultural and legal variations in the nature of water institutions and
geographical context in Thane district, this dissertation thus tries to develop an
institutional-geographical framework for researching the problems of water distribution
and management in Mumbai-Thane region.
Due to the emphasis in political ecology on developing a critical focus upon
neo-liberal policies in the water sector, it is often forgotten that the water sector is still a
state monopoly in countries like India. And that corrupt practices and lack of access to
water can flourish under the aegis of the public sector too. This dissertation is thus
informed by Karen Bakker`s advocacy within human geography of applying an ethical
lens on urban and regional water governance in the developing world (Bakker, 2010). A
common thread between all three papers is an ethical perspective that draws our
attention to the relationships that exist between geographical place, social relations and
water institutions.
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The three papers in the dissertation share a focus on the actual experiences of
communities with water scarcity in the water districts outside Mumbai. They also
jointly contribute to developing an institutional and spatial understanding of the
geographical relationship of a significant and growing metropolitan city-region like
Mumbai to a socio-economically poor, agricultural hinterland in Thane district.

6.4

Policy Implications
Through its focus on developing a combined institutional and political-

ecological understanding of water transfers, this dissertation also seeks to contribute to
the policy literature on water in the Mumbai-Thane region and in the State of
Maharashtra. All three papers contribute to the contemporary debate around water
policy in the Konkan region and in the State of Maharashtra as a whole. The academic
nature of the inquiry in this dissertation does not preclude such a focus on policy. The
existing research literature on water in the city of Greater Mumbai and the surrounding
region, including in human geography, does not engage with the policy dimensions of
the problem (see Gandy, 2008). Alternatively, those who have done field research in
Greater Mumbai on urban water problems have not paid sufficient attention to water
policy and have neglected crucial legal-institutional aspects of the urban and regional
dimensions of the water question (Anand, 2011). A synthesis of fieldwork, historical
research and analysis of State Government policy around rural-urban water transfers has
allowed me to throw light on the policy dimensions of the water question in the
Mumbai-Thane region. It has also helped me to avoid the pitfalls that might have
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resulted from an exclusive reliance on a political-ecological analysis of the regional
water question.
The chief policy contribution of this dissertation lies in the analysis of the legalinstitutional framework of water transfers, and the conflict between urban and rural
water entitlements, as presented in Paper Two. Greater Mumbai`s water rights in the
MMR are critically scrutinized, and this is the first time that the role of prior
appropriation has been highlighted in the water literature on Mumbai and urban India.
The legal underpinnings of Greater Mumbai’s claims to the water were unearthed by an
analysis of water by-laws and legal frameworks at various scales (urban, rural, and
regional), as well as analysis of historical material that provided details about the 1950s
decision to reserve an entire watershed for the purposes of the city (Modak, 1948). The
policy implications of such institutional rules for sustainability and environmental
justice are then made evident through the case study. This contribution also adds to the
already voluminous case study literature on water law in the Indian context. It also fills
a major gap in the urban water research on Mumbai and contrasts with the mainly
cultural and ethnographic orientation in the literature (Gandy, 2008; Anand, 2011).
A further policy contribution is made in Paper Three, where causes behind the
underutilization of water for irrigation are researched at the level of the canal minors.
There, the disinterest of engineers in maintaining the canal system points to the political
dynamics of water contestation, and to their own complicity with rich farmers in
constructing an official discourse of underutilization. The water rights of the city and
the countryside are further outlined and highlighted in the paper, even as the regional
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water governance structures that inform rural-urban water transfers are examined
through an analysis of government and planning reports, as well as of High Court
affidavits contesting water transfers. The administrative nature of water transfers meant
that close attention was paid to the Irrigation Department as a main actor in the water
politics of the region. Researchers have been unwilling to bring state actors in India
who manage water under critical scrutiny. However, the wide coverage by local media
in Thane district of corrupt practices within the Irrigation Department, and the various
encounters this researcher had with the near breakdown of relations between senior
level engineers and their junior counterparts, point to a serious dysfunction in the water
bureaucracy in the region and the State of Maharashtra.
In Paper One, the sensitive nature of my research on water governance precludes
me from identifying the main political actors in the corruption nexus, but it is clear that
closer attention should be paid to the welfare of poor agricultural communities in the
tribal areas especially in the context of a modern irrigation project that has been
implemented to further their economic well-being. If more attention were paid to
developing better governance frameworks that ensure the accountability of public
officials, and furthermore, if more efficiency in water use were to be ensured at the rural
and urban levels, an outcome like the dispossession of the tribal community of its
access to water is not necessarily inevitable.
This research has demonstrated and also validated a long tradition in the
political ecology literature which argues that water scarcity and shortages are socially
and politically produced, and that solutions lie in social, political and ethical domains,
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rather than the purely technological. The findings of this dissertation tell us that the
water governance picture in the Mumbai-Thane region can be transformed only by a
fundamental reform of water practices, local laws and policies inherited from the past.
The present exclusive reliance on increasing water supply through new dam projects
will not serve the needs of the varied sectoral demands within this region, especially in
the context of very fast paced spatial transformation. Regulating water in a manner that
balances sectoral (urban, industrial, agricultural, rural) interests is not impossible, if
policy makers realize that successful collective action around water would necessitate
the creation of water districts and decentralizing water management to democratically
elected water district councils. An example of such co-operation around joint rural and
urban water provision already exists in a formal governance setup within the MMR. For
instance, a good example of such co-operation is the creation of the Shahad Temghar
Water Authority by cities of the MMR (such as Thane, Mira-Bhayandar and Bhiwandi),
who have partnered with villages in Thane District to set up their own water services
system (Sivaramakrishnan, 2014, p. 68; Rao, 2015, p. 166).
Further experiments to create such independent water authorities encompassing
urban and rural water users should be extended outside the boundaries of the MMR in
Thane District. This is vital given that rural populations living outside the metropolitan
boundaries of Mumbai (but inside the hydrometric area) do not have adequate legal
leverage to have their basic water entitlements met under existing local water laws.
Consequently, a reform of such laws (i.e. the Maharashtra Irrigation Act of 1976, and
the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act of 1988) also acquires significance. The latter,
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while exclusively protecting Greater Mumbai`s water demand and senior water
appropriation rights, is a great obstacle to potential water governance reform at the
regional level. The riparian underpinnings of the Maharashtra Irrigation Act
(Government of Maharashtra, 1976) serve to exclude landless populations from access
to water. Legal reform thus has to go hand in hand with reform of water policy at the
regional level in Mumbai-Thane region.

6.5

Recommendations for Future Research
This dissertation raises a number of questions that warrant further research. The

difficulty of researching water governance in India has been highlighted in other places
of this chapter and in other parts of the dissertation. The non-transparent nature of how
the Irrigation Department functions; the lack of communication between various
Government entities that manage water; and the absence of an umbrella organization
with regional water data on Mumbai were particularly challenging. This research
project helped me to better understand such informational gaps and also prepared me to
continue with an urban component of this research in the near future. Secondly, this
research highlights the theoretical limitations of political ecology as a framework for
examining water problems. The absence of attention to policy within South Asian
political ecology led me towards institutionalism in order to examine regional water
governance in the Mumbai-Thane region. I plan to engage more closely with the broad
corpus of work in institutionalism and the common pool resource literatures to research
the regional water question in the Mumbai-Thane region.
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This dissertation could not examine the political-economic structures that
underlie uneven agricultural development in the Dahanu area. However, in the near
future I will be analyzing census data from the past two decades in order to examine
migration patterns of the tribal community related to water scarcity, as well as the
creation of exclusive water districts for Mumbai. Furthermore, I was not yet able to
utilize archival sources of Maharashtra State Government; Mumbai Municipal
Corporation; or the World Bank, regarding the development of the water supply system
for Greater Mumbai and other towns in the MMR. Thus, I plan to conduct the following
thematic research in future:
•

Develop an understanding of the historical context of urban water supply and
hydroelectric dam projects outside Mumbai, from 1892 to 1990;

•

Investigate and classify various litigation concerning water and land in the
Tansa-Vaitarna water district and the Surya Command Area, in order to better
understand legal- institutional frameworks;

•

Analyze the role of the World Bank in funding and developing multipurpose
dam systems, canal systems, and long distance aqueducts (from the 1960s
through the 1980s), that extend into northern Thane District from the City of
Mumbai;

•

Comparatively study water governance practices of other large Indian
metropolitan regions, such as Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore and
Hyderabad against those of Mumbai.
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6.6

Conclusion
Through closer empirical work on institutions and the rules that inform water

policy, as well as further field research on users' experiences with water scarcity on the
canal system in the water districts, this dissertation renders a critical but nuanced picture
of the nature and impact of water transfers upon rural communities within the MumbaiThane region. Using an interdisciplinary analysis of the experiences of such small-scale,
marginal, tribal farmers, this dissertation also narrates a story about the continued
dispossession of India`s tribal communities from their access to resources. It is quite
clear that tribal farmers on the canal system in Dahanu lose out in their access to water
due to the brazen nature of the nexus between engineers and upper-caste, Vadaval
commercial farmers. While this dissertation originally set out to investigate the role of
formal water institutions, my findings also highlight the importance of both formal
governance mechanisms and informal politics that revolve around such water transfers.
Economic growth and development mean higher water demand and, consequently, more
dam building in areas such as the Mumbai-Thane region (Joy et al., 2008). Thus,
growing water demands of both the urban and rural sectors of the Indian economy mean
that challenges of governance in the water sector will remain important in future.
A singular focus on class and social differentiation in this dissertation could not
by itself have revealed the working of the internal structures and institutions that play a
role in the underutilization of water in the Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project. That is
also true of my analysis of the Tansa-Vaitarna water district, where prevailing
institutions are also identified as important factors enabling Greater Mumbai to
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exclusively access the watershed at the expense of rural communities. With an equal
emphasis on the functioning of formal and informal institutions and other place-related
factors such as caste and class, this dissertation thus makes an important
interdisciplinary contribution to understanding the causes behind underutilization of
water from Surya Project. The theoretical literature within institutional economics
(Hodgson, 2006), as well as empirical and theoretical research within human geography
and development studies, have identified caste and its metamorphoses as a modern,
social and economic institution (Harriss White, 2003; Chari, 2004; Gidwani, 2000 &
2008). The rise of the Vadaval caste-cluster, along with social change on the canal
system in the agricultural belt of Dahanu and northern fringes of Mumbai Metropolitan
Region, also confirm empirical research that points to the role of rising caste groups as
vanguards of capital accumulation in urban and rural India. Thus, water conflict
between small-scale farmers of the tribal community, Vadaval commercial farmers, and
urban Mumbai is situated in its proper institutional and social-geographical context.
The empirical findings of this dissertation also present a qualification on the
urban political ecology literature, which tends to rely on a more structural critique of the
state, of markets and of the modern water technology that enable cities to expand their
water frontiers. The commodification of water resulting from urbanization and
commercial agriculture is also an implicit part of the transformation of the water
landscape of Mumbai-Thane region. Mumbai’s growing access to water from Thane
District is not merely predicated on its political power and economic clout. It is also
based on historic decisions taken in the 1950s that entailed reserving entire water
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districts for the eventual use of Mumbai, as well as the creation of the Mumbai
Hydrometric Area in the early 1970s. Moreover, the decision to implement canal
technology in Thane District in the 1970s, along with the social, ecological and
economic consequences of those technological choices, constitute an important part of
the empirical puzzle about water management in this region.
This focus of this dissertation on the geographical relationship of fast growing
metro Mumbai and MMR to its rural hinterland in Thane District has hopefully
demonstrated the value of more such studies on urban-regional water governance and
urban-rural contestation over water, in the context of rapidly urbanizing regions of India
and other parts of Asia. As contestation around water resources emerge with
simultaneous ecological and political challenges in a number of urban-regional
locations around the world, this dissertation makes a contribution to the theory and
empirics of that particular problem. By applying a historical and institutional lens to the
resource dilemmas faced by thousands of agriculturists in the Mumbai-Thane region,
and placing some of the analysis in a framework that embraces a kind of theoretical and
methodological pluralism, I have also affirmed my faith in the theoretical and
methodological pragmatism that Elinor Ostrom and other institutional scholars
have advocated in their research. I believe that by drawing from disparate streams of
analysis - in disciplines such as environmental politics and political ecology - an
interdisciplinary methodology in scholarly and applied research will continue to give us
new answers regarding questions about the commons, such as we have just examined in
the Mumbai-Thane context.

!285

References
Ambasta, A. (1998). Capitalist Restructuring and Formation of Adivasi Proletarians:
Agrarian transition in Thane District, Western India, c.1820-1990.
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Institute of Social Studies, The Hague,
Netherlands.
Anand, N. (2011). Pressure: The politechnics of water supply in Mumbai. Cultural
Anthropology. 26 (4), 542–564.
Bakker, K. (2010). Privatizing Water: Governance failure and the world`s urban water
crisis.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Chari, S. (2004). Fraternal Capital: Peasant workers, self-made men and globalization
in provincial India. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Forsyth, T. & Johnson, C. (2014). Elinor Ostrom's Legacy: Governing the commons and
the rational choice controversy. Development and Change, 45 (5)1093–1110.
Gandy M. (2008). Landscapes of disaster: water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in
Mumbai. Environment and Planning A., 40 (5), 108 – 130.
Gidwani, V. (2000). Labored Landscapes: Agroecological change in central Gujarat. In
A. Agrawal & K. Sivaramakrishnan (Eds.). Agrarian Environments: Resources,
representations and rules in India. Durham: Duke University Press.
Gidwani, V. (2008). Capital Interrupted – Agrarian development and politics of work in
India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Government of Maharashtra (1976). The Maharashtra Irrigation Act, 1976. Law and
Judiciary Department. Bombay: Printed at the Government Central Press.
Retrieved June 2, 2013 from http://www.ielric.org/content/e7605.pdf
Harris-White, B. (2003). India Working: Essays on society and economy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Hodgson, G.M. (2006). What Are Institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40 (1), 125. Retrieved January 12, 2014 from http://www.geoffrey- hodgson.info/user/
bin/whatareinstitutions.pdf
Joy, K.J., Biksham, G., Paranjpe, S., Gaud, V., & Vispute, S. (2008). Introduction: A
million revolts in the making: Understanding water conflicts in India. In K.J Joy

!286

et al. (Eds.), Water Conflicts in India: A Million Revolts in the Making. London:
Routledge.
Lankford, B. (2013). Resource Efficiency Complexity and the Commons: The
Paracommons and Paradoxes of Natural Resource Losses, Wastes, and
Wastages. London: Routledge.
Meinzen-Dick, R. & Pradhan, U. (2005). Recognizing Multiple Water Uses in
Intersectoral Water Transfers in Ganesh Shivakoti. In D. Vermillion, W. FungLam, E. Ostrom, U. Pradhan, & R. Yoder (Eds.), Asian Irrigation in Transition:
Responding to challenges. New Delhi: Thousand Oaks/California: SAGE
Publications.
Mehta, M. (1999). Suppressed Subjects? Gender dynamics in the context of agrarian
change and seasonal labour: Migration in Dahanu Taluka, Maharsahtra.
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Institute of Social Studies, The Hague,
Netherlands.
Modak, N. (April 1948). Final Report on Augmentation of Bombay City's Water
Supply: Vaitarna-cum-Tansa scheme, Part I & II. Bombay: Municipal Printing
Press.
Molle, F. & Berkoff, J. (2006). Cities versus Agriculture: Revisiting intersectoral water
transfers, potential gains and conflicts. Comprehensive Assessment Research
Report 10. Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Mollinga, P.P. (2013). Canal Irrigation and the Hywdrosocial Cycle: The
Morphogenesis of Contested Water Control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank
Canal, South India. Geoforum, 57 (November), 192-204.
Rao, N. (2015). Reshaping City Governance. London: Routledge.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2014). Governance of Megacities: Fractured thinking,
fragmented setup. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Neil (1984). Uneven Development: Nature, capital and the production of space.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Social Power and the Urbanization of Water-Flows of Power.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Wade, R. (1982). The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal
irrigation in South India. Journal of Development Studies, 18 (3), 287-328.

!287

Wade, R. (1985). The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian state is not better at
development. World Development, 13 (4), 467-497.
Walker, P.A. (2006). Political Ecology: Where is the policy? Progress in Human
Geography, 30 (3), 382-395.
World Bank (1999). Intersectoral Water Allocation and Management: India Water
Resources Management. South Asia Rural Development Series. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.

!288

Appendices
Questionnaire

CAD Project Name ________________
Command
Project Command (1); Outside Command (2)
Canal System –
Sub Minor 2/DM 1(1); Sub minor 2/ DM 2(2)

Distributory/Minor Canal Reaches Upper (1); Middle (2); Tail (3)
Respondent Marginal
Category
Code

Small

(up to 1Ha)
(1)

(1-2)
(2)

Medium

Large

(2-4)
(3)

(above 4)
(4)

1. IDENTIFICATION
1.1 Distt.
1.2 Block

______________
______________

1.3 Village ______________

1.4 Head of Household name

____________

1.5 Caste SC/ST/BC/UP

____________
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2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
2.0 Socio-economic
Characteristics

Illiterate

Literate

Primary

Secondary
& above

2.1 Male Adult (Nos)
Between(14-18)
Above 18
2.2 Female Adult (Nos)
Between (14-18)
Above 18
2.3 Children (below 14
yrs Nos)
Male
Female

2.4 Main occupation of
Adults of household
1. Mainly Cultivation
2. Farm. Wage laborer
a)Farm servant
b)Non-Farm wage laborer
3. Type of Job
a)Urban salaried services
b)Rural salaried services
4. Self Employed/Artisan
5. Non-worker
Total

No. of Adults
Male

Female

Total
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Reason of being non-worker: e.g. age, disability, disease, etc

Type of Job
a) Urban salaried services: ______________________
b) Rural salaried services :________________________

2.5 Family
Sr. No

Male
Female

Employment during the year 2007-2008
No. of months worked
Own farm
Outside
Farm

Unemployed

Non
farm

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

3. LAND INVENTORY
3.1 Owned Total ___________ (a+b)
(a) Cultivated
___________
(b) Uncultivated (Varkas) __________
3.2 Leased in (+) ___________
3.3Leased out (-) ____________
Details of lease terms; duration, cost, output share, labour tying inter linkages

3.4 Net area cultivated ___________
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3.5 Net area irrigated ___________ (a+b+c)
(a)By Canal ______ha
(b)Well/tube well _______ha
(c) Nalla
(d) Others ________ha

3.6 Annual cost incurred towards water charges last year
3.7 Area unirrigated (ha) _____________
3.8 Reasons for non irrigation _________
(a)Unleveled land or elevated
(b) Absence of field channels/ Choked outlets
(c)Scarcity of water
(d) Cattle problem
(e) other reason specify

4. ON FARM DEVELOPMENT WORKS

4.1 Whether field channels exist for fields
Yes (1);
No (2)

4.2 Whether these channels are well maintained
Yes (1);
No (2)

4.3 Who maintains these channels?
Govt (1); Irrigation (2); Panchayat (3); Farmers (4)

4.4 Do you get water in time?
Yes (1);
No (2)
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4.7 Whether you are told about the availability of irrigation
Water in advance
Yes (1);
No(2)

4.8 How do you get advance information of canal water?
Availability
Notice board (1); Slips (2); Verbal (3); Newspaper (4)

4.9 Reasons for dissatisfaction with CAD/ Surya project works/any suggestion for
correction in present activities ________________________________________
4.10

Farmers assessment about status of different CAD/ Surya project activities

Activities

1.Construction of channels
2. Maintenance of channels
3. Fields drains
4.Land leveling
5.Warabandi
6.Lining of channels
7.Land consolidation
8.other Specific

Whether implemented
on your farm
Yes/No

Which of the
following
activities you
consider useful
(tick all that
apply)

Activities you still
require (tick all
that apply)

!293

5. CROPS GROWN/ CROP PRODUCTION
Season/Crop
variety NYV
or Local

Irrigated
Area in
ha

Main
qtl

Total quantity of
produce sold (qty)

Rainfed
By
product
qtl

Kharif

Rabi

Summer

Convert all the figures in qtls & acres
Main produce -- rice, vegetables
By product -- grass etc

Area in
ha

Main
qtl

By
product
qtl

Main
product

By
product
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6. CROP PRODUCTION INPUTS AND COST OF CULTIVATION
PER ACRE

Season &
crop

Typ
Fertilizers in
e
kg
Cost Irrig
Human
Bullock
Thres
atio
IR* Seed
Tractor
Org
of
Labor
pair
her
n
or
Kg
hrs
Fer Kg
pestidays*
days
hrs
char
1
2
3
4
5
UI
cides
ges
R*

Kharif

Rabi

Summer

*All the information to be converted into per hectare basis.
*labor required for all the agricultural operation of the crop, such as land preparation sowing,
manure/fertilizer application, inter culture, harvesting, threshing will be taken into account
including family, hired and contract labor. Use open-ended questions in interview guide
* IR – Irrigated UIR—Unirrigated
* Fertilizer –Give quantities of fertilizer applied in kg. urea in column 1, Dap in column 2,
Murate of potash in column 3, Ammonium sulphate in Column 4 Super Phosphate in column 5.
*Type of seed: HYV or local
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7.1 DURABLE HOUSEHOLD ASSETS
Name

Number

Present value (Rs.)

Area

Value

(a) Bicycle
(b) Motor cycle
(c) Radio/Tape/VCR
(d) Watch/Clock
(e)Sewing Machines
(f) Others specify
Sub Total

7.2 TYPE OF HOUSE
Type of house
Kuccha
Pucca
Mixed
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7.3 AGRICULTURAL ASSESTS
Sr. No

Name of assets

No.

Value
(Rs)

Sr.
No

Name of assets

1

Cows

9

Tractor

2

Buffalo

10

Seed drill

3

He-Buffalo

11

Thresher

4

Goats

12

Sprayer/Duster

5

Sheep

13

Chaff cutter

6

Pig

14

Diesel pump/
pump set

7

Poultry

15

Electric pump

8

Others specify

16

Bullocks

17

Improved
bullocks drawn
implement

No.

Value(Rs)
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8. CREDIT/LOAN TAKEN
8.1 Loan outstanding at the beginning of this year (in January 2007) Rs.__________
8.2 Loan taken during 2007-08

Purpose for which taken

Amount
Borrowed
Rs

Source of
loan.
Whether
employer/
money
lender/bank

Rate of
Interest

1. Agriculture
(a) Crop loan/input
(b) Purchase of Machine/Tractor
(c) Capital improvements (construction of
well, diesel motor, PVC pipe, land leveling)
(d)Livestock purchase
2.Consumption Loan
(a) Marriage
(b) Religious functions
Total
What if we receive water for 12 months will u still go out to work? ______________________
What will u produce through the year? __________________________________________
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Interview Guide:
Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews
The Location of Study: Charoti village, Dahanu Block, Thane District,
Maharashtra
Questions for this village are as follows:
1. How much land do you own (if any)? Does your land lie within the revenue
boundaries of Charoti village? Did you inherit, purchase, or acquire the land by other
means? How much of this land do you cultivate yourself? How much land do you rent
out? To whom do you rent it and on what basis? Do you rent in any land in addition to
the land you own? From whom and on what basis?
If you are not a landowner, do you rent land? How much land do you rent? Does this
land lie within the revenue boundaries of Charoti village? From whom do you rent the
land and on what basis? Are the owners resident in the village?
2. What is the land distribution in the village like? Is there is a preponderance of small
and marginal farmers (1-2 hectares? Or does the village have several farmers with
medium and large land holdings (five hectares and more)?
3. Is your main occupation agriculture? What crops do you cultivate? Does your
production from agriculture meet the immediate needs of your family? Do you sell any
agricultural produce? Where? Is agriculture carried out on your farm in both the
monsoon and the Konkan hangam (post monsoon) season?
4. How do you meet your needs for agricultural inputs e.g. credit, fertilizers, pesticides
and water?
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5. Do you employ labour to help in your farm activities? Do you employ labour during
the peak agricultural season (July-November)? How many labourers? Do you employ
labour at other times of the year? What are the main areas from where the labour
utilized on your farm is drawn?
6. Do you or members of your family ever work as agricultural labourers on other
people’s fields in this village? Do you or other members of your household have to
engage in non-farm work to take care of the needs of the family or enhance household
income? Is the non-farm work within this village or outside the area?
7. If you or members of your household migrate for work, do you look for work in
coastal Dahanu or in Mumbai city? How many months in a year do you (or they) spend
outside your village, either working or looking for work? What are the kinds of labour
contract in these areas? Is the work predominantly in agriculture or is it non-farm work?
Do you (or they) get paid daily? What are the work conditions like?
8. How many (or what proportion) of the villagers from Charoti work in Vangaon or
other agricultural areas in the coastal belt? How many work in Mumbai (or other urban
areas)?
9. What are your impressions of the role of water in your daily life? What importance
does it have in the agricultural practices you follow?
10. Is there any access to groundwater in this village (e.g.tubewell) irrigation in this
village?
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11. How do you perceive the Surya dam project? Has it brought any changes to the
well-being of farmers in your village? Has it brought any improvement to your own
farming situation? If it has, in what ways? If it has not, then why not?
12. What do you have to say about the functioning of the Mahalakshmi irrigation water
society in the village? Have you been involved in the society, and in what capacity?
13. What are your views on the maintenance of the canal system by dam/project
authorities? Are the canals maintained well and is the delivery of water on schedule?
14. How do you cope with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do you see the
larger farmers in the village coping with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do
the small and marginal farmers cope, especially those without any access to irrigation
water at all?
15. What are your opinions about water from the Surya project being distributed to
Mumbai city and non-tribal areas in Dahanu and Palghar (such as Vangaon and
Saphale)? Are you aware of this happening already? If it were to happen, what would be
your reaction?
16. Are land transactions in the village and other parts of the Surya command area
increasing? Do you have any concerns about this? How are these land transactions
affecting your overall welfare and the well being of the tribal community in the village?
17. What have the political representatives of the tribal community done if anything to
ensure better utilization of water from the Surya project? What have they done? Has any
other organization been active in trying to improve access to irrigation water in the
village?
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18. To whom does the water of the Surya project belong in your opinion? The city of
Mumbai, farmers from western Dahanu or the tribal farmers from the interior?
Location of study: Vangaon Dahanu taluka, Thane district
1. How much land do you own (if any)? Does your land lie within the revenue
boundaries of Vangaon? Did you inherit, purchase, or acquire the land by other means?
How much of this land do you cultivate yourself? How much land do you rent out? To
whom do you rent it and on what basis? Do you rent in any land in addition to the land
you own? From whom and on what basis?
If you are not a landowner, do you rent land? How much land do you rent? Does this
land lie within the revenue boundaries of Vangaon village? From whom do you rent the
land and on what basis? Are the owners resident in the village?
2. What is the land distribution in the village like? Is there is a preponderance of small
and marginal farmers (1-2 hectares), or does the village have several farmers with
medium and large land holdings (five hectares and more)?
3. Is your main occupation agriculture? What crops do you cultivate? Does your
production from agriculture meet the immediate needs of your family? Do you sell any
agricultural produce? Where? Is agriculture carried out on your farm in both the
monsoon and the Konkan hangam (post monsoon) season?
4. How do you meet your needs for agricultural inputs e.g. credit, fertilizers, pesticides
and water?
5. Do you employ labour to help in your farm activities? Do you employ labour during
the peak agricultural season (July-November?) How many labourers? Do you employ
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labour at other times of the year? What are the main areas from where the labour
utilized on your farm is drawn?
6. Do you or members of your family ever work as agricultural labourers on other
people’s fields in this village? Do you or other members of your household have to
engage in non-farm work to take care of the needs of the family or enhance household
income? Is the non-farm work within this village or outside the area?
7. If you or members of your household migrate for work, do you look for work in
coastal Dahanu or in Mumbai city? How many months in a year do you (or they spend
outside your village, either working or looking for work)? What are the kinds of labour
contract in these areas? Is the work predominantly in agriculture or is it non-farm work?
Do you(or they) get paid daily? What are the work conditions like?
8. How many (or what proportion) of the villagers from Vangaon work outside the
village in other agricultural areas in the coastal belt? How many work in Mumbai (or
other urban areas)?
9. Do you have any business contacts in urban areas, especially with respect to
marketing of produce in Mumbai and Gujarat states? Does the location of the village on
the railway line benefit your farm?
10. What are your impressions of the role of water in your daily life? What importance
does it have in the agricultural practices you follow?
11. Do you have access to irrigation water? From what source? How do you cope with
the unavailability of irrigation water? How do you see the larger farmers in the village
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coping with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do the small and marginal
farmers cope, especially those without any access to irrigation water at all?
12. What percentage of the village’s farmers access groundwater for irrigation? What
are the other sources of irrigation? (E.g. small projects such as Minor tanks which are
maintained by the Zilla parishad District Council of Thane)?
13. How was the groundwater situation ten years back? Has there been serious depletion
of aquifers? Has there been any salinization or any other decline in the quality of the
groundwater? Has the Surya irrigation project improved the ground water levels on your
farm or in other parts of the village?
14. What is your opinion on the contention of the Surya command project authorities
that farmers in Vangaon village should pay water charges for the improved groundwater
levels, as some aquifers in the village have been recharged by the canals which bypass
the village?
15. Should the canal system be extended to Vangaon and western parts of Dahanu?
Would you like to have the water from the Surya dam for your farm? If yes, why? If
not, why not? Would the benefits of irrigation lower the land ceiling in the area and lead
to redistribution of land? What would be the consequences?
16. What are your opinions about water from the Surya project being distributed to
Mumbai city? Are you aware of this happening already? If it were to happen, what
would be your reaction?
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17. Are land transactions in this village increasing? Do you have any concerns about
this? How are these land transactions affecting your family’s welfare and the well being
of the village overall?
18. Have the political representatives of Vangaon done anything to gain access to water
from the Surya project? What have they done? Has any other organization been active
in trying to access Surya water from Vangaon?
19. To whom does the Surya water belong in your opinion? The city of Mumbai,
farmers from western Dahanu, or the tribal farmers from the interior?
20. Is the grass trade still active in the area (last reported in 1984 and 1998)? How
important is that to Vangaon’s economy?

Semi-structured Interviews with the Chief Engineers and Section Engineers.
1. What area of land was the Surya project designed to irrigate? Was there an over
projection in the initial area of agricultural land to be irrigated by the Surya project? If
so, why was this the case?
2. How are farmers in the tribal beneficiary villages such as Charoti benefiting from the
project? What are visible indicators of improvement in welfare in these communities?
3. Is there underutilization of water from the Surya project? Does the fragmented nature
of land holdings in the Surya command area affect the viability of tribal farms and their
ability to use canal water? What other factors affect the ability of tribal farmers to
utilize water from he project?
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4. Why is the Mahalakshmi water society in Charoti not functioning? What steps have
the Irrigation Department taken to improve the functioning of such farmer’s
organizations/committees to ensure better utilization of the water?
5. Does Vangaon come in the command area of the Surya projct? If yes, what are the
steps the Irrigation Department is taking to make the farmers of Vangoan pay irrigation
charges for the water? If no, does Vangoan benefit in other ways from the project?
6. Under what rationale (legal and commercial) has the Surya project been supplying
water to the western parts of Dahanu and to Saphale village in Palghar? Are
commercial reasons a paramount consideration as in the case of supply of water to the
Mumbai metropolitan region?
Is work on the project complete? If not, how long will it take to complete work on the
canals and convey the water to the beneficiaries? Which interests (or certain
communities) are blocking the completion of the Surya project? One view is that the
farmers of Vangaon and western Dahanu have used their political clout to block the
completion of the project so as to benefit themselves of water? Do you believe this to be
the case?
7. How is the growing influence of urbanization and pressure on land impacting the
functioning of the Surya irrigation project?
8. Has there been an increase in land transactions, land leasing activity and distress
selling of land in the command area?
9. How would improved access to water halt or reverse downward socio-economic
mobility in the command area and its vicinity?
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10. In addition to irrigation water, what are the other inputs needed to improve
agricultural development indicators in the Surya command area communities?
11. How would you outline the various phases of water resources development in this
part of Thane over the past few decades? How have water resource development
practices evolved over time? Do you think the Surya project was some sort of a
“watershed” in Thane?
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